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Readings of the Constitution have changed. Sometimes they have changed because
the constitutional text has changed. But more often they have changed while the text has
remained the same. Can it be that these changed readings-changes that track no change
in constitutional text-can nonetheless be readings offidelity, faithful to the Constitution's
original meaning? On some readings of originalism, the answer must be no. But this essay
argues that any complete account of interpretive fidelity must allow-indeed require-
changes in constitutional readings even when there has been no change in the constitutional
text. f meaning is afunction of both text and context, the claim made here is that fidelity
in interpretation must accommodate changes in both. Drawing on the interpretive practice
of translation, the author models an argument of interpretive fidelity that tracks changes in
the background context, justifying changed readings as necessary translations to preserve
constitutional meaning in different interpretive contexts. Using this model, the author then
examines ten examples of changed readings unsupported by changes in text and argues that
these may best be understood, through the device of translation, as arguments based in
fidelity. Finally, the author points to limitations on a practice of fidelity as translation
present in the practice of literary translation itself. These suggest a practice of translation
in law that would not be as radical as first impressions may. suggest, and indeed, may be
required to understand some of the most significant moments in American constitutional
history.
I. Introduction
From Texas come a question and a claim, and together they raise the
subject of this essay.
First the claim. In an article published in this review just last year,
Nicholas Zeppos divided the world of interpretive practice (for statutes at
least) into three parts. At the core is a practice of originalism, a commit-
ment to "fidelity" needed to "counter anxiety over judicial lawmaking."1
Originalism, said Zeppos, "resolves interpretive questions in statutory cases
1166
1. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Uses ofAuthority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis,
70TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1992); see also Lino A. Graglia, 'Interpreting"the Constitution: Posner
onBork, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1019, 1019-22 (1992) ("Originalism is a virtual axiom of our legal-political
system, necessary to distinguish the judicial from the legislative function.").
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by asking how the enacting Congress would have decided the question." 2
Quoting Richard Posner, Zeppos continued, "Mhe judge should try to put
himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how they
would have wanted the statute applied to the case before him."' Or again,
[t]he judge's role [is] to re-create and then return to the time of
enactment to imagine what that Congress would have done had it
been confronted with [a] claim. This temporal aspect is critical to
the originalist's inquiry. The court asks only what the enacting
Congress would have done; subsequent events or the state of the
world today are not a basis for decision.4
As method, of course, originalism is not unchallenged, and Zeppos
contrasts its two main competitors. The first, what Zeppos called "dynam-
ic" or "public values theories," urges "courts to decide cases by applying
current public values or practical considerations." 5 These public values
schools teach that judges need to "focus on the current needs or values of
society," 6 that their method should be "'nautical' (not archeological) and
'dynamic' (not static),"7 and that "[tihe views, beliefs, or values of a
Congress long gone and unaware of the current structure of society are un-
likely to provide a useful or meaningful guide for decision."8 Thus, the
public values theories "openly acknowledge[] a role for evolutionary con-
siderations and societal values in the interpretive process." 9 The second
competitor of originalism, what we all call "textualist" theories, are more
ascetic,"° working to reduce the discretion of the originalist judge by
reducing the "potentially wide array of originalist sources."" Like ori-
ginalists, "textualists envision no role for the judiciary in updating statutory
law," but unlike originalists, textualists abstain from a broad view of the
2. Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1075.
3. Id. at 1078 n.22 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-87
(1985)).
4. Id. at 1079 (footnote omitted).
5. Id. at 1081, 1080, 1081-84. The leading "dynarmist" scholars are Alexander Aleinikoff,
William Eskridge, Daniel Farber, and Philip Frickey. See id. at 1074-75 n.3 (citing these authors'
major works). Cass Sunstein also embraces something close to the dynamist's method. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 157-59 (1990).
I discuss these scholars below at notes 32, 61, 191, and accompanyingtext (AleinikofO; notes 32, 51,
327, 350, and accompanying text (Eskridge); notes 26, 32, 59, 360 (Farber); and notes 32, 35, 37, 67,
193, and accompanying text (Sunstein). Dean Guido Calabresi's approach is obviously related, but,
as I argue below, distinct in significant ways. See infra note 351.
6. Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1081.
7. Id. (footnotes omitted).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1084.
10. See Larry Kramer, JudicialAsceticism, 12 CARDOzO L. REv. 1789, 1789 (1991) (arguing that
Justice Scalia's textualist approach is more accurately characterized as judicial asceticism than as
revisionist formalism).
11. Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1086, 1086-87.
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context within which a statute is written, fearing the judges cannot be
trusted with all that context may allow. 12
That is the claim-that interpretive theory divides into these three
schools, only the first of which (originalism) may claim for itself the virtue
of fidelity. Dynamic and textualist theories depart from fidelity, even if
they depart for good reason. Or so Zeppos suggests.
Now for the question. In a recent essay, Sanford Levinson asks "How
many times has the Constitution been amended?" 3 One might think this
a relatively simple question-after all, twenty-six (or is it twenty-seven?) 14
snippets of text have been appended to the constitutional text; therefore, the
Constitution must have been amended twenty-six (or twenty-seven) times.
But if by "amendment" one means "a legal invention not derivable from
the existing body of accepted legal materials," 5 then twenty-six (or
twenty-seven) amendments may be either too many or too few. Too many,
if some snippets of text were unnecessary (perhaps the Fifteenth Amend-
ment was immanent within the Fourteenth); too few if some changes
required, but received no, new snippets of text (the New Deal, for one ex-
ample; McCulloch v. Maryland,7 for another).
Focus on the second part of this puzzle-that there may have been
more amendments than snippets of new text. We all know that readings
of the Constitution have changed, even when the text read has remained the
same.' 8  At 'one time "Commerce ... among the several States"' 9 did
not allow spending to build highways;' ° at another, it authorized the regu-
12. Id. at 1085. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 62 (1988) (arguing that the use of original intent rather than an
objective inquiry into the reasonable import of the language increases the discretion and, therefore, the
power of the court).
13. Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change, 8 CONSr. COMMENTARY 409, 409
(1991).
14. On the (what ought to be) questionable status of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, see Richard
B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61
FORDHAM L. REv. 497 (1992).
15. Levinson, supra note 13, at 412.
16. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The rights of the citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.") with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
17. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN WoRDs LOSE THEIR MEANING
247-63 (1984).
18. See Sheldon D. Pollack, ConstitutionalInterpretation as Political Choice, 48 U. PITT. L. REV.
989, 989 (1987) ("Mhe very same constitutional text has at various times sanctioned the concepts of
slavery and human chattel, as well as racial discrimination and segregation.").
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20. Or so Madison thought. See James Madison, Veto Messages of the Presidents of the United
States, in SENATE Misc. Doc. No. 53, at 16-17 (1887).
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lation of the consumption of homegrown wheat.21 At one time "equal pro-
tection of the laws" permitted de jure racial segregation;' at another it
(arguably) requires mandated integration.' These different readings we
can call changed readings, and we can understand Levinson to ask how we
can tell when a changed reading is an amendment (an "invention") rather
than mere interpretation.'
But to ask this is to presume what Zeppos seems to deny-that some
changes can be changes offidelity. For the category "changes of fidelity"
appears nowhere in Zeppos's taxonomy. Constancy is the virtue of origin-
alism; change the vice (even if the necessary vice) of dynamism. Thus, in
Zeppos's scheme, once we know that readings are changed readings, dif-
ferent from those the originals would have given, we are already on to
justification, not of the readings, but of our act of interpretive infidelity.
With changed reading comes our expulsion from the domain of faithful
interpreters. Fidelity requires constancy; change betrays infidelity.
Now it may be a bit unfair to burden Nicholas Zeppos as standard
bearer of the originalists. After all, his important and original work was
an attempt to quantify (and question) the originalists' claim to interpretive
dominance. Nonetheless, he captures what I believe is a common under-
standing about the relationship between interpretive change and interpretive
fidelity, and one which I believe is, in important ways, mistaken.
The mistake is suggested by the following: We emerge from a genera-
tion where the badge of infidelity was affixed to those who desired to keep
the Constitution "in tune with the times." So charged the great fidelitist
Justice Black,' and before his righteousness have cowered the Constitu-
tion's tuners, defending their "adjustments" on grounds of necessity,
meekly attacking his rigidity with claims of impossibility. 6
21. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
22. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
23. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,217 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring and
dissenting) (holding that if a school system is determined to be a racially dual system, the school board
has an affirmative duty to desegregate the entire system).
24. Levinson, supra note 13, at 428 (suspecting that the problem may be insoluble).
25. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I will not
distort the words of the Amendment in order to 'keep the Constitution up to date' or to 'bring it into
harmony with the times.'"); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675-76 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("[Tihere is no constitutional support whatever for this Court to use the Due
Process Clause as though it provided a blank check to alter the meaning of the Constitution as written
so as to add to it substantive constitutional changes which a majority of the Court at any given time
believes are needed to meet present-day problems."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522
(1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting the philosophy that the Court has a duty to "keep the Consti-
tution in tune with the times"). Black of course was not first to voice this criticism. See West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Sutherland, I., dissenting) ("Mhe meaning of the
Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic events."), among others.
26. As Daniel Farber suggests,
Probably the most prevalent argument against originalism is that it is too static, and
19931 1169
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But just think of the image that Black's metaphor evokes. Is "tuning"
unfaithful? A concert pianist plays a series of outdoor concerts. On the
third night, the temperature falls dramatically, causing the piano to fall
"out of tune." Is it more faithful to Beethoven to leave the piano out of
tune? Would tuning the piano be the same kind of infidelity as adding a
couple of bars to the end of the first movement? Is there no difference
between tuning so the music sounds "the same" (the same?) and changing
the tempo or cutting some particularly dark passages so the music sounds
better? Is it really "tuning" when one makes the music sound better? Is
it really infidelity when one changes the music to make it sound the
same?27
What Black's metaphor misses is a distinction between fidelity and
change, a distinction that is the subject of this essay: Can an interpretive
change be interpretive fidelity and, if so, how can we know when?' For
we all know that sometimes fidelity to an original meaning requires doing
something different, and that, in those cases, doing the same thing done
before would be to change the meaning of what was done before. Take a
simple example to make the point: If a diplomat is ordered to "be polite"
while in Iraq (where belching after eating signals approval)29 and belches
loudly at the end of her meal, it would not befidelity to her order to belch
loudly at the end of her next meal with the British Monarch, even though
(in an importantly impolite sense) she would have done the same thing as
thereby disregards the need to keep the Constitution up to date with changing times.
Originalism is unworkable, then, even if the original intent can be reliably determined,
because originalism would make the Constitution itself unworkable.
Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guidefor the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1095
(1989). In Harper, 383 U.S. at 663, Justice Black restated the approach that he vehemently opposed
as he attacked it in his disseflting opinion:
The Court's justification for consulting its own notions rather than following the
original meaning of the Constitution... apparently is based on the belief of the majority
of the Court that for this Court to be bound by the original meaning of the Constitution
is an intolerable and debilitating evil; that our Constitution should not be "shackled to the
political theory of a particular era," and that to save the country from the original
Constitution the Court must have constant power to renew it and keep it abreast of this
Court's more enlightened theories of what is best for our society.
Id. at 677 (Black, J., dissenting).
27. The same question may be evoked by Sanford Levinson and J.M. Balkin's essay, Law, Music,
and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1598-99 (1991). Indeed, much of the question
that is the focus of this essay follows their analysis.
28. As John Wofford suggests, "It is misleading... to think of this choice as one in which words
are given either 'frozen' or 'dynamic' meanings." John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of
History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 520 (1967). But see Graglia, supra
note 1, at 1030 (asserting that "flexible interpretation" is "a euphemism for short-circuiting the
amendment process").
29. See DONALD HAWLEY, MANNERS AND CORRECT FoRM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 102 (1984)
(observing that though belching is never obligatory in the Arab world, some guests will mark their
appreciation by deep belches).
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before. Change here-bowing rather than belching-is fidelity. We all
know that this diplomat must do something different in Britain if she is to
do the same thing as in Iraq. She must change her act to remain faithful
to the original command-not to change her act would be to manifest infi-
delity.
Yet despite this that we all know, much of the debate over fidelity in
constitutional theory proceeds as if all this were forgotten. While origin-
alists sometimes say that we must apply the principles of the Framers and
Ratifiers to the circumstances of today," they more often behave as if the
question were simply (and always), "How would the originals have an-
swered this question then?"31 And while non-originalists usually claim
that weight should be given to the historical meaning of the Constitution,
rarely do they suggest just how this should be done. Thus, the extremism
of the strict originalist (decide cases now as they would have been decided
then) invites the extremism of the non-originalist (decide cases now as
would be now morally the best), and in between these extremes is lost our
understanding of what fidelity might be.
In this essay, I suggest we rethink our ideas of fidelity and change
with what is by now quite an old trope: translation.32 For if there is truth
30. See, e.g., Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J., concurring) ("[The
judicial duty] is to ensure that the powers and freedoms the framers specified are made effective in
today's circumstances."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1984).
31. See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2507 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that precisely what process is due is defined by historical
practices); Edwin Meese Ill, Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers
Division, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE25, 29 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds.,
1988) ("On every question of construction [we should] carry ourselves back to the time, when the
constitution was adopted; recollect the spirit manifested in the debates; and instead of trying [to find]
what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one, in
which it was passed." (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge William Johnson (June 12,
1823), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAs JEFFERSON 439, 449 (Albert E. Bergh ed., 1907))).
32. The notion of translation as a trope derives from THOMAS WILSON, THE ARTE OF RHETORIQUE
194 (facsim. reprod. 1962) (1553). Oxford describes a trope as a "procedure,' which captures well
the use of the term here. 18 OXFoRD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 581 (2d ed. 1989). As I discuss it below,
translation is a procedure for locating an application of fidelity in a current context. For a discussion
of tropological inference, not wholly in sync with my usage, see Scott Brewer, Note, Figuring the Law:
Holism and Tropological Inference in Legal Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 823 (1988).
In the sense in which I will describe the term below, the list of "translators,' or at least those
sketching a translator's argument, is quite long. The most famous of these is perhaps Dean Paul Brest
who, just over a decade ago, sketched the practice of the "moderate originalist" who aims to
'translate' the Constitution into the current context. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 205 (1980). Brest has been followed by others. See
Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional
"Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 599 (1985) (discussing a characterization of originalists as
attempting to project the Framers' intentions through time); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists,
73 VA. L. REV. 659, 672 (1987) ("To converse with the founders, you need a translator.'); Terrance
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1068, 1067-69 (1981) ("Constitu-
tional law thus emerges ... as a process by which each generation gives formal expression to the
Texas Law Review [Vol. 71:1165
values it holds fundamental in the operation of government."); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 407, 494-95 (1989) (casting judicial interpretation of
ambiguous statutes in terms of translating congressional intent to the current factual assumptions,
societal norms, and legal environment); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules LaidDown: A Critique
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983) ("[H]istorical
understanding requires an imaginative transposition of former world views into the categories of our
own."). The notion, of course, was not born with Brest. Perhaps its most creative pre-Brest appear-
ance was in an extraordinary piece by Felix Cohen, which linked the process of interpretation across
contexts to the theory of relativity, to suggest, "The achievements of modem mathematics and physics
. . . give ground for hoping that we shall some day achieve a powerful new organon for mutual under-
standing,-a theory of translation." Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE LJ.
238,272(1950). Most recently, James Boyd White has offered the most thoughtful discussion of legal
interpretation as translation in JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL
AND LEGAL CRITICISM 257-69 (1990) thereinafter WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION]. Much earlier,
Frances Lieber may have captured the essence of translation in his distinction between "interpretation"
and "construction." See FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 11, 44 (3d ed.
1880). Alfred Hill has also described a practice of constitutional interpretation that may, in result, be
quite similar to the translator's practice. See Alfred Hill, The Political Dimension of Constitutional
Adjudication, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (1990); see also Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as
Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELLL. REV.
1298, 1335-39 (1992) (analogizing the lawyer's role to that of a translator in that the lawyer bridges
the gap between the language used by the parties and that used by thejudge). And in political science,
Hanna F. Pitkin displays a work of translation as she explicates THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
(1967).
The notion of "translation" has not been solely the product of academics. Justice Jackson most
famously described the Court's task as one of translation in West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
639-40 (1943). See infra note 372. Similarly, Justice Brennan adopted the methodology of translation.
See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, in
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 31, at 13, 17. Justice Brandeis has also been
described as a great translator. See James B. White, Judicial Criticism, in INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE, supra note 31, at 393, 404 [hereinafter White, Judicial Criticism]. Charles Reich,
certainly the most ingenious of modem translators, has even found a way of reading Black's opinions
as translations-despite their apparent rejection of anything like "translation." Charles Reich, The
Living Constitution and the Court's Role, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT: A SYMPOSIUM
133, 139-49 (1967).
The approach sketched below comes closest in substance to that suggested by Brest, supra, and
in process to that Judge Posner describes as "imaginative reconstruction." See Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 817 (1983)
[hereinafter Posner, Statutory Interpretation] ("Thejudge should try to think his way as best he can into
the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to
the case at bar."). Posner analogizes the judge's role when interpreting statutes to that of a platoon
commander who may not receive the command of his superior officer and who must, therefore, "decide
what the commanderwould havewanted him to do, and act accordingly." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw
AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 253 (1988) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE]; see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE273-76 (1990) [hereinafter
POSNER, PROBLEMS] (explicating the military analogy and imaginative reconstruction); Richard A.
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 189-90, 199-201 (1986) [hereinafter Posner, Legal Formalism] (making
the military analogy); see also Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68
NEB. L. REv. 431, 449 (1989) [hereinafter Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation] (advocating a
'pragmatic approach" to statutory questions). The approach sketched here is distinct from Posner's
approach in ways that will be apparent below, but the counterfactual imagination required by both is
the same.
Finally, within private law, translation most directly patterns the doctrine of cy pres. For a dis-
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in the suggestion that Levinson's question raises-that there can be fidelity
in interpretation even if there is a change in a text's readings-then no
practice of language is more familiar with how change can be fidelity than
translation.33 The translator's task is always to determine how to change
one text into another text, while preserving the original text's meaning.
And by thinking of the problem faced by the originalist as a problem of
translation, translation may teach something about what a practice of in-
terpretive fidelity might be.
What follows is a sketch of a practice of fidelity in law, modeled on
a practice of translation in language. I use this sketch to examine ten
examples of changed readings in law, understood by many as changes of
infidelity. Under the model of fidelity as translation, I then ask whether
instead they can be understood as translations rather than infidelities.
As applied to these examples, however, the practice of translation will
appear quite unconstrained-as a model for activism rather than a guide to
restraint. I suggest this too may be misleading. For within the practice of
literary translation itself are constraints which, if carried to translation in
law, reveal limitations on the practice that are similar to the limitations of
traditional judicial restraint. I outline some of these limitations and suggest
how they may be understood as consistent, both with a practice of transla-
tion and with an ideal of restraint.
My aim in this essay is not to argue for or against fidelity as an inter-
pretive ideal. Instead my tack is internal. I take as given the judiciary's
(at least feigned) commitment to fidelity as its goal' and ask simply what,
given what we know about meaning and change, a practice of fidelity
would have to be. I conclude that a practice of fidelity would have to be
something like the practice of translation sketched below.
cussion of this similarity, see Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy,
78 GEo. L.J. 281, 310-11 (1989) (asserting that because rational legislators would favor a cy pres
interpretational approach, courts that engage in it can rightly claim to be implementing the legislators'
design).
This approach is also importantly distinct from three others that may appear on first glance to
be similar: Dean Guido Calabresi's view as discussed in GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE
AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Eskridge's approach as sketched throughout his articles, William N.
Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. LJ. 319 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1982); and Aleiikoff's theory as
described in T. Alexander Aleiikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988).
These three scholars have each developed extraordinarily important conceptions of evolutionary in-
terpretation. But each, while sensitive to the effect of context on preserving meaning, rests on this
unstated notion that change means infidelity. Or so I will suggest below.
33. I do not claim that the only usage of the word "translation" is as a practice of fidelity. Oxford
discusses a number of meanings that directly contradict such an ideal. See 18 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIoNARY 409-10 (2d ed. 1989).
34. Which, without doing the numbers, I believe is a safer assumption than that undermined by
Zeppos's work. See Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1099-1101 (arguing empirically that the originalist goal
of fidelity to the enacting legislature is not the Supreme Court's methodology).
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II. Changed Readings and Fidelity
To understand what a practice of interpretive fidelity would be, we
need to say something about the object of our fidelity: meaning. That is
the aim of this Part-first to sketch what it is about the nature of meaning
that raises the problem of interpretive fidelity, and second to provide a
language in which that problem can be addressed. The aim is not to pro-
vide a philosophical theory of meaning, though no doubt the way I speak
of fidelity relies upon a particular philosophical conception. The aim is
instead to speak of meaning in a way that, while artificial (and perhaps
weird), helps us focus on the necessary elements of a practice of interpre-
tive fidelity.
Begin with how meaning is made. Words are written in context. If
they have meaning, contextualists35 would say, they have meaning because
of this context. Their meaning depends on this context: The nature of the
context affects the text's meaning, and likewise changes in the context can
affect the text's meaning. Think of it like this: If meaning is what these
words do, then it is as if these words pull certain levers, press certain
buttons, or (for boomer children) tap certain keys on a keyboard; these
levers or buttons or keys are the context, and what this pulling or pressing
or tapping does depends upon how these levers or buttons or keys are
structured. If they are structured one way, they have one meaning; another
35. The world of these contextualists is of course well populated, reaching literary theorists and
philosophers. See, e.g., A.L. Becker, Biography of a Sentence: A Burmese Proverb, in TEXT, PLAY,
AND STORY: THE CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF SELF AND SOCIETY 135, 135 (Edward M.
Bruner ed., 1984); BEDRICH BAUMANN, IMAGINATIVE PARTICIPATION 189 (1975); STANLEY FISH,
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 2 (1989); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279, 304 (1985); Eugene A. Nida, Principles of Translation as
Exemplified by Bible Translating, in ON TRANSLATION 11, 14 (Reuben A. Brower ed., Oxford
University Press 1966) (1959); Burton Raffel, Translating Medieval European Poetry, in THE CRAFT
OF TRANSLATION 28, 50, 53 (John Biguenet & Rainer Schulte eds., 1989). Legal scholarship, too, is
populated by contextualists. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 526-27
(1989) (Stevens, J.); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.); Frigaliment Importing Co.
v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Friendly, J.); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-45 (Cal. 1968) (Traynor,
C.I.); POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 32, at 101-105, 247-55; WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION,
supra note 32, at 81; Brest, supra note 32, at 208; Cohen, supra note 32, at 241; Arthur L. Corbin,
The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 187 (1965);
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 416 & n.33, 418; Powell, supra note 32, at 674; White, Judicial Criticism,
supra note 32, at 404. Professor Davis describes a methodology of contextual legal criticism that is
essential to feminist legal study. See Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration
Exploring Hierarchy and "Feminine" Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1643 (1991) ("But the norms
and presuppositions that shape legal outcomes cannot be understood fully in the isolation of a judicial
opinion. They are shaped by a cultural context, and they emerge long before judges sit down to
compose their opinions.").
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way, another meaning. Any author choosing her meaning relies upon how
these contexts are structured.
Because meaning depends on context-or more simply, because
meaning depends on more than text alone-it should follow that the same
text written in two different contexts can mean quite different things ("Meet
me in Cambridge" written in England can mean something very different
from "Meet me in Cambridge" written in Massachusetts). 6 Likewise, a
different text written in two different contexts can mean the same thing
("Meet me in Cambridge, Mass." written in England can mean the same
thing as "Meet me in Cambridge" written in Massachusetts). Whether the
meaning between these contexts changes depends not just on whether the
text has remained the same, but also (if contextualism is right) on how the
contexts have remained the same.
Context matters, then-at least in writing. But if context matters in
writing, it must also matter in reading. Words are read no less than
written in context. And just as differences in meaning can follow from
differences in the context of writing (X means A here, but B there), so too
may differences in meaning follow from differences in the context of
reading or, more importantly, from the gap between the context of reading
and the context of writing (X means A when read here but B when read
there).37 The phrase "Branson was a public-school dropout," written and
read in America, would mean that Branson attended and dropped out of a
state-funded school. The same text written and read in England would
mean that Branson attended and dropped out of a private school. The same
text written in America and read in England would either confuse or simply
raise questions. 8 What its meaning was, what its author intended its
meaning to be, or what "those words would mean in the mouth of a normal
speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were
used"39 depends upon a judgment about the context against which we read
36. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 346 (1963), provides a good
example of this point. In this case, the Court held that a stock acquisition provision in § 7 of the
Clayton Act, though reenacted verbatim from an earlier amendment, "must be deemed expanded in its
new context." See also In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) ("What 'clearly' means
one thing to a reader unacquainted with the circumstances of the utterance-includingsocial conventions
prevailing at the time of the drafing-may mean something else to a reader with a different
background."); cf. Letter from James Madison to H. Lee (June 25, 1824), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRrTNos 441-43 (1884) (published by order of Congress) (discussing how changes in the meaning of
words present a problem for the constant interpretation of the Constitution); Letter from James Madison
to N.P. Trist (Mar. 2, 1827), in 3 LETERS AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra, at 565-66 (same).
37. Bo HANSON, APPuCATION OF RULES IN NEW SITUATIONS: A HERMENEUTICAL STUDY 13
(1977); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 493-94.
38. Hence when the Wall Street Journal writes "Mr. [Richard] Branson, an English public-school
dropout," only questions are raised. Ken Wells, High Flier: Adventure Capitalist is Nipping at the Tail
of Big British Airways, WALL ST. I., May 22, 1992, at Al.
39. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 417-18
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the text. Obviously, at times this judgment can be critical.
Between the context of writing and the context of reading, then, there
may arise an interpretive gap. And it is this gap that suggests the general
problem that gives rise to the subject of this essay. When the interpretive
gap is small-when the context of writing is very similar to the context of
reading-the confusion caused by differences between contexts may also be
quite small. Reading can proceed as if context did not matter. Judges can
say interpretation begins as always with the text read as if interpretation
really did involve just a text that is read.' ° When contexts remain alike
they may also remain invisible.
But when the gap is not small-when the differences between contexts
become quite large-then reading cannot proceed as if context did not
matter.41 Or at least it cannot so proceed if contextualism is correct and
the aim of the reader is something like interpretive fidelity. For if
contextualism is correct, and a change in context is ignored, the reader
may rewrite the writer's original meaning.
Consider a recent example that may better make the point.42 Former
Title 38, Section 3404(c) of the United States Code said that a veteran
could pay an attorney no more than ten dollars for services related to a
veterans' benefit suit.' In Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Sur-
vivors," the Supreme Court upheld this limitation against a challenge
based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Said the
Supreme Court, the government had an interest in keeping the benefits
proceedings simple and cheap, and this interest would be defeated if
attorneys were allowed to muck up the process.' Effectively barring
attorneys thus served a rational end, and the statute survived substantive review.
(1899). I do not mean that these formulations are equivalent. I mean only that whatever formulation
is selected, the same point applies.
40. See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 135 (1988); Goodyear Atomic Corp.
v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 183 (1988); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552,
557-58 (1990).
41. Referring to statutes, JudgeEasterbrookwrites: "Legislationspeaks across the decades, during
which legal institutions and linguistic conventions change. To decode words one must frequently
reconstruct the legal and political culture of the drafters." In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th
Cir. 1989). Cf. Edward S. Corwin, JudicialReview in Action, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 658 (1926)
("In the case of the Constitution... the question at once arises, whether this is the ordinary meaning
of 1789 or the present year of grace? The divergence is, naturally, at times a very broad one.").
42. Note that I offer the case here only for this limited point-that is, to show how meaning may
change. I later address the question of how to deal with the changes in meaning that a changing context
makes.
43. 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c) (1958), amended by 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(1) (1988). In 1988 Congress
amended this provision, replacing the ten-dollar attorney fee limit with a provision that allows attorneys
to collect a fee not in excess of 20% of any past due benefits awarded under certain circumstances.
Id. § 5904(d)(1) (Supp. 111 1991).
44. 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
45. Id. at 311,321-26.
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So far, so good-for a statute written in 1985. But the statutory limit
in Walters was written not in 1985, but rather derived from a statute
written in 1864. When written in 1864, its meaning' was to limit the
fees attorneys could charge, not to exclude lawyers from veterans' benefits
proceedings altogether.47 As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, ten
1868 dollars were the equivalent of some five hundred eighty 1985 dollars,
and five hundred eighty dollars in 1985 was certainly adequate for the ser-
vices an attorney would render.4 When enacted, the statute was a price
ceiling, and like all meaningful ceilings, it was set above the price floor.
But because of inflation-one kind of change in context-as read by the
Court in 1985 this ceiling had dropped below the price floor. The statute
as read became a complete barrier to acquiring lawyers' services, not
simply a limitation on reasonable rates. Whatever the meaning of the
statute Congress passed, it was not the meaning the Court applied.49 A
changing context had changed the statute's meaning.
Now what the proper response is to a change such as the one in Wal-
ters is a distinct question, and one I defer answering until the last Part of
this Article. (It is enough now to say that it certainly does not follow that
a proper response would have been to read "$10," say, as "$580," though
indeed, the example should suggest why it might.) The only point of the
example is just this: Between 1864 and 1985, the context of this statute had
changed in a dramatic way, at least with respect to the relative prices of
attorneys. If meaning is the use that words have, then that changing con-
text changed the meaning of these words. By ignoring, as the Court did,
the change that the context had effected, the Court read the words as if
context did not matter. But here context clearly did matter.
If context matters to meaning, and if contexts may change, then the
reader focused on fidelity needs a way to neutralize or accommodate the
effect that changing context may have on meaning. Fidelity, that is, needs
a way of reading that preserves meaning despite changes in context.
This I suggest we have not yet done, or have not yet done well. Too
much of legal interpretation proceeds as if all that mattered to meaning was
text, and hence, too much legal interpretation proceeds as if all that need
be focused upon is fidelity to text. Much fidelity does come from fidelity
to text,' but much is not all. Meaning is made from something in the
46. Or its purpose, or intent, or function or aim or effect or whatever else you want to say.
47. Id. at 360-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 361 (Stevens, .. , dissenting).
49. Another way to understand the oddness of the Court's result is to imagine that in 1980
Congress had changed the currency referred to in 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c) from dollars to schmallers, a
new currency set at 60 % of the value of the dollar. Clearly the Walters Court would then have faced
the question of which exchange rate to use-one indexed to 1868 or 1985.
50. Justice Scalia's opinion in Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990), is a good
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foreground (text) and something in the background (context). To preserve
meaning, both grounds must be tracked.
So how then should reading at a (contextual) distance proceed? How
can the effect of changing context be neutralized? In what follows, I begin
by sketching a way to speak of the question, and I then use this vocabulary
to hazard an answer.
How can we describe "context"? I have said that context affects
meaning, and that gaps between the context of writing and context of
reading make meaning vulnerable. But obviously not every change in con-
text makes meaning vulnerable. Meaning is only selectively vulnerable
because some changes in context just do not matter. And if meaning is
only selectively vulnerable, then we need a way to speak of those changes
that matter to meaning, distinct from those changes that do not.
Others have offered conceptions of context that range from the very
broad to the quite narrow.5" For our purposes "context" will be relatively
narrow. "Context" is just that range of facts, or values, or assumptions,
or structures, or patterns of thought that are relevant to an author's use of
words to convey meaning.52 Consider some examples. When a Briton
says, "Meet me in Cambridge," meaning Cambridge, England, an under-
standing about the referent of the word "Cambridge" is relevant to the
text's meaning, just as the time she spent in Cambridge may also be rele-
vant to the text's meaning (at least for her). When the diplomat belches at
the table after dinner, a particular custom of etiquette is relevant to the
text's meaning, just as the heartiness of the belch may be relevant to its
meaning. When a legislature sets a ceiling on the price of gasoline, the
market price of fuel may be relevant to the text's meaning (that it is below
the ceiling), but so too may the effect on a re-election bid be relevant to its
meaning. In each case, depending upon how broadly one wants to under-
stand "meaning," the facts mentioned are arguably relevant to under-
standing the author's use of the words. I will identify these facts as
"elements" of the text's context.
So understood, a context is comprised of elements arguably relevant
example. There, the eight-year litigation was shown to be premised upon a simple misreading of the
grammar of the statute. Id. at 78-85.
51. For Becker's attempt to catalogue contextual elements, see Becker, supra note 35, at 136.
Gadamer would include within these contexts "prejudgments" or "pre-understandings," terms that
connote the perspective of the interpreter much more than "context." Eskridge, Spinning Legislative
Supremacy, supra note 32, at 351 n.121. In what follows, I ignore everything the reader contributes
to context, though I confess I am ignoring something significant.
52. C. T. Tymoczko, Translation and Meaning, in MEANING AND TRANSLATION 29, 36 (F.
Guenthner & M. Guenthner-Reutter eds., 1978) ("Obviously, communists and capitalists disagree.
What I am arguing is that such disagreement can [affect] semantic analysis. Truth and meaning are not
separate topics. The actual economic practices of a society play a crucial role in the determination of
a correct assignment of meanings to its economic discourse.").
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to the use and interpretation of a text. These elements may change. They
change, or differ, whenever the context against which a text is read
changes or differs-that is, either when a text is juxtaposed against a
foreign context, or when the context from which the text emerges changes
or evolves. Elements evolve in the same way that the components of a
particular context are understood to evolve. For example: when the rele-
vant contextual element is the understanding of another conversant, that
element changes when the conversant or her understanding changes; when
the contextual element is a particular custom of etiquette, that element
changes when the custom evolves, or the community changes; when the
contextual element is a particular cost of production, that element changes
when the component costs of that production change. hy or how such an
element changes is for now unimportant-an understanding, for example,
may change because it is discovered to be mistaken, or because the prefer-
ences that underlie it themselves come to change. It is enough to note that
they change, and that this change may matter to meaning.
So much describes what "contexts" are and that they may change, and
that if they do change, meaning may change. But when does meaning
change? How can we tell whether a changed context has changed
meaning?
Doubtlessly, no formula will reveal when meaning between two con-
texts has changed, and nothing of what follows is meant to suggest any-
thing to the contrary. The judgment that meaning has changed is interpre-
tive, and its boundaries cannot be set in advance. And, as will become
clear when I discuss translation below, what changed meaning is may best
be understood as a function of the purposes of the text read.
Nonetheless, we need a way to speak of how meaning may change.
Even without a formula to divine changed from unchanged meaning gener-
ally, we can use what amounts to interpretive heuristics to understand at
least some conditions under which we would say that meaning has changed.
We can then use that understanding to model a practice in law that would
accommodate those changes. That, at least, is my intent here, and in what
follows, without purporting to suggest necessary or sufficient conditions for
changed meaning generally, I propose at least one way to observe that
meanings have been changed by context, to prepare for our exploring ways
to accommodate that change.
I have identified context as comprised by those elements arguably rele-
vant to an author's use of a particular text. Among those elements, some
will no doubt be more significant than others. We can say that the most
significant elements are not just relevant to an author's use, but are indeed
relied upon by the author when using the text-relied upon in just the sense
that had they been other than they were when the author first used these
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words, then the author would have used words other than she did.53 For
example, imagine I say to my friend, "Meet me in Cambridge tomorrow."
One could imagine that the price of a ticket to Cambridge is arguably rele-
vant to my request (the higher the price, the more significant the request
I am making). One could also imagine that the fact that my friend speaks
English is relevant to my request (if she only spoke French, then she would
not have understood what I said). Finally one could imagine that the dif-
ference between these two arguably relevant conditions could be that the
latter is relied upon in a sense that the former is not. It could be that had
my friend not spoken English, I would not have used the words I did, while
had the price of a ticket been greater, I still would have used the words
that I did. If this is so, then her speaking English was relied upon in a
sense that the price of a ticket was not.
I will call the elements of a context relied upon in the sense just
described a presupposition of the author's use of a text.' While any ele-
ment of an original context may change, and thus change something about
the significance of the text, when a presupposition changes something more
significant happens. When a presupposition changes, we imagine that the
author would have accommodated that change when she first used the text,
at least had she had the chance. Or alternatively, a presupposition marks
out those elements of an interpretive context that, had they been different,
would have led to a change in text. So in the example just given, my
friend's ability to speak English was a presupposition of my request that
she "meet me in Cambridge tomorrow" in just the sense that had she not
spoken English, I would have said something different-for example,
"Rencontre-moi demain A Cambridge."
So understood, I will use "presupposition" as a shorthand for tracking
changed meaning. If between two contexts a presupposition has changed,
53. Compare Chief Justice Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward:
It is more than possible, that the preservation of rights of this description was not
particularly in the view of the framers of the constitution, when the clause under
consideration [impairments of contracts] was introduced into that instrument... . It is
not enough to say, that this particular case was not in the mind of the Convention, when
the article was framed, nor of the American people, when it was adopted. It is necessary
to go farther, and to say that, had this particular case been suggested, the language would
have been so varied, as to exclude it, or it would have been made a special exception.
The case being within the words of the rule, must be within its operation likewise, unless
there be something in the literal construction so obviously absurd, or mischievous, or
repugnant to the general spirit of the instrument, as to justify those who expound the
constitution in making it an exception.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 644-45 (1819).
54. Compare Collingwood's description: "Whenever anybody states a thought in words, there are
a great many more thoughts in his mind than are expressed in his statement. Among these there are
some which stand in a peculiar relation to the thought he has stated: they are not merely its context,
they are its presuppositions." R.G. COLLINOWOOD, AN ESSAY ON MErApHYsics 21 (1940).
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then I will say that the same text in the second context has a different
meaning. And where meaning has changed in this sense, a problem of
interpretive fidelity is raised-that is, the reader must accommodate for this
changed presupposition if she is to be faithful to the text's original
meaning.
This formulation of changed meaning needs careful qualification, and
even as qualified, it is only a partial understanding and, in some ways,
quite misleading. First the qualifications: As I suggested before, I do not
claim that changed meaning is coextensive with changed presuppositions,
at least if "coextensive" means that a changed presupposition is a necessary
condition of changed meaning. Again everything depends upon one's con-
ception of meaning,55 and depending upon that conception, meaning may
change even when a presupposition has not. But everything that follows
in this Article can stand while remaining agnostic about a particular con-
ception of meaning, as long as our conception remains broadly context-
ualist. So long as the conception is contextualist at some extreme the
problem that is the focus of this essay will arise, and when it does, the
need for something like the response of this Article will be presented as
well.
More qualifications: As I have narrowed the notion of presuppositions,
my analysis hangs on the idea that a text in an original context would have
differed had that context differed in relevant respects. One could well be
skeptical about this judgment56 (though I think that there are limits even
to this skepticism): how could we know what would have been done? Must
we imagine that the author (a person or a collective) would actually have
redrafted the text in a particular or different way? What possible relevance
could an author's possible response to a changed presupposition have for
us now? These questions are devastating if one conceives that the first
virtue of the interpreter is certainty, determinability, or full confidence.
One cannot be certain about these judgments; these judgments will not lead
to a determinate answer; and whatever answer these judgments yield,
neither the answer nor the judgments will inspire the confidence of all who
understand them.
But the premise of this exercise is that a different virtue stands first
in the interpreter's schedule-the virtue of fidelity to meaning. Fidelity
may well impose high costs on certainty and determinism,' and it may
55. And I expect no clear guidance from a chameleon term such as "meaning"; Ogden and
Richards collect some 16 definitions of this arch-ambiguity. C.K. OGDEN & I.A. R CHARDS, THE
MEANING OF MEANING 186-87 (8th ed. 1947); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, 'Meaning" in the Law
of Contracts, 76 YALE L. 939, 940-42 (1967).
56. See Brest, supra note 32, at 221 ("When the interpreter engages in this sort of projection, she
is in a fantasy world more of her own than of the adopters' making.").
57. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 163 (1990) ("We must not expect too
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well be that those costs dominate any benefit that fidelity may confer. But
before we reckon the costs, we must understand what the method of fidelity
would be. And to do that, we must put to one side questions of certainty
and determinism, at least until the outlines of the fidelitist's method are
clear.
A final oddity must be noted. I have suggested that we could imagine
a changed text following from a changed presupposition, as if presupposi-
tions could be individuated and separately accounted. No doubt this sug-
gestion is greatly misleading. One presupposition will never change alone,
and it will never be clear how to account for any number of presupposi-
tions that could change at a given time. And despite the relative simplicity
of the model so far sketched, the whole aim of the ten examples that follow
is to reveal something about the complexity that emerges from multiple
changes in a text's presuppositions. Again, despite the picture of a method
of mechanics, the fidelitist's method will be an art of judgment.
These qualifications made, and some saved for later, we can turn now
to the application of these general ideas to interpretation in law. If this
idea of contextuality is a general feature of meaning, then what follows will
be a particular application to meaning in legal texts, informed by a practice
designed precisely to accommodate changes in context-translation.
III. Step One of Fidelity: Contextualists
Turn now from the question of how meaning may change and consider
the notion of fidelity-the promise to constrain the range within which
meaning may change. Firm within our legal culture is the conviction that
if judges have any duty it is a duty of fidelity to texts drafted by others,
whether by Congress or the Framers; that applications of those texts, as
Levinson suggests, be drawn from the "existing legal material" 8 however
defined, and that the aim must be to preserve that material. That, as Judge
Easterbrook describes this, judges carry out decisions they do not make. 9
That is the ideal; the question is how the ideal is to be realized.
Our discussion of contextualism suggests that if the aim is fidelity,
then the initial step must be to read the text in its originating context,
finding its meaning there first.' Nothing compels us to select that
much of the search for original understanding in any legal context. The result of the search is never
perfection; it is simply the best we can do . .
58. Levinson, supra note 13, at 417.
59. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984); see also Farber, supra note 32, at 281-82 (discussing the extent to which
judges are constrained by statutory language and legislative intent).
60. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common Con-
cerns of an Unlikely Pair, in INTERPRMhING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 31, at 115, 122 ("A
different approach is taken by the contextualist, who does not begin with the text alone. His approach
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context-we could, for example, choose to read the text against the current
context, or some other context.6 But if the choice of context affects
meaning, then for a fidelitist, there is something deeply troubling about this
unhitched way of reading normative texts. If we could pick the context,
we could pick the meaning. Reading, as one originalist put it, would
become "a picnic to which the framers bring the words and the judges the
meaning."62
Thus among fidelitists, the first step of reading is contextual. But
after this first step, practices separate. Indeed, two very different ap-
proaches have emerged, one that I will call "one-step fidelity," and the
other "two-step fidelity. " ' Even if both types of fidelitists agree that
fidelity begins with a contextualist reading, after this first step the one-step
and two-step diverge. For with this first step, the one-step believes the
problem of fidelity both begins and ends-that once we find meaning in the
originating context (the context of writing) we simply apply that meaning
in the context of application (the context of reading) as if any differences
between the context of writing and the context of reading just did not
matter. Fidelity, the one-step believes, means applying the original text
now the same as it would have been applied then. As Robert Bork puts it:
"What is the meaning of a rule that judges should not change? It is the
meaning understood at the time of the law's enactment.""
But this approach, the two-step believes, ignores a crucial step, and
to see just why, we need to say something more about the nature of the
texts the two-step reads.
requires him to begin with the text together with its surroundings. He must build a theory of meaning
that links text and context."). The appeal of such a method may be obvious, though as I describe
below, a contextualized reading is neither the only reading, nor is the contextualist the only reader.
61. Aleinikoff discusses the approach of those who would read the statute as if passed today in
Aleinikoff, supra note 32, at 49-51. Such a way of reading is the literal import of Justice Brennan's
injunction, speaking of the Constitution, that "the ultimate question must be, 'What do the words of
the text mean in our time?'" Brennan, supra note 32, at 17. Professors Redish and Drizin, moreover,
have explicitly advanced such a way of reading the Constitution, under the theory of the "modem
understanding" textualist. MartinH. Redish&KarenL. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism andJudicial
Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1987) ("[l]n most instances the
Constitution's textual limits can reasonably be derived from modem understanding of the specific
terminology."). Finally, this may be the best way to read Rust v. Sullivan, I11 S. Ct. 1759 (1991),
in which the Court permitted the Department of Health and Human Services to adopt a reading of an
abortion-related statute that most likely would not have been permissible in the context of the statute's
enactment. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1788 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of this decontex-
tualized way of reading, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSs JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 386-87
(1988).
62. Meese, supra note 31, at 38 (quoting Brief for the United States at 24, Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495)).
63. As should be clear, these two types of fidelitists are ideal types. No one is a pure one-step
or a pure two-step. My aim in describing the world of fidelitists like this is simply heuristic.
64. BORK, supra note 57, at 144.
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The lawyer reads normative texts. What distinguishes normative texts
from other texts is that normative texts are not just read in context, but are
also applied in context. A tort system, for example, may have a statute
that says, "Exercise reasonable care." As applied in, say, the context of
authorship, a court could conclude that D, who drove sixty-five miles per
hour down a narrow, curving road and caused an accident, did not exercise
reasonable care, and is therefore liable. The text's meaning (the meaning
of the words "exercise reasonable care") is derived against the original
context; the application's meaning (D is liable) is derived against the ori-
ginal context as well. In that original context we can say that the appli-
cation's meaning must be consistent with the text's meaning.
If we speak of the application's meaning, then we must consider the
application itself to be a text. And as with any text, its meaning is a
function of its context. Here, then, begins the problem faced by the two-
step. For while contextualism teaches that we read the original text in the
original context, we have no choice but to make an application, not in the
original context, but in the current context. If the original and current con-
texts differ, then the meaning of the same application in the two contexts
may differ as well. So again (and obviously), if in the second context, D
was driving sixty-five miles per hour down the same road that has been
straightened and widened to standards of a major artery then our applica-
tion of the text (D is liable) should be different (D should not be liable).
And if we applied the text in the second context just as we applied it in the
first context, the application in the second context would be inconsistent
with the meaning of the text in the first.
This potential inconsistency, raised by the different contexts of appli-
cation, we can call the problem of dual contexts. We can summarize the
problem by saying that with any normative text, there are in effect two
texts, a normative text and an application whose meaning is to be consistent
with that normative text. If the context between the normative text and the
application changes, then the meaning of the application may now be in-
consistent with the normative text's original meaning.
What distinguishes the two-step fidelitist from the one-step is that the
two-step seeks a way to preserve the meaning of the application in just the
way the one-step agrees we should preserve the meaning of the text. The
one-step and two-step read a text against its original context so that its
meaning in the original context is preserved; the two-step reads the
meaning of the application as applied in the current context so that the
meaning of the application is the same in the original and current con-
text.' Thus, while the one-step applies the text now and here just as it
65. See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication, 82
NW. U. L. REv. 226, 230 (1988) ("[J]udges are to apply the rules of the written constitution in the
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would have been then and there,'a the two-step asks how to apply the text
now and here so as to preserve the meaning of an application then and
there-how, that is, to make the meaning of the current application equiva-
lent to the meaning of an original application,67 or alternatively, how to
translate the original application into the current context.68
To help see the difference between the methods of the one-step and the
two-step, consider a recent case interpreting the scope of the Eighth
Amendment, Harmelin v. Michigan.'
The Eighth Amendment proscribes punishments that are cruel and unu-
sual.' Though inspired by the practice of some English courts to apply
sense in which those rules were understood by the people who enacted them." (emphasis in original));
David A.L Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 489, 515 (1985)
("Original understandings of application are just that: the way in which one age, in its context and by
its lights, construed these abstract intentions.").
66. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment is to be
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted
... ."); Raoul Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation . The Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 25 (1986) (quoting the Senate Judiciary Committee report on the Fourteenth
Amendment to say that "[a] construction which would give the phrase... a meaning differ[ent] from
the sense in which it was understood and employed by the people when they adopted the Constitution,
would be as unconstitutional as a departure from the plain and express language of the Constitution"
(ellipsis in original)); Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It
Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1029, 1030-31 (1977) ("[Slince the authors of the Constitution
proposed, and the people accepted, a certain document as the supreme law of the land, what was meant
at that time should still be legally controlling."); Richards, supra note 65, at 505 (stating Raoul
Berger's stance that if history shows language would apply to X and not Y "the failure to apply the
language to X or its application to Y is a wrong and abusive interpretation of the meaning of the
constitutional text").
67. Compare Pollack's discussion of the practice of hermeneutics. See Pollack, supra note 18,
at 1007-08 (concluding that the nearest we can come to an "original" understanding of the Constitution
is by transposing original conceptions into our contemporary conceptual framework); see also Peter
Goodrich, Historical Aspects of Legal Interpretation, 61 IND. L.J. 331, 347 (1986) (stating that in
Gadamer hermeneutics is the doctrine of translation and suggesting that the doctrine "has a peculiar
relevance to legal hermeneutics"); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 494-95 (discussing the judicial
construction of statutes that have been rendered ambiguous by changed contexts).
68. This notion that the meaning remains constant while the applications change, to account for
changed contexts, is of course familiar. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory
of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. Rsv. 1189, 1197 (1987) ("mhe reader, even in
assessing arguments about 'plain meaning,' will understand that she is reading a constitutional text,
which implies that the language is situated in an interpretive tradition and must be read with at least
a tacit awareness of the range of extratextual concerns that constitutional interpretation conventionally
takes into account."); Wofford, supra note28, at 521 ("[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties
never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation." (quoting Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 367 (1926))); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 451 (1934) (Sutherland, I., dissenting) ("[Mieaning is changeless [while] application ... is ex-
tensible.").
69. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
70. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Texas Law Review
punishments far outside any statutory sanction,71 as applied to federal
courts the original English proscription would have been empty-not in the
sense that the Third Amendment (prohibiting the quartering of troops) has
been rendered empty by changing contexts72-but in the sense that it never
would have had a constitutional function, again, as applied to federal
courts. Since there is no federal criminal common law,' the only punish-
ments federal courts could impose were those prescribed by statute. Any
attempt to assess a stricter penalty would violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.
For the Eighth Amendment to have had any meaning in the American
scheme, then, it must have had a meaning other than its original English
meaning. This much even the staunchest of the Supreme Court's original-
ists believes.74 But the question is how much more the amendment pro-
scribes. To answer this, the one-step looks to the original context of its
application and asks how it would have been applied there-what, in the
original context, was viewed as cruel and unusual. And having completed
this step, the one-step then applies the text as it would have been applied
then to the punishments that are being assessed now. Since it was not then
viewed as cruel to punish any felon, regardless of the offense, with death,
the one-step could conclude proportionality was not originally seen as a
factor relevant to the determination whether a punishment was cruel or
unusual. Since proportionality was not then a factor, it is not now a factor,
and hence now it is permissible to punish a felon with life in prison, even
when the felony is, say, mere possession of an illegal narcotic.75
This was the reading of the Court's most consistent originalist-Justice
Antonin Scalia-and it suggests a general methodology that Scalia has not
been slow to apply. When, as enacted, the constitutional text resolved a
question or, more precisely, when a practice was not proscribed at the time
the provision was enacted (here disproportionate punishment) then that ends
71. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2687-91.
72. The Third Amendment reads: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S.
CONST. amend. III.
While the Amendment has been invoked as evidence of constitutional protection of individual
privacy from governmental intrusion, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967), it has in
general been "ignored because it is of no current importance whatsoever." Sanford Levinson, The
Embarrassing SecondAmendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 641 (1989).
73. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). But see Gary D.
Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and
the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919 (1992) (asserting that federal
common-law criminal jurisdiction did exist until Hudson & Goodwin).
74. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2691-92 (Scalia, J.).
75. In Harmelin, the Court upheld a Michigan statute that imposed life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for possession of an illegal narcotic (m Harmelin's case, about 22 ounces of
cocaine). Id. at 2681.
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the constitutional inquiry from that time forward. Contra Justice Frank-
furter's view that "basic rights do not ... become petrified,"76 Justice
Scalia believes that they do-at least until democrats intervene.
But note that even this one-step fidelitist is not unflinching, and from
his grimaces we may catch a glimpse of the problems with one-step fidelity
itself. Consider Justice Scalia's first consideration in print of the scope of
the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause-not the
Court's Harmelin decision, but his essay on originalism published two
years before.' There Justice Scalia discussed flogging-a punishment
common at the time of the Founding (though not at the time of the Four-
teenth Amendment)78 and hence not a punishment that would have been
considered "cruel" or "unusual." Since a punishment must be both cruel
and unusual, and flogging was then neither, for the originalist flogging
would seem to be a clearly constitutional mode of punishment.
But Justice Scalia blinked. Okay, so flogging was a perfectly respect-
able punishment in 1791. But come on-flogging today? Few federal
judges, said Scalia, would stand for it in a society such as ours.79 Even
he, Scalia seemed to confess, would be "weak" enough to find something
problematic in a statute (certainly constitutional in 1791) that, for example,
required public flogging for adultery.'
Now what would explain this hesitation in originalism's leading jurist?
Is the problem here anything more than weakness of the will, a kind of
judicial akrasia?8' Is not the flogging example a paradigm of constitution-
ality, under the one-step fidelitist's conception?
The difficulty the consistent one-step faces is revealed if we return to
the discussion of why meaning may change. As I said, a text's meaning
may change when context changes. Here the text is an application, and as
I have suggested, the meaning of an application is no less a function of
context than is the meaning of a text. But the one-step does not focus on
the meaning of the application in context, or indeed, on the context of
application itself, so any change in the meaning of an application due to a
change in the context of application will be wholly missed by the one-step.
76. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.).
77. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
78. Amar and Widawsky rely on scholarship showing that "by the mid-nineteenth century, the lash
was considered too 'cruel' for the punishment of 'free men,' but was still commonly used on slaves."
Akhil R. Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to
DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1375 n.65 (1992); see also State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514, 516
(Del. 1963) (remarking on Delaware statutes that had limited the number of crimes for which the
punishment of whipping could be imposed).
79. Scalia, supra note 77, at 861.
80. Id. at 864.
81. Or again, weakness of the will. Cf. Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts
and Crimes: Toward an Economic Theory of the Will, 11 INT'L REV. OF LAW & ECON. 149 (1991).
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She will apply the text now as if now were then, with the result that (at
times) the meaning of the application now will be different from the
meaning of the application then.
More concretely, the reading here is an application of the constitu-
tional proscription against "cruel and unusual punishments." Such a pro-
scription must embrace something about the presuppositions of a culture-
namely what that culture views as cruel and unusual. At one time, flog-
ging was not viewed as cruel; for us, now, flogging is "cruel and
unusual." If we were to proscribe "cruel and unusual punishments" now
we clearly would be proscribing flogging. If the reader ignores this change
in presuppositions, then her reading will change the meaning of the text.
An application of the Eighth Amendment that permitted flogging would be
an application that permitted, rather than proscribed, cruel and unusual
punishments.' Or again, reading the amendment in the same way in this
different context would be to read into the text a different meaning.
Now of course I don't mean to suggest that all texts are like the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, nor that no other issues matter when
addressing the interpreter's virtue of fidelity. Plenty-perhaps most-legal
texts are more or less autonomous from the cultural context in just the
sense that aspects of the nonlegal context can change without drawing into
question those "relatively autonomous" texts. For these texts, little or no
accommodation is required to account for changes in the cultural context;
for them, "translation" would have little role. And even if fidelity were
to require translation, there may be other, independent reasons for limiting
or rejecting such accommodation: fidelity, that is, may be trumped by other
values.
My only point thus far is to isolate what it is about the one-step's
method that leads to the conclusion that she will systematically defeat the
ideal of fidelity. Something does: In at least some cases, the one-step
originalist, by ignoring changes in context, changes rather than preserves
meaning. In these cases, the one-step originalist defeats rather than ad-
vances fidelity.
82. Scalia responds to this idea, arguing that as between a reading of "cruel and unusual for the
age in question" and "cruel and unusual in 1791 " we have no "textual or historical evidence" of which
reading the Framers intended. Scalia, supra note 77, at 861-62. But besides the pointjust made-that
it would be at a minimum odd for a "Constitution" Cm the emphatic sense of McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)) to permit a cruel and unusual punishment simply because it was
not "cruel and unusual" in 1791-there is at least the textual evidence suggested by the failure of the
clause to say "the cruel and unusual punishments." And if there is textual evidence suggesting one
reading over the other, one might wonder whether at a minimum the burden should shift to one who
would maintain the contrary.
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IV. Step Two of Fidelity: Translation
One-step fidelity-originalism in some of its forms-fails to preserve
meaning across interpretive contexts. It fails because, although sensitive
to the effects of context upon meaning in the original context, it is blind
to the effects of context upon the application meaning in the application
context. If context counts in one case, it ought to count in both, or so the
two-step argues.
The same insight that helped isolate the blindness of the one-step thus
provides a clue to the method of the two-step. For if the failure of the
one-step was her neglect of context in application, then the hallmark of the
two-step is her attention to context in application. Like the one-step, the
two-step understands that changed context can affect meaning; unlike the
one-step, the two-step applies this understanding to the meaning of an
application. The two-step's aim is to preserve original meaning, not just
in the original context but as applied in the current context.
What the two-step needs is a method to neutralize the effect of
changed context on an application's meaning. As we shall soon see, the
method the two-step suggests is a device called translation.' In what
follows, I develop a sketch of this practice of translation and suggest its
link to a practice of interpretation in law. Once this sketch is complete, I
will turn to examples in legal interpretation which I believe manifest this
practice that the two-step hopes to model.
A. Step Two: The Link to Translation
In its commonsense meaning, translation is that process by which texts
in one language are transformed into texts of another language, by con-
structing a text in the second language with the same meaning as the text
in the first. As one commentator has put it, "To translate from one lan-
guage into another is to express in one language what is said in the other.
This involves the formulation of sentences in one language which have the
same meaning as sentences of the other.""
How can this commonplace practice answer the two-step's need?
The two-step seeks a process that neutralizes the effect of changed
context on a text's meaning; translation is a practice that neutralizes the
effect of changed language on a text's meaning, where language is just one
part of context, and changed language is just one kind of change in con-
text.' If translation is a device developed to accommodate contextual
83. See supra Part ]].
84. Howard Sankey, Incommensurability, Translation and Understanding, 41 PHIL. Q. 414, 416-
17; see also Goodrich, supra note 67, at 348 (stating that hermeneutics provides the rules for
rediscovering the intent of the original author of a text).
85. Language change may or may not be the most extreme kind of change. For example, a
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changes of one type (language), the two-step suggests, perhaps it can be
adapted to contextual changes of other types as well.
The two-step sees in commonsense translation a model for interpretive
fidelity generally, just as theorists of translation see in translation a clue to
communication generally. As one theorist has put it, one need move very
little from commonsense translation to see how it is just a special case "of
the process of communication and reception in any act of human
speech."86 For in every act of reading or understanding, we read what
was said against the background of some context, find a meaning, and
carry that meaning into a context of our own.' If these interpretive con-
texts differ, not just in language, but also "by distance in space and time
within a single language,"8 then, in a sense, translation of some form al-
ways occurs. Commonsense translation is just a special case of the process
of translation that occurs everywhere. 9 Or again,
In using language one shapes old words into new contexts
pushing old language into the present. All language use is in this
sense translation to some degree; and translation from one language
to another is only the extreme case.'
Every act of communication, the theorist of translation asserts, is an
act of translation. And if so, then what distinguishes among communica-
tions is simply the extent to which this process of translation is more or
less self-conscious, or the extent to which the translators are conscious of
the role the background has on meaning in the foreground. So as a matter
of description, we could array cases along a dimension that tracks the
closeness of the interpretive contexts between the source and target texts
(so that at one end stand cases of translation between languages, and at t~e
other cases of communication within a community). And when so arrayed,
we would also have aligned cases by the extent to which a process of trans-
conceptual change between English and French today may be less significant than the change between
the English spoken in 1540 and the English spoken today.
86. GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION 414 (1975); see
also Rainer Schulte & John Biguenet, Introduction to THEORIES OF TRANSLATION 1, 7-8 (Rainer
Schulte & John Biguenet eds., 1992) (discussing the view that language itself is essentially a form of
translation due to the plurality of meanings for all words).
87. See Cohen, supra note 32, at 271.
88. Reuben A. Brower, Introduction to ON TRANSLATION, supra note 35, at 3; see also
MACINTYRE, supra note 61, at 372 ("[W]hen a tradition is expressing itself within a linguistic
community whose language is not the originating language of that tradition,... it can only present its
relationship to its past through a recognition of the presence of the originating language, and indeed
of any intermediate languages, within the language in which it is now spoken and written.").
89. "There are always two worlds, the world of the text and that of the reader, and consequently
there is the need for Hermes to 'translate' from one to the other." RICHARD E. PALMER,
HEtmENE.UTIcS31 (1969).
90. Becker, supra note 35, at 135; see also STEINER, supra note 86, at 47 ("[I]nside or between
languages, human communication equals translation." (emphasis omitted)).
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lation is ordinarily self-conscious or apparent.9 At one extreme (where
languages differ) the process of translation is quite explicit; at the other
(where speakers are contemporaries) the process of "translation" is impli-
cit. Between the extremes are cases that are more complex-constitutional
interpretation, for example, where the language is nominally the same but
the interpretive contexts are radically different. In such cases, the theorist
of translation suggests, we could advance fidelity by acting as if this intra-
language reading were interlanguage translation, focusing explicitly on the
differences in interpretive context and the effect such differences have on
meaning.
This understanding suggests that the link between translation and legal
interpretation operates on the level of theory.' But it is not just this link
in epistemology that draws the legal interpreter to the practice of trans-
lation. In addition to theory, the legal theorist is drawn by the translator's
practice itself. On the level of practice, because translation offers a rela-
tively well-developed craft and long-developed history, it may guide a
method for reading contextually distant legal texts. Two aspects of the
translator's practice are crucial to the two-step's practice in particular, and
we should flag them here to help us understand something of translation's
appeal-first, the translator's power to change text; second, the methodo-
logical maturity and apparent neutrality of the translator's craft.
Consider first the power to change text. The translator accommodates
one type of contextual change, a change in language. Until this contextual
change occurs, the translator is powerless; once this change occurs, the
translator is empowered to change text. On one level this change is just
nominal-at a minimum the translator must change word X in language A
to Y in language B. Think of the scene from Fail Safe,' in which the
President (Henry Fonda) is holed up in a closet-like room with only his
translator (Larry Hagman), and they are speaking via the hot line to the
Soviet Premier about the nuclear holocaust they are about to unleash. In
no situation could the words of the Soviet Premier be more important, and
yet, to reach across the gap in interpretive contexts, this low-level bureau-
crat, apparently not even thirty, changes the Premier's words to convey the
Premier's meaning to the President. The Premier says X, the translator
says the Premier says Y, and the fate of the world hangs on there being a
relationship of a particular kind between the meaning of X in Russian and
Y in English.
91. C. STEINER, supra note 86, at 392-93 ("The delineation of'resistant difficulty,' the endeavour
to situate precisely and convey intact the 'otherness' of the original, plays against 'elective affinity,'
against immediate grasp and domestication.").
92. Rainer Schulte and John Biguenet make a similar point with respect to interpretation generally.
See Schulte & Biguenet, supra note 86, at 7-9.
93. FAIL SAFE (Columbia Pictures 1964).
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This sanction to change text is precisely the sanction the two-step
fidelitist seeks-the power, in effect, to change an original text in light of
a changing interpretive context (though, fortunately, the two-step need not
often confront issues of nuclear war). The legislature said X, and the two-
step, respecting the change in interpretive contexts, wants to say Y, because
only Y will mean now what X meant then. The two-step seeks a practice
that empowers her to change in the name of fidelity, and translation is the
model for any such practice.
A second aspect of the translator's craft is also crucial to translation's
appeal. At first glance, the practice of translation appears quite unprob-
lematic: it appears to invite little judgment or discretion by the translator,
it appears to be objective, and it appears to provide a clear methodology
for the radical transformation that it effects. We trust the translator in Fail
Safe, at least in part, because the process seems to require little judgment
from him: the Soviet Premier speaks in Russian, and a translator, appar-
ently automatically and without thought, says the same thing in English to
the President. The two-step seeks this appearance of neutrality and
objectivity-the appearance of engaging little judgment or discretion as she
transforms one application of a legislative text into another. The more the
process appears a process of translation, the more the two-step hopes to
adopt translation's unproblematic nature.
Both elements of the ordinary translator's practice are crucial to the
two-step fidelitist. For put both together and they suggest an immense
power in the translator that nonetheless, by its nature, appears to be
constrained: the power to rewrite the words of others, constrained by a
methodology that promises to keep the product the product of its author,
not the translator. Fidelity as translation takes on all of the attraction of
a pre-Realist judicial mind: powerful, though neutral; flexible, though
serving the will of others.
This hope for the peace of the pre-Realist mind, together with the duty
of fidelity, invites further exploration of the translator's craft. What can
law gain from the lessons of the practice of translation? Or at least, what
can fidelity in law gain?
B. Step Two: The Practice of Translation
To understand what can be learned from the practice of translation, we
need to look more extensively at that practice itself. In this section I
outline some of the questions raised by the practice of translation itself and
connect these queries back to what I believe are the same questions in the
practice of legal interpretation. Translation and legal interpretation share,
I suggest, a common core of interpretive problems, and by exploring this
link, even if we weaken preconceptions about the strength of translation,
we may strengthen notions of the strength of legal interpretation. What
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will emerge from this sketch is first, and unsurprisingly, the immense
power that the translator has to recreate a text that preserves meaning; and
second, and more surprisingly, that because of a responsibility that this
power suggests, the translator act with an ethic that I will call "humility."
Both of these elements will be crucial to the two-step's practice in law.
While the history of translation, both as a practice and as a subject of
critical reflection, is long, the number of significant ideas is, as one
commentator put it, "meagre": "Over some two thousand years of argu-
ment and precept, the beliefs and disagreements voiced about the nature of
translation have been almost the same. Identical theses, familiar moves
and refutations in debate recur, nearly without exception, from Cicero and
Quintilion to the present-day."'
In part this history describes a conflict over how best to achieve
fidelity-what fidelity is and how it is practiced.95 And perhaps unsur-
prisingly, as one considers the vast range of translated texts (poetry, prose,
instruction manuals for Christmas toys), no simple or obvious formula for
fidelity has emerged.' Among theoretical contenders we can select three
general approaches. At times, a practice of strict literalism or word-for-
word translation prevailed; at other times, a more liberal practice of faith-
ful but autonomous restatement that captured the meaning of an original
work with a text more natural to the target language; and finally, at times
a far less restrained practice of imitation, namely creating parallel texts
within the idiom of the target text.' Dryden, whose most extensive out-
put as a poet was translation," describes three similar approaches:
94. STEINER, supra note 86, at 238-39. For an exceptional historical overview of translation
theories, see Hugo Friedrich, On the Art of Translation (Rainer Schulte & John Biguenet trans.), in
THEORIES OF TRANSLATION, supra note 86, at 11, 11-16.
95. For a general discussion of this history, see STEINER, supra note 86, at 236-38.
96. See id. at 254-56 ("The true road for the translator lies neither through metaphrase nor
imitation. It is that of paraphrase. . . ." (emphasis in original)); Bayard Q. Morgan, A Critical Bibli-
ography of Works on Translation, in ON TRANSLATION, supra note 35, at 271, 275 (listing several
18th-century and 19th-century formulations of definitions, typologies, and problems of translating);
Edwin Muir & Willa Muir, Translating from the German, in ON TRANSLATION, supra note 35, at 93,
94 (contrasting the difficulties posed by translating various types of prose and poetry from one language
to another, and from one style to another); Nida, supra note 35, at 12-13 (listing four basic principles
of"accuratetranslating"). Walter Benjamin describes the different possibilities of translation depending
upon the text in Walter Benjamin, The Task of the Translator (Harry Zohn trans.), in THEORIES OF
TRANSLATION, supra note 86, at 71, 72.
97. See STEINER, supra note 86, at 253 (describing the three classes of translation: strict literalism,
"trana-lation" by faithful but autonomous restatement, and "imitation, recreation, variation, interpretive
parallel," which "covers a large, diffuse area"); see also id. at 236-38 (describing the history of
translation practices). Rainer Schulte and John Biguenet suggest that more creative methods have
dominated during the 19th and 20th centuries with Vladimir Nabokov as the "only major exception,"
maintaining that "only a literal translation, a word-for-word translation, is a valid one." Schulte &
Biguenet, supra note 86, at 6.
98. WILLIAM FROST, DRYDEN AND THE ART OF TRANSLATION 1 (1955) (quoting JOHN DRYDEN,
Preface to the Translation of Ovid's Epistles, in ESSAYS (W.P. Ker ed., 1900)).
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metaphrase, or word-for-word, line-for-line renderings; paraphrase,
his own method, "where the author is kept in view by the translator,
so as never to be lost, but his words are not so strictly followed as
his sense; and that too is admitted to be amplified, but not altered";
and imitation, which he describes in terms that would apply as
accurately to Pope's Horace or Johnson's Juvenal as to the
seventeenth-century examples he cites.'
Now the contest over method in translation, like the contest over
method in legal interpretation, cannot be resolved in the abstract. And
indeed, once we step away from generalities and begin to work with parti-
cular instances of translation or, as I will describe them, institutions of
translation, we see that the differences in method track differences in the
purpose or function of translation more than they track any useful philo-
sophical commitment to one method or another.
Hence our question here will not be what method of translation makes
sense in general or for all texts, but rather how best to craft a practice of
translation for the normative texts of law."°  And to understand this
question we will consider the practice of translation as the result of two
distinct processes (two steps): first, the understanding of the material to be
translated (a process of finding familiarity), and second, the process under
which sameness in meaning is found (a process of finding equivalence).
1. Aspects of Translation: Familiarity.-The first dimension of a
practice of translation touches the conditions under which translation pro-
ceeds-the knowledge that one has of the source text and context, the target
text and context, and the relationship between the two. These conditions
flow, in a sense, directly from the understanding of contextualism already
sketched, and would be an aspect of any practice of translation-or at least
one would so expect. 1 1 Together they describe a practice of familiarity,
in which the translator must engage, with both the culture from which the
source text derives and the culture to which the target text will apply."°
99. Id. at 31-32.
100. See HANSON, supra note 37, at 33 (maintaining that the interpreter should be able "to explain
why the interpretation chosen is the right interpretation"); Emilio Betti, On a General Theory of
Interpretation: The Raison D'Etre of Hermeneutics, 32 AM. I. JURIS. 245 (1987) (stating that every new
science must establish the relevant goals of truth to be attained and must determine the cognitive
methods by which such goals are to be pursued).
101. Though there have been important exceptions to this understanding. See STEINER, supra note
86, at 356-61 ("Some of the most persuasive translations in the history of the mitier have been made
by writers ignorant of the language from which they were translating .... ).
102. See MACIN'RE, supra note 61, at 373 (observingthat a translator must realize that linguistic
expression is the product of "beliefs, institutions, and practices" at a "particular time and place");
Reuben A. Brower, Seven Agameinons, in ON TRANSLATION, supra note 35, at 173, 173 (depicting
the translator of poetry as attempting to make "the poetry of the past into poetry of his particular
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Familiarity is found when one understands something like the character of
each context, as well as of those for whom and to whom the text speaks.
As James Boyd White describes, familiarity is found when the translator
is "at home" in both contexts,"o understanding from where and to where
meaning is to be carried.
Now what it means to have a knowledge of the character of a context,
or for that matter, of a person, is not an easy question, and for our pur-
poses is a question best left to one side."° Suffice it that one knows the
character of a context (a person, a friend, a lover) when one knows some-
thing about the interrelationships of ideas or understandings or presupposi-
tions that give texts meaning in that context. One has familiarity when one
knows much more than a single text; when one knows how that text inter-
relates with others near it, and the context within which it sits-when one
present"); David C. Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Henneneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58
S. CAL. L. REv. 136, 138 (1985) ("To understand is to grasp the relevant context that determines the
possible parameters of the sentence or expression."); Powell, supra note 32, at 675 (arguing that an
interpreter who wants historical illumination on the meaning of a text must place the text in its
historical setting); Raffel, supra note 35, at 53 ("If then there is any overarching lesson to be learned
from my remarks, it is... that the literary translator is necessarily engaged with far more than words,
far more than techniques, far more than stories or characters or scenes. He is . . . engaged with
worldviews and with the passionately held inner convictions of men and women long dead and vanished
from the earth. A large part of his task, and perhaps the most interesting..., is the mining out and
reconstruction of those worldviews, those passionately held and beautifully embodied inner
convictions.").
103. See White, Judicial Criticism, supra note 32, at 404. As White notes, however, complete
familiarity cannot be achieved. Id.
104. When we say that someone has a knowledge of another's character, we can understand that
claim as a claim about a certain kind of facility with counterfactuals about that person. I know a
person-I understand her character-when I can tell you something.about how that person would act
or would have acted differently in a hypothetical situation. A friend walking down the street hands a
homeless person one dollar. Someone asks me whether I know the character of my friend. I say I do,
and one way I manifest that knowledge is to describe how my friend would have acted had the context
of that act of generosity differed: it would not have mattered had that person been black instead of
white; it would not have mattered had she been a man instead of a woman; it would have mattered if
she had been a Rockefeller rather than destitute; it would not have mattered if it was the last dollar my
friend had with her, and so on. I have a knowledge of my friend's character-I understand her-when
I can to some degree answer these questions. Virginia Woolf suggests something similar:
And this, Lily thought, taking the green paint on her brush, this making up scenes about
them, is what we call "knowing" people, "thinking" of them, "being fond" of them! Not
a word of it was true; she had made it up; but it was what she knew them by all the same.
She went on tunnelling her way into her picture, into the past.
VIRGINIA WooLY, To THE LIGHTHousE 258 (1927).
Professor Fuller describes the process as applied to statutory interpretation. See Lon L. Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630, 667 (1958)
(recommending the use of hypothetical cases to assist the process of interpreting statutes). For a
general discussion of the role of counterfactuals in the law, see Robert N. Strasafeld, If... :
Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 339 (1992). See also E.D. Hirsch, Jr.,
Counterfactuals in Interpretation, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 31, at 55, 55
(arguing that acknowledgement of the need for counterfactuals clarifies some difficult problems of
interpretation).
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knows, for example, its purpose, the assumptions that underlie it, the scope
of its reach, and theories it embraces. °5 And as these aspects of charac-
ter are found "only in their contextual environment," familiarity requires
that the translator "develop modes of thinking that reconnect them with the
dynamic fields of words, modes of thinking that will allow them to explore
meaning associations within a word and meaning connections created by
words in a specific context.""°
2. Aspects of Equivalence: The Problem.-Familiarity-that the trans-
lator knows from where and to where the text must be carried-thus
defines the first step in a practice of translation. The second step is to find
equivalence in meaning between the two contexts. In this section, I
explore this idea of equivalence, and conclude that within it, as it has been
understood by theorists of translation, is the potential both for an extraordi-
nary degree of flexibility in finding equivalence in meaning and the begin-
nings of a constraint on that practice of creativity. Both creativity and its
constraint will be essential to the two-step's practice in law.
As an ideal, the notion of equivalence may appear quite unproblem-
atic. As one commentator has put it, the duty is to construct in the target
language what the author in the source language would have written, had
that author been in the target context,"W or more succinctly, "[I]f Virgil
must needs speak English, it were fit he should speak not only as a man of
this Nation, but as a man of this age."'O° The translator has "to invent
formal effects in his own language that give a sense of those produced by
the original in its own."" ° Or, as Gadamer describes, the translator's
aim "must never be to copy what is said, but to place himself in the direc-
tion of what is said (i.e., in its meaning) in order to carry over what is to
be said into the direction of his own saying.""' Or, as Benjamin
describes, it is the finding of "that intended effect upon the language into
which he is translating which produces in it the echo."''
But once one attempts to carry this ideal into effect, one trips over two
obvious obstacles. First, there is no sense of equivalence in the abstract
105. See generally Tymoczko, supra note 52, at 36 ("What a language can mean depends upon
the environment of the language users. . .).
106. Schulte & Biguenet, supra note 86, at xi.
107. Morgan, supra note 96, at 274 (paraphrasing Letter from Orinda to Poliarchus (Letter XIX),
in LETTERS FROM ORINDA TO POLIARCHUS (Katherine F. Philips ed., 2d ed. 1729)).
108. SIR JOHN DENHAM, Preface to The Destruction of Troy, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF SIR
JOHN DENHAM 160 (rheodore H. Banks ed., 2d ed. 1969) (emphasis in original).
109. Jackson Mathews, Third Thoughts on Translating Poetry, in ON TRANSLATION, supra note
35, at 67, 67.
110. HANS-GEORO GADAMER, Man and Language, in PHILOSOPHICAL HERmENEurics 59, 68
(David E. Linge ed. & trans., 1976).
111. Benjamin, supra note 96, at 77.
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that could guide any practice of translation in particular; second, even if we
could specify a sense of equivalence for a particular practice of translation,
translators will confront unavoidable interlinguistic gaps.
Consider the first: Whether a translation produces an equivalent
meaning will depend upon the function of the translation itself-crudely
what the translation is for. This purpose is defined within an institution of
values, values not defined by "translation" itself but by the institution
within which translation functions. As these institutions differ, so too will
the sense of equivalence differ. The translator must select-or a practice
of translation must select-the nature of the equivalence that it will demand
before translation can proceed.
The following examples of equivalence in translation may make this
ambiguity more clear, by comparing three practices that could be described
broadly as practices of translation. The first is an eighteenth-century
English practice for translating French and Spanish novels. As described
by critic Helen Hughes:
It was their habit to adapt to English taste alien products, to reflect
British standards of manners and morals by means of interpolations
and alterations, in some cases changing the scene from Paris to
London, sometimes substituting for French names typically British
cognomens, often in greater or less degree modifying speech and
thought and even most critical and characteristic acts to suit the
purposes of entertainment plus instruction to which British fiction
was so generally dedicated."'
Now the justification for these extreme practices of translation is one
that should be familiar to jurisprudes. Although an extreme form of
change, the eighteenth-century translator claimed that these changes were
justified, not just by the aspiration to make significance more plain, but
instead on moral grounds. Here is just one example:
The Translator flatters himself with the Hope, that those who
have a Sense of Virtue, will pardon his having, in the Course of this
Work, sometimes check'd the Sallies of his Author's Wit, when it
began to grow prophane, and the Lusciousness of an Expression,
when tending to corrupt or debilitate the Mind of the young Reader:
That they will pardon him, if in any Instance where Profaneness and
Lewdness have been united, he has broke the Conjunction; and by
presuming to alter a Word or two, has given a different Turn to a
Thought, or clothed an Expression with greater Decency.11 3
112. Helen S. Hughes, Notes on Eighteenth-Century Fictional Translations, MOD. PHILOLOGY,
Aug. 1919, at 49, 49.
113. Id. at 54 (quoting THE BEAU-PHILOSOPHER; OR THE HISTORY OF THE CHEVALIER DE
MAINVILLERSix-x).
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Compare this practice then to a second, as exemplified by Clarence
Jordan's translation of the "Good Samaritan" story, included as part of his
"Cotton Patch" version of the Bible:
But the Sunday school teacher, trying to save face, asked, "But...
er... but.., who is my neighbor?"
Then Jesus laid into him and said, "A man was going from
Atlanta to Albany and some gangsters held him up. When they had
robbed him of his wallet and brand-new suit, they beat him up and
drove off in his car, leaving him unconscious on the shoulder of the
highway.
"Now it just so happened that a white preacher was going down
that same highway. When he saw the fellow, he stepped on the gas
and went scooting by.
"Shortly afterwards a white Gospel song leader came down the
road, and when he saw what had happened, he too stepped on the
gas.
"Then a black man traveling that way came upon the fellow,
and what he saw moved him to tears. He stopped and bound up his
wounds as best he could, drew some water from his water-jug to
wipe away the blood and then laid him on the back seat. He drove
on into Albany and took him to the hospital and said to the nurse,
'You all take good care of this white man I found on the highway.
Here's the only two dollars I got, but you all keep account of what
he owes, and if he can't pay it, I'll settle up with you when I make
a pay-day.'
"Now if you had been the man held up by the gangsters, which
of these three... would you consider to have been your neighbor?"
The teacher of the adult Bible class said, "Why, of course, the
nig-I mean, er ... well, er ... the one who treated me
kindly."114
114. CLARENCE JORDAN, THE COTTON PATCH VERSION OF LuKE AND ACTS 46-47 (1969). By
way of contrast, I offer the King James version:
But he, willing to justify himself, said unto Jesus, And who is my neighbour?
And Jesus answering said, A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell
among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed,
leaving him half dead.
And by chance there came down a certain priest that way: and when he saw him, he
passed by on the other side.
And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came on and looked on him, and passed
by on the other side.
But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and when he saw him, he
had compassion on him,
And went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own
beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him.
And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host,
and said unto him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come
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Jordan's method too aims to preserve something of the significance of
the text translated, at least for its intended audience. He explained his
method of translation as follows:
Why a "cotton patch" version? While there have been many
excellent translations of the Scriptures into modem English, they still
have left us stranded in some faraway land in the long-distant past.
We need to have the good news come to us not only in our own
tongue but in our own time. We want to be participants in the faith,
not merely spectators.... So the "cotton patch" version is an at-
tempt to translate not only the words but the events. We change the
setting from first-century Palestine to twentieth-century America.
We ask our brethren of long ago to cross the time-space barrier and
talk to us not only in modem English but about modem problems,
feelings, frustrations, hopes and assurances. 15
Finally there is a practice that-perhaps only by translation-may be
called a practice of translation. This approach is suggested by Judge
Richard Posner's image of the field commander who adapts orders given
by his superior to conditions encountered in the field, even when the
adapted orders are apparently inconsistent with the direct orders given." 6
In a sense very similar to Jordan's and the practices described by Hughes,
the practice of the field commander is a practice of translation, the justifi-
cation for which resonates with one offered by John Adams when speaking
of the discretion of a foreign minister to change Congress's orders. Adams
told Congress in 1782:
I see no way of doing my duty to congress, but to interpret the
instruction, as we do all general precepts and maxims, by such
restrictions and limitations, as reason, necessity, and the nature of
things demand. It may sometimes be known to a deputy, that an
instruction from his principal was given upon information of mis-
taken facts. What is he to do? When he knows, that if the truth had
been known, his principal would have given a directly contrary
order, is he to follow that which issued upon mistake? When he
knows, or has only good reason to believe, that. if his principal were
on the spot, and fully informed of the present state of facts, he would
give contrary directions, is he bound by such as were given before?
again, I will repay thee.
Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbour unto him that fell among the
thieves?
And he said, He that shewed mercy on him.
Luke 10:29-37.
115. CLARENCE JORDAN, THE COTTON PATCH VERSION OF PAuL's EPISTLES 7 (1968).
116. POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 32, at 269-73; POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note
32, at 253; see also supra note 32.
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It cannot be denied that instructions are binding, that it is a duty to
obey them, and that a departure from them cannot be justified; but
I think it cannot be denied, on the other hand, that, in our peculiar
situation, cases may happen, in which it might become our duty to
depend upon being excused (or, if you will, pardoned) for
presuming, that if congress were upon the spot, they would judge as
we do. 1
17
How can we evaluate these three extreme examples of translation?
Are all infidelities? Or fidelities? Is a commitment to reject one a
commitment to reject all?
I take it most would share Hughes's skepticism about the English
practice described; I also take it that many at least see something of the
reason or attraction behind Jordan's isomorphic endeavor with the Bible;
finally, I imagine most would agree with Adams's pragmatic conception of
the necessity of liberal translation by the foreign minister, at least under the
conditions of the eighteenth century. All three practices, however, in
important respects, are the same practice of translation: each aims to carry
as much as possible from the foreign text into the domestic context; each
aims to replicate the experience and sense of the source text in its target
context; each is designed to assure that any gap between the interpretive
contexts not undermine the purpose or function of the original text in its
original context. How then could our intuitions about the correctness of
these applications differ if the practice in each is, in essence, the same?
One way to understand-and perhaps justify-these differences in
intuition is to look to the different institutions within which each translation
proceeds. First, the texts are indeed different-the novels critiqued by
Hughes are fiction (or as she might say, fiction twice over);... Jordan's
text is a normative text (its aim is to tell not simply a story, but a lesson,
and to tell a lesson requires connecting more directly with the receiver than
a novel must);.19 Adams's texts are orders, normative texts in a more di-
rect sense. Second, the institutions within which each text functions are
different-the aims or purpose of those who participate within the institu-
tion are different, novels less coercive than foreign ministries. And each
translator might suggest it is these differences in the nature or purpose of
the text that explain whether one method of equivalence is acceptable over
another.
But to start speaking in this way about the different institutions within
117. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERAuSTS 130 (1959) (quoting 8 JOHN ADAMs, WoRKS 11-12
(1856)).
118. Hughes, supra note 112, at 225 (stating that the translated 19th-century novels were "garbled
abridgements and revisions which often completely metamorphosed in English guise their Spanish and
French originals").
119. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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which the translation proceeds is to draw to the fore precisely the point
about equivalence that was hinted at at the start. The differences in institu-
tions suggest how "equivalence" is endogenous to a practice of translation,
and that the practices themselves determine what will be considered equiva-
lent. Practices will differ, and if practices differ, "equivalence" will differ.
Nothing in the bare notion of translation could arbitrate among these differ-
ent conceptions of equivalent translations; all that can resolve such a dis-
pute is something about the practice of which each is a part.
What these differences suggest is that no fixed, or practice-
independent, conception of equivalence is available to guide a practice of
translation. Instead, whether self-consciously or not, each practice incor-
porates norms of equivalence, and it is to these norms that our attention
must be turned. Finding equivalence is in part the setting of the norms of
equivalence.
Setting norms of equivalence is the first obstacle to a practice of
finding equivalence. Consider now the second problem. As is common-
place, languages, whether understood in a limited sense (English, Korean,
Russian) or in a less-limited sense (the language of the legal formalists, the
language of the critical legal theorists), will not map1'2 one on the other.
And indeed, as James Boyd White has most carefully shown, the same lan-
guage over time does not map on itself.1  This characteristic of lan-
guage gives rise to translative gaps: ideas well or simply expressed or
constituted in one language will be invisible or distorted or mangled in
another. And where these gaps occur, the translator will confront an
unavoidable, but important, interpretive choice. In trying to find equiva-
lents between two relatively autonomous systems of meaning, the
translator-despite her traditional mechanic guise-mustjudge how the gap
will be filled. No clear method will reconstruct meaning in a second or
target language, and any such link will require of the translator something
more creative-will at times, that is, require her to construct a text in the
target language that will carry the same force or significance as the text in
the source context, creating something more than a simple replication of
words from an original text to replicate its meaning." As Alasdair
120. See STEINER, supra note 86, at 28-29 (pointing out that interpretation necessarily requires
translation); Arthur Schopenhauer, On Language and Words (Waltraud Bartscht trans.), in THEORIES
OF TRANSLATION, supra note 86, at 32, 36 ("Not every word in one language has an exact equivalent
in another. Thus, not all concepts that are expressed through the words of one language are exactly
the same as the ones that are expressed through the words of another."); see also MAcINTYRE, supra
note 61, at 375 ('The characteristic mark of someone who has ... acquired two first languages is to
be able to recognize where and in what respects utterances in the one are untranslatable into the
other.").
121. WHITE, JuSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 32, at 239-41; White, Judicial Criticism, supra
note 32, at 393; see also STEINER, supra note 86, at 28 ("The time-barrier may be more intractable
than that of linguistic difference.").
122. See FROST, supra note 98, at 17 ("[A] good translation will be both a poem, or piece of
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MacIntyre says, speaking even of proper names, translation will require
"gloss and explanation as an indispensable part of its work.""
Consider just three examples of translative gaps. Each presents
problems the translator has no obvious tool to fill, and each parallels a gap
present in the law.
The first gap results from an underdetermined source. Here are two
examples. To translate "Gorbachev went to New York" into certain dia-
lects of Zapotec, the translator needs to know whether Gorbachev had ever
been to New York before." To translate "I hired a worker" into
Russian, the translator must know whether the worker was male or fe-
male."z  Each is an example of an underdetermined source, since in
each, the translator needs information from the source context that is not
presented by the words of the text. In such cases, the translator must
locate in context (or construct) the missing element before the translation
can be completed.
The second example is an apparently overdetermined source. One
example would be the reverse of the example translating "worker" into
Russian-translating what appears to the English to be "female worker" in
Russian into English. From the perspective of the English speaker, the fact
that the sex of the worker was specified suggests that it is significant; but
from the perspective of the Russian, because it is necessary to specify the
sex, the sex is not significant." In this situation a translator must decide
from the context whether the specificity is needed or not, and supply or
drop it accordingly. But of course whether specificity is necessary is again
not apparent from the text.
The third example is of a transformed significance of some selected
term. Professor White notes, for example, "The German 'Wald' is differ-
ent from the English 'forest,' or the American 'woods,' not only linguis-
tically but physically: the trees are different."" z Because of the trans-
formed significance of the term "woods" the translator may have to pick
a wholly different term, or construct a wholly different phrase, to capture
literature, in its own right and an interpretation of its original.. . ."); Richmond Lattimore, Practical
Notes on Translating Greek Poetry, in ONTRANSLATION, supra note35, at 48, 48-49 ("[Thetranslatorl
must use all his talents, his understanding of the language and of the meaning of his original and his
own skill in verse, to make a new piece of verse-work which represents, to him, what the original
would be, might be, or ought to be, must be, in English.").
123. MAcINTYRE, supra note 61, at 378.
124. See Nida, supra note 35, at 22-23 ("When, as in the Villa Alta dialect of Zapotec, spoken
in southern Mexico, it is obligatory to distinguish between actions which occur for the first time with
particular participants and those which are repetitious, one must make a decision, despite the lack of
data in the source language.").
125. Roman Jakobson, On Linguistic Aspects of Translation, in ON TRANSLATION, supra note 35,
at 232, 236.
126. Id.
127. WHITE, JuSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 32, at 235.
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the sense of the source term in the target context. Rabassa suggests
another example, where the source text is significant because it coined the
phrase translated, a significance the translated text will certainly lose."
These of course are not the only gaps within translation, nor are they
necessarily the most significant. But note how they parallel similar gaps
facing the legal interpreter.
The underdetermined source: A statute provides for the shifting of "a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs," 29 but is written in a con-
text in which statutes did not distinguish between expert witness fees and
attorney's fees. When read in a context in which statutes do distinguish
attorney's fees from expert witness's fees, the legal interpreter, just like the
translator, must decide which of two possible readings-that the shifting
permits shifting of expert's fees or that it does not-is more faithful to the
meaning of the statute as written." Whatever the correct result, it is
clear the result cannot be derived without considering this change in con-
text and reading back to the original context meaning that may or may not
have been there originally.
The apparently overdetermined source: Imagine a response to the
following argument: "The Constitution gives Congress the power 'to raise
and support Armies' (but only for two years)," and the power 'to pro-
vide and maintain a Navy' (not so limited),'32 but it nowhere speaks of
an air force. Therefore, the Air Force is unconstitutional."' 33 Such an
argument assumes that the decision to exclude an air force at the Founding
was deliberate-certainly if a constitution were written today that specif-
ically mentioned a navy and an army but not an air force, a strong argu-
ment would exist that an air force is unconstitutional. But of course, since
there was no such thing as an air force in 1789, it is absurd to read the gap
as a proscription."
128. See Gregory Rabassa, No Two SnowflakesAre Alike: Translation as Metaphor, in THE CRAFT
OF TRANSLATION, supra note 35, at 1, 9 (noting the challenge of translating an author who "like James
Joyce," because his "mind was broader than the language, went about inventing neologisms and
restructuring the tongue in quite a logical way so as to express thoughts and feelings that lay beyond
the norms of its expression").
129. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1992).
130. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1140-46 (1991)
(distinguishing other statutes that allow shifting both attorney's and expert witnesses's fees and holding
that fees for services rendered by experts in civil rights litigation could not be shifted to the losing party
pursuant to § 1988); c.f Monique Michal, Comment, After West Virginia: The Fate of Expert Witness
Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1591 (1992) (asserting that the same language
in the fee-shifting statute allows expert witness fees to be awarded in exceptional patent cases).
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, C1. 12.
132. Id. cl. 13.
133. POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 32, at 263.
134. See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
-This Constitution, -72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1232 (1987) (arguing that an originalist could not provide
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As Chief Justice in Massachusetts, Holmes faced a similar problem,
interpreting a clause of the Massachusetts Constitution providing that voting
was to be taken by "written vote."'35 The question facing the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court was whether this provision proscribed voting
by machine. If a law were passed today requiring voting by "written vote"
it would reasonably be read to exclude voting machines, since voting
machines are now present and are apparently excluded by a clause requir-
ing "written votes." But given that the clause in the Massachusetts Consti-
tution was written in 1780, when there were no voting machines, Holmes
reasoned that the provision did not exclude voting machines. Reading the
clause restrictively would be to read it anachronistically. 1'36
Compare the emending reading described above with a reading of the
Eighth Amendment. 37  The Eighth Amendment explicitly incorporates
a proportionality limitation on fines, but not on jail sentences. Therefore,
like the conclusion that the Air Force is impermissible, or the conclusion
that voting machines are impermissible, one could conclude that a propor-
tionality limitation on jail sentences is impermissible. But of course, in
1791, just as there was no such thing as an "air force," nor such thing as
a "voting machine," there was no such thing as prison, or at least anything
at all like our current prison practice. As with the English common law,
criminal sentences were primarily either death or fines.' Thus, when
read in a context in which a third punishment option is presented-prison
terms-the interpreter must decide which of two options (reading propor-
tionality to apply to prison terms or not) is more faithful to the original
design. Just as with the air force example, the mere fact that propor-
tionality was not explicitly extended to prison terms does not resolve the
interpretive matter. As with the apparently overdetermined source above,
the translator here must do more to understand the significance of the
source text. Recall: If in Russian one had to mention "female worker"
then the fact that "female" was mentioned need not be essential to the
translation; so too, the fact that air force, or "written," or proportionality
for prisons was not mentioned, need not be essential to the translation.
The transformed significance: The Second Amendment protects the
a historical answer to the question of the Air Force's constitutionality).
135. See In re House Bill No. 1291, 60 N.E. 129, 131 (Mass. 1901).
136. See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 32, at 267 (discussing Holmes's resolution of the case);
see also Holmes, supra note 39, at 419-20 (stating that in interpreting statutes "the only thing to do is
find out what the sovereign wants").
137. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VMI.
138. See ADAM J. HIRSH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY
AMERICA 4-5 (1992) (referring to Massachusetts as an exemplary American colony where "[b]y far the
most prevalent forms of criminal sanction ... involved monetary penalties, admonitions, physical
battery, or capital punishment").
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right to bear "arms" the better to support a "well regulated Militia."""
The scope of that "purpose" clause turns on the meaning of "militia."
When the amendment was written, "militia" referred to every able-bodied
male; as understood today, it refers to a segregated semiprofessional
standing army."4 The interpreter thus faces the gap created by this
change in meaning when applying the scope of the purposive clause. If,
as David Williams argues, the purpose of the clause was to place an anti-
government force in the people,'41 then this shifting meaning of "militia"
critically undermines the amendment's purpose-to serve the ends of the
current "militia" alone would be wholly to defeat the purpose of the ori-
ginal amendment. It may be to understand the meaning of this clause
today, the interpreter must read it to serve the purposes of everything but
what we understand the "militia" to be.
These examples provide a flavor at least of the kinds of gaps faced by
the legal interpreter and the similarity of those gaps with those faced by the
translator. How the translator in law fils these interpretive gaps is a
question addressed below.
3. Aspects of Equivalence: Creativity.-The search for equivalence
must confront first the problem of gaps. If equivalence is relative to a
practice, and if gaps are inevitable, then two consequences follow for a
practice of translation applied to law. First, the practice must be self-
conscious about the norms of equivalence that it constructs-about what be-
tween the two contexts we aim to preserve. And second, the practice must
be self-conscious about the method it embraces-about the inevitable choice
that will be unavoidably thrust on the translator. These two conse-
quences together suggest a duty of the translator that I will call the duty of
creativity.'4' Acknowledging the choice, both in the specification of
139. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
140. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 553, 574-75 (1991).
141. Id. at 553-55, 575; see also Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 214-18 (1983) (explaining that the
Framers' understanding of "militia" casts doubt on an interpretation of the Second Amendment that
limits it to protecting a state's right to arm organized military units); Levinson, supra note 72, at 646-
47 (contending that "militia" refers to all of the people, or at least all of those treated as full citizens
of the community).
142. See Rabassa, supra note 128, at 7 (describing the translator's choice); see also Renato
Poggioli, The Added Artificer, in ON TRANSLATION, supra note 35, at 137, 141 ("[O]ne must reject
the notion that the translator's is a voice singing tunes that others have composed for him.... [W]hat
moves the genuine translator is not a mimetic urge, but an elective affinity. .. ").
143. See WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 32, at 257-59 (describing "translation"
as 'the creation of texts in response to texts, meant to honor the other and assert the self"); Lattimore,
supra note 122, at 49 ("Right or wrong, I think verse translation is ... author plus translator.");
Brower, supra note 88, at 7 ("Mhe translator is a 'creator'... ."); see also Dudley Fitts, The Poetic
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equivalence and in the execution of particular translations, the translator
has a duty to work creatively with the text translated to preserve as much
meaning as context will allow. She must "take liberties" with a text to
preserve its meaning, to preserve what the author "wants to say." 1" She
may have to rework the text to act creatively to capture in the target lan-
guage what was meant in the source;'45 she may have to ignore the plain
language of the text in one context to convey the same meaning in a
second. "The motive is invention, not imitation."' She must reach be-
yond the text at times, transform the text at times, and ignore the text at
times. All this is necessary if meaning is to be preserved.'47
Now what is most interesting about the practice of translation when
one links it to equivalent problems in the law is that despite this need for
creativity-despite the artifice of the criteria, and despite the inevitable
gaps in the execution-what follows is not chaos. (Indeed, because gaps
are predicated on a judgment that there is no single way to fill them, a
translator is insulated from the charge that she went on in a way unfaithful
to the original.) Without firm foundations, there are still translations, there
are better and worse translations, there are even right and wrong trans-
lations, and within any practice, practitioners make such distinctions all the
time. Thus, in practice, even if not in theory, translation proceeds without
foundation and yet functions to constrain those within its play.
4. Aspects of Equivalence: Humility.-The nature of language requires
that the translator act with what I have described as creativity. But creativ-
ity itself suggests no limit. The license to create-to-preserve quickly
becomes indistinguishable from the license simply to create. And indeed,
as part of this inevitable debate about the license to create, there has also
been a perpetual debate among theorists of translation about the extent to
which a translator may make her text over to make her text better. 4
Nuance, in ON TRANSLATION, supra note 35, at 32, 34 ("Largely, then, we must take the translator
on trust, granting him a kind ofvatic authority."); cf. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 87-88
(rev. ed. 1969) (acknowledging that judges are allowed some interpretive freedom when applying
statutes so long as their interpretation is guided by the original problem the law was intended to
address).
144. Rabassa, supra note 128, at 3; see also Fitts, supra note 143, at 39 (stating that "alterations
and refinements" during the translation of a Spanish poem "are the legitimate, even necessary,
prerogatives of the translator").
145. See WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 32, at 257-58 (arguing that the point of
translation is not to imitate or replicate the original text, but rather to create a new text that "bear[s]
a relationship of fidelity" to the original).
146. Mathews, supra note 109, at 67.
147. See MACINTYRE, supra note 61, at 379-81.
148. As Lattimore presents the question: "[Blut if you honestly find him less good than his own
standard, should you improve him? This is more difficult." Lattimore, supra note 122, at 49. The
dilemma is, as Croce puts it, between "Faithful ugliness and faithless beauty." Morgan, supra note
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This was the debate adverted to above, in the discussion of the metaphras-
ists, the paraphrasists, and the imitators, 4 9 but the conflict is broader
than that. Throughout this conflict runs an ethic cautioning the translator
that even though empowered to be creative, she should not "improve" the
text translated, or that if she does improve it, she has not translated it.1"
"'A translator is to be like his author,' wrote Dr. Johnson in reference to
Dryden, 'it is not his business to excel him.' Where he does so, the ori-
ginal is subtly injured. And the reader is robbed of a just view." 15'
Consider how one commentator describes this resistance to improve-
ment:
The ethos of the translator is a perfect blend of humility and pride.
His two greatest virtues. . .are the reverence he feels toward the
author or work he translates, and the sense of his own integrity as an
interpreter, which is based on both modesty and self-respect....
There is no literary worker more respectful of the property of his fel-
low artist, none less willing to infringe on what takes the legal name
of copyright. The translator always gives full credit, sometimes even
more credit than is due, to the maker of a blueprint that he could not
use without considerably changing and adapting it. All these
characteristics indicate that the translator is perhaps the only modem
artist who acts and behaves as if he were only an artisan, .
serving with simple and single-minded devotion a beauty to which he
cannot give his name, and yet not unaware of the nobility of his
calling, of the dignity of his task.15
The translator acts as if she were only an artisan-she must act, as I
will describe it, with appropriate humility. But, why? Others certainly
reject this attempt to limit the creative improvement the translator may
offer the original author. What reason could there be for a translator to
carry over the warts as well as the virtues? If the translator must have the
power to change the text in any case (as a function of creativity), why not
make the text the best text that it can be?153
96, at 278 (quoting BENEDETrO CROCE, AESTHETIC 68 (Douglas Ainslie trans., 1922)).
149. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
150. Poggioli, supra note 142, at 146.
151. STEINER, supra note 86, at 402.
152. Poggioli, supra note 142, at 145; see also Morgan, supra note 96, at 275 (quoting Samuel
Johnson's view: "A tr[anslator] is to be like his author: it is not his business to excel him."); Vladimir
Nabokov, The Art of Translation, 105 NEW REPUmIc 160, 161 (1941) ("[A translator] must possess
the gift of mimicry and be able to act, as it were, the real author's part by impersonating his tricks of
demeanor and speech, his ways and his mind, with the utmost degree of verisimilitude."); STEINER,
supra note 86, at 302 ("Fidelity is ethical, but also, in the full sense, economic.").
153. For, of course, the tradition in translation itself has not been monotonic. See John Hollander,
Versions, Interpretations, and Performances, in ON TRANSLATION, supra note 35, at 205, 206 ("Every
literary document that purports to be a translation... makes a kind of contract to be correct, but it
is traditional to regard any such contract, if filled to the letter, with a bit of contempt and suspicion.");
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One way to understand this self-imposed ethic on the practice of trans-
lation is this: If "equivalence" cannot be defined in the abstract, then
neither can the appropriate limits to creativity be established in the abstract.
It is wrong, then, to say humility is or is not part of a translator's practice
generally, for here again we must distinguish among the different kinds of
translation and the different purposes that translation may serve. For some
of these practices humility will be a virtue; for others, perhaps not. Con-
sider the following. If one is translating instructions for assembling a
child's toy, there is little vice in making the translated text even clearer
(better) than the original; here humility would be unnecessary.1 4 Con-
versely, if one is translating an author's prose so that students can evaluate
the author's skill, there indeed may be vice in improving the text trans-
lated; humility here would be a virtue. Whether humility has a role is in
part a function of the purpose of the translation, just as the nature of equi-
valence is in part a function of the purpose of the translation.
Like equivalence, then, the question is not about humility in general,
but about whether humility should have a role in the translation of norma-
tive texts in law. But even so limited, the answer may appear unclear.
There is of course a strong intuition that if, for example, one is translating
a normative text, the translation ought to be the best normative translation
possible-that if you have translated the words of a moral person such that
she no longer appears moral (because, for example, the notion of morality
has shifted between the two contexts, and her words in the old context
appear insensitive or offensive in the new) then you have failed to translate
her words properly. 55 On such a view, humility should not constrain
creativity; the translator should work to make the translation the best
possible normative text.156
But a second intuition may draw this idea-the notion that we should
avoid humility and make the text the best it could be-into doubt, and in
the remainder of this Part, I describe one possible argument for humility
within a practice of translating normative texts. Depending upon the prac-
tice, and depending upon the institution within which the practice is a
Morgan, supra note 96, at 277 ("I am persuaded that... the Translator... must re-cast that original
into his own Likeness.. . . mhe live Dog better than the dead Lion.") (quoting Letter from Edward
Fitzgerald to I.R. Lowell (Dec. 12, 1878), in 2 LETTERS oF EDWARD FiTZGMERAL 260, 261 (William
Wright ed., 1894)).
154. Unless of course there were tort liability consequences.
155. Think again of the 18th-century translation of French novels into English-if the acts named
by the English translator were not "immoral" in France but were immoral in England, the translation
would preserve the "morality" of the text on both sides of the Channel. See supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
156. Obviously, this is intended to suggest something of Dworkin's structure, in particular his
belief that the judge should make the law the best it could be. See the discussion of Dworkin infra note
350 and accompanying text.
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practice, a practice of translation may have what I will call institutional
consequences. These consequences may suggest reasons to limit the scope
of translative creativity just so the practice of translation need not be
limited in other ways as well.
By an institutional consequence I mean just this: Think of the power
to translate as a delegated power from an author to an agent. As with any
delegated power, the delegator faces an agency problem-the problem how
to control the actions of the agent. For some institutions, it may be criti-
cally important to assure that the agent not exceed the scope of her dele-
gated authority.157 Were lines of authority clear, the agent could easily
steer clear of the boundaries. But where the lines of delegated authority
are unclear, the agent may seek ways to assure the delegator of her willing-
ness to stay well within the bounds of the delegated authority-ways, that
is, to signal obedience.
It is against this background that we should consider once again the
scope of the translator's creativity. For it may be that a more creative
translative practice may change the author's willingness to leave questions
open to translation, which may, in turn, narrow the scope for translation
left the translator by the author. Consider one example that may make this
clear.
Imagine that Congress, after a long and political struggle, passes a
statute providing funds for family planning clinics. The statute is to be
administered by a special agency established by the act itself, with the
agency heads appointed by the President. In the decision to pass the
statute, basic policy choices were made-at a minimum, whether family
planning should be provided at all-and Congress no doubt now wants that
policy choice respected. But beyond basic policy, there is a range of detail
left unaddressed that someone must resolve. About this detail, Congress
has little concern, save that it be resolved by someone, and preferably
someone other than Congress.
Now obviously, the extent to which Congress will delegate these
decisions of detail depends upon how much Congress trusts the agency to
respect those decisions that Congress has not delegated. For it is always
within the power of a delegate to act to undermine policies that were not
in fact delegated, and the wider the scope of delegated authority, the more
easily could the delegate so act. Thus, if Congress could trust the agency
to respect Congress's policy choice absolutely, then Congress would be
quite willing to delegate all other issues to the agency's discretion. But if
Congress did not trust the agency's willingness to uphold Congress's policy
choice, then Congress would limit the range of the agency's discretion.
The scope of discretion granted the agency, then, is in part a function
157. Recall the Fail Safe example discussed above. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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of the degree to which the delegator trusts the agency to respect the deci-
sions not delegated. It is this endogeneity that raises the institutional
consequences for translation. For if the scope of delegation to the agency
is in part a function of trust, then an agency would want ways to signal that
it is worthy of trust, to increase the scope of authority delegated. To the
extent that the delegate can signal, through procedures or practice, that she
will respect undelegated decisions-that she will not either directly or indi-
rectly take actions that undermine their significance-she will induce the
delegator to increase the scope of delegation. Respectfulness in one area
may increase license in another.'- 8
How does this example connect with the point about humility in
translation? If, in the example just given, creativity stands for the scope
of delegation and humility stands for the signals that the delegate can send
to indicate that she will respect decisions not delegated, then the argument
is that it may, for some institutions, make sense for the translator to
embrace a practice of humility so as to induce trust in the delegator. For
without humility there may be no clear distinctions between those acts of
creativity that make a text "better" and those that are instead attempts to
undermine a nondelegated choice. As long as there is no such clear dis-
tinction, the delegator cannot know which the translator is doing. In such
a world, the translator may have reason to adopt a practice that signals
institutional respect"9 so as to induce the delegator to accord a wider
range of discretion to the translator.
The constraint of humility may then make sense for particular institu-
tions of translation-in particular, those where the translator acts as the
agent for an author's normative intent (the agency translating Congress's
will into action), or those where the translator acts as the agent for a
practice generally and not the author in particular (translating foreign prose
for comparative purposes; a secretary typing a student's exam so the pro-
fessor can read it). Or more generally, humility makes sense where the di-
mension about which the translator acts with humility is that dimension for
which the institution believes the author should be held responsible, or
alternatively, that dimension along which the author is being measured, or
the author is to speak most genuinely. Again, if we are trying to imple-
ment Congress's choices, then the translator must be humble with respect
to those choices; if we are trying to measure the author's skill, then the
158. Fora discussion of theproblems of agency, seeROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATELAW 114-23
(1986).
159. There are of course many examples of this sort of constraint. Consider a lawyer forbidding
a typist permission to "improve" the brief, while permitting him to correct errors. To the extent the
lawyer trusts the typist to make such a distinction, the scope of the errors she will allow him to correct
increases; to the extent she does not trust him to respect the line, the review she insists upon will
increase.
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translator must be humble with respect to issues of style and craft; if we
are trying to reproduce the poet's final words, the translator best presents
them as stated. Conversely, if we care not at all about the author's skill
or craft, the translator has little reason to act with humility with respect to
the author's words or craft-a reporter, for example, recounting the wit-
ness's account of the story may have little reason to refrain from improving
the grammar of the statements made; a field commander has little reason
not to improve the clarity of the instructions to his troops; a manufacturer
has little reason not to improve the clarity of the warning label attached to
the product it imports.
These considerations suggest the possibility that a practice of trans-
lation for legal texts should be conditioned by a constraint of humility.
And when I sketch the practice as applied to law below, I will examine
again whether in fact a constraint of humility should be imposed. My aim
so far is not to conclude that it must be imposed, or even yet that it should.
It is only to suggest the reasons that may exist to justify its constraint.
These reasons, like the reasons that give shape to equivalence, derive first
from the institution within which the translation functions.
V. Two-Step Fidelity: Finding Equivalence
As sketched so far, the practice of translation moves in two stages:
first, understanding the contexts between which the translator must move;
and second, locating something called an equivalence between the two con-
texts. In finding equivalence, the practice must first specify the sense in
which translations for that practice are equivalent; it must acknowledge the
necessity of creativity; and finally, it may have reasons to constrain creativ-
ity with an ethic of humility.
Using this sketch, I will outline below a model of judicial"w trans-
lation for interpretive questions in the law. Already, though, the similarity
in the interpretive problems should be apparent. Like the interlanguage
translation of texts, interpretation in law proceeds first by understanding
the sense or meaning of the text at issue in its original context (familiarity);
the problem of fidelity is how to preserve that significance in the current
context (equivalence). Like interlanguage translation, ordinary notions of
interpretation in law reflect the relativity of the concept of equivalence and
echo both the requirements of creativity and the limitations of humility.
The aim of the subparts that follow is to build on this similarity to develop
a model of translation applicable to law.
160. As should become clear, the practice may be quite different for other kinds of institutions.
Thus, the constraints on an agency could be different from those on a court. See supra note 158 and
accompanying text.
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A. Two-Step Fidelity. A Model
The first step of fidelity is familiarity, both with the context of author-
ship and with the context of application. As Jefferson Powell states: "We
can understand the original meaning of the Constitution ... only by
'plunging [ourselves] into the systems of communication in which [the
Constitution] acquired meaning. '" 161
Familiarity, then, is the common step of both the one- and two-step
fidelitists-the practice of the contextualist. As Justice Scalia describes,
Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous
mass of material-in the case of the Constitution and its Amend-
ments, for example, to mention only one element, the records of the
ratifying debates in all the states. Even beyond that, it requires an
evaluation of the reliability of that material.... And further still,
it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmo-
sphere of the time-somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we
have which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes,
philosophies, prejudices, and loyalties that are not those of our
day.162
Obviously the needed degree of familiarity is a function of the cultural
distance that the translation is to cover. If that distance is great, then so
too must the exploration of the originating context be great; if it is small,
then so may the exploration be as well.
Disagreement among fidelitists begins in the second stage, the process
of finding equivalence. The translator's second step is to reconstruct a text
in the application context that replicates the meaning of the application in
the original context.1" But here emerge the two most obvious differ-
161. Powell, supra note 32, at 675 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Joyce Appleby, Republicanism
in Old and New Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 20, 28'(1986)). Powell suggests to un-
derstand the meaning of constitutional clauses the interpreter must 'place them in a complex and
unfamiliar setting: classical-republican thought about the autonomous and virtuous citizen, the British
Country ideology... , notions ultimately derived from ancient Greece concerning the inevitably re-
distributive tendencies of democracies, common law and Whig ideals about the traditional English
liberties, and so on." Id. (citation omitted).
162. Scalia, supra note 77, at 856-57; see also Richards, supra note 65, at 519 ("Mhe
interpretation of constitutional law ... must ... engage in a complex historical reconstruction of our
constitutional traditions."). For this reason, Scalia has argued, we must understand, for example, the
original Constitution against the backdrop of the common law. See County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1672 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reminding that "the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of 'unreasonable seizures' . .. preserves for our citizens the traditional
protections against unlawful arrest afforded by the common law.").
163. Of course, as some have argued, once we know presuppositions have changed, we know too
that we can do nothing more with the statute being read. Changing presuppositions entail the death of
fidelity, not any possibility of translation. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence
and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MIcH.
L. REV. 672, 731-32 (1987) ("[Clourts will give expansive purpose-based scope to words or phrases
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ences in the translative practices. First: for the interlanguage translator,
this reconstructed text is a different text in a different language; for the le-
gal translator, the reconstructed text is an application of the text in a
different context; for the interlanguage translator, the source text is an
original text in a foreign language; for the legal translator, the source text
is a first (or first hypothetical) application. Therefore, while for the
interlanguage translator it is the meaning of the two texts that must be
preserved, for the legal translator it is the meaning of the two applications
that must be equivalent.
A second difference between interlanguage translation and legal trans-
lation is more difficult to accommodate. For the interlanguage translator,
there is a relatively clear signal that translation is required when the
languages are "different." For the legal translator, differences in language
are not so clear, and thus there is no clear way to identify the predicate for
an act of translation. Always there will be some change, but perhaps only
rarely will change merit translation.
To remedy this, the legal translator needs a way to speak of those
changes that remark the need for translation. Based on the previous discus-
sion of how context changes meaning,"' I will use the device of the
changed presupposition to identify those cases where meaning between two
contexts has changed. Where we imagine that those who first used the text
would have used a different text if some fact of the original context
changed, then we will understand that fact as a presupposition, and focus
on how that changed presupposition engenders a problem of translation.
Again, this is just one way of understanding this notion of a presupposi-
tion, and indeed, it is narrower than I believe makes sense. But I use this
narrow sense simply to help track how a model of translation will function.
Once the pattern is clear, the need' for that restriction will fall away.
The method that I outline begins by identifying presuppositions that
have changed between the two contexts and constructing an accommodation
to account for that change. Often (always?) there will be more than one
possible accommodation-more than one way to restructure the application
to preserve its meaning. Among these alternatives the translator will have
to choose. In outlining this choice below, I make a crucial assumption:
Among the possible accommodations, I assume that the translator has a
duty to select the change that is most conservative. The translator is to
find the accommodation that makes the smallest possible change in the legal
material and still achieves fidelity.
This principle of conservatism is of course not inherent in the notion
so long as the prevailing conditions and assumptions of the time of enactment hold substantially true.
After that, however, manifest intent.., becomes meaningless.").
164. See supra notes 29, 43-49 and accompanying text.
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of translation-it derives, if it derives at all, from a legal practice external
to translation. Moreover, the meaning of the notion "the smallest possible
change" will not be seen fully until we have considered a number of
examples. But note that at times the smallest change may require changing
the outcome in a particular case (reversing an application) while at other
times it may require preserving the outcome in light of the changed circum-
stances. Given the theoretical commitment to the smallest possible change,
there is no way a priori to know which of these options will be preferred,
but what is important for our purposes is simply to flag that merely
because outcomes are different in some cases and not in others does not yet
demonstrate an inconsistency in method. The method aims for minimal
change consistent with maximal preservation. What that will be is not
clear in the abstract.
Summarizing again: A problem of translation is presented when, be-
tween the authoring and application context, there is a change in context
of a certain kind. That change I have described as a change in presupposi-
tions, a change which, had it occurred in the authoring context, would have
required a change in the text in that context for the meaning in that context
to be preserved. If a presupposition changes, then the translator must
accommodate that change in the current context if fidelity is to be
achieved. In accommodating that change, the translator will strive to make
the smallest possible change necessary to preserve as much from the ori-
ginal context as is possible.
B. Two-Step Fidelity: Translations
The ten examples that follow apply this model of translation to the
law. I have divided these examples into two categories-those that account
for changes in what can be called legal presuppositions and those that
account for changes in nonlegal presuppositions. A legal presupposition
is simply a presupposition internal to the legal culture; a nonlegal presup-
position is one derived from or dependent upon the social or political
culture. Of course no clear line divides the two; some may appear to be
a bit of both, and whether they fit into one category or the other is not
important. The process applied to both is the same, and the division I
make here is simply for exegesis. 16
In each example, the hope is not so much to convince about the parti-
cular outcome sketched. I in no way intend to endorse the particular
outcomes sketched below. My aim instead is to suggest how broad is the
class of interpretive problems linked by what I believe is a common inter-
165. Fred Schauer points to a similar distinction. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 399, 416 n.46 (1985).
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pretive structure. In each of the following examples, the question is how
to accommodate a change in a presupposition, so as to preserve as much
as possible from the original context. Some results will appear conser-
vative, some liberal. But it is a strength of the approach, I suggest, that
it links both conservative and liberal outcomes alike.
1. Legal Presuppositions: Overruling.-The first insight of the two-
step is that sometimes changing an application may be an act of fidelity and
that sometimes preserving an application may be an act of infidelity. To
see how change can be fidelity, and constancy can be infidelity, we need
a simple and clear example. The simplest-and most trivial-is the change
required to account for the overruling of an earlier case.
Begin with the originalist bias-to apply the text the same way, to
make no change-and note how odd this bias is in the case of overruling.
No doubt, not all overrulings are alike-not all are explicit, not all rely on
a similar justification, not all are what they say they are. In analyzing
Supreme Court overrulings, Dean Geof Stone has isolated three classes:
first, where subsequent experience shows that the initial decision on its own
terms was a mistake; second, where circumstances change such that one
can imagine that the same Justices would not have reached the same result;
and third, where the Justices simply disagree with the result on its own
terms." Of these, Stone rightly concludes the third is most problem-
atic.167 To this list, Professor Jerold Israel would add a fourth category
(perhaps encompassed within Stone's second) of overrulings to account for
changes in supporting precedent-where the overruled decision explicitly
hangs upon a precedent that has itself subsequently been overruled.168
This is the class of overruling that I describe.'69
When a court overrules a precedent that itself rested upon a precedent
that has been overturned, there is certainly a change in the application of
that earlier text or legal principle. But the fidelitist's question is whether
that change is a transformation (where the court adds something to existing
legal meaning), or simply an accommodation (where the court accounts for
changes made elsewhere, by another court or by a legislature). If the out-
come in case X rested on an overruled precedent Y, then precedent Y can
be understood to be a presupposition of case X. If Y is a presupposition,
then the fidelitist asks what decision would have been reached by the origi-
166. Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional
Doctrine, 11 HARV. I.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67, 71-72 (1988).
167. Id. at 71.
168. See Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SUP. CT. REV.
211,223-26.
169. I put to one side the question whether the precedent overruled was itself overruled on grounds
of fidelity.
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nal court in case X had the precedent overruled now been overruled then.
If the court imagines that the earlier court would have decided X differ-
ently, then the court acts with fidelity if it now decides X differently.
Given the change in Y, a presupposition, overruling X is an act of fidelity
to X.17
0
Elkins v. United States" provides an example of this kind of fidelity
in overruling.' 2  At issue in Elkins was the continued validity of the
"silver platter doctrine," under which the fruits of searches conducted by
state officials that would have been illegal under federal law had they been
conducted by federal officials, but that were legal under state law, could
nonetheless be used in a federal criminal trial. 73 Weeks v. United
States74 announced the presupposition underlying the silver platter rule-
the nonincorporation of the Fourth Amendment. Because the Fourth
Amendment did not apply against the states, the search was not illegal, and
there was no special reason to exclude its fruits in federal court.'75 The
issue became one of choice of law, and no overriding state interest required
that state law be displaced.
Thus, the silver platter doctrine rested upon the presupposition of
nonincorporation. In Wolf v. Colorado,76 that presupposition changed,
for in Wolf the Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment against the
states, and state officials as well as federal officials were subject to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment."7  After incorporation, the
question facing the fidelitist was whether changing the earlier applications
of the silver platter doctrine was fidelity, or whether preserving the silver
platter doctrine was fidelity.
To answer this, we need to think for a second more about what fidel-
ity would be. As Sanford Levinson suggests, one way to understand this
notion of fidelity is to ask which act adds the least to the "existing body of
accepted legal material.'178 Our discussion so far should suggest at least
that change is not always addition-that if presuppositions change, change
170. As Israel points out, one implication of this is that the opinion now deemed incorrect could
have been correct when decided. Id. at 223.
171. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
172. A second exampleis provided by the Court's overruling of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968), in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 (1976).
173. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) ("We do not question the right of the
federal governmentto avail itself of evidenceimproperly seized by state officers operating entirely upon
their own account.").
174. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
175. See id. at 398.
176. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
177. Id. at 27-28. State officials were not, however, subject to the same remedies. The
requirements of the exclusionary rule were not incorporated against the states until Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
178. Levinson, supra note 13, at 412.
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may be required if one wants to avoid adding to the existing body of legal
material. Elkins is a plain example of this point.
As the Court held, here at least change was fidelity. Once the Fourth
Amendment had been incorporated, the Court held, "[t]he foundation upon
which the admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal trial originally
rested-that unreasonable state searches did not violate the Federal Consti-
tution-thus disappeared, " 179 and once gone, the act of overturning the
doctrine (as Elkins did) was the act that would be faithful to the legal
material that then existed. Thus, though abandoning a long line of
Supreme Court precedent, Elkins was itself, trivially, an act of fidelity in
light of the changes in the legal presupposition of Weeks. To have held
otherwise would, in the words of Levinson, have added legal material to
the existing stock; the Court would have been amending by its refusal to
change." °
Conforming the example to the model sketched so far: between the
two contexts, the presupposition changed was the incorporation of the
Fourth Amendment; this change was a changed presupposition if, had it
been changed in the original context, the outcome in that context would
have been changed as well. The argument for Elkins must be that over-
ruling the silver platter doctrine added least to the legal material in the
second context-that fidelity required, in light of the overruling, a change
in the application of the earlier doctrine.
I have described this conclusion as trivially true, and in a sense it
certainly is. But I have offered it to make plain what are the first critical
points for the translator: (1) that change in light of changed presuppositions
is the essence of fidelity; and (2) that refusing to change in light of changed
circumstances would be infidelity. So however trivial the example, it
belies what is at the core of the confusion about fidelity. Sometimes
change is essential for fidelity.
One final qualification before we move on. Note that the analysis of
fidelity is transitive-that despite the binary nature of the discussion of
contexts above (original and current contexts), the analysis proceeds by
assuming that every step up to the penultimate was legitimate, and asks
whether the change in the current step is legitimate as well. Of course this
is a partial analysis of an inquiry of fidelity, for there are many antecedent
steps that could be questioned as well. But my point again is not to claim
finally that any of the examples offered are correct translations; it is instead
simply to sketch how translation proceeds.
179. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960).
180. Levinson, supra note 13, at 411-17.
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2. Legal Presuppositions: The APA.-The simple point so far is just
this: from a change in the foreground, one cannot conclude that there has
been a violation of fidelity; if fidelity is fidelity to meaning, one must
count the foreground and background before one can reckon changed
meaning. And the practice of translation is a practice to focus attention on
the salience of the background.
But changes in controlling precedent are a facile example of inter-
pretive fidelity. More interesting are examples that rely on changes more
diffuse than a single controlling precedent, where the change that leads to
the changed application is a change wholly in the background of the parti-
cular issue or text-an example, that is, that reveals a greater significance
to contextualism.
Such an example was suggested by Justice Scalia (when he was still
Academic Scalia) discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yan-
kee.' The article begins with what could only be described as a conser-
vative's relish for the Supreme Court's bridling of an errant D.C. Circuit.
For years, Scalia wrote, the D.C. Circuit had fashioned revisions to the
settlement enacted by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)," against
constant and repeated warnings by the Supreme Court to interpret the
statute as written." Finally, in Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court, in
as explicit a rebuke as possible, drew the line, instructing lower courts to
uphold the bargain Congress struck in 1946, and not to develop a common
law of administrative rulemaking. If the bargain struck by Congress was
flawed, then it was Congress's job to correct it. Neither the Supreme
Court, nor the D.C. Circuit, was to tinker with that bargain.,
Scalia, however, went on to ask the question implicit in the approach
of fidelity, namely whether the Supreme Court's interpretation of the APA,
in its current context, best effected the bargain struck by Congress in 1946.
For between 1946 and 1978, as Scalia argued, the legal "landscape" under-
lying the APA had not remained constant: by the mid-1970s, "vast num-
bers of issues of the sort of which in 1946 would have been resolved in a
formal adjudicatory context ... were being resolved in informal rule
making and informal adjudication.""' In consequence, Scalia wrote,
181. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978).
182. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706
(1988) and other scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). Enacted in 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) is in essence a mini-constitution for the administrative agencies, governing procedures for rule-
making and adjudication. See Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and
Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 253 (1986).
183. AntoninScalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
SuP. CT. REv. 345, 359-75.
184. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 545-47.
185. Scalia, supra note 183, at 377.
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It may indeed be true, as the Court said (quoting a 1950 case),
that the Act "settled 'long-continued and hard-fought contentions,
and enact[ed] a formula upon which opposing social and political
forces have come to rest.'" But if they have remained at rest since
1946, the landscape has moved beneath them. The APA is of course
not remotely a self-contained statute, but assumes an entire
underlying jurisprudence and practice-which have in the interim
drastically altered, as reflected in the decisions of the Supreme Court
itself. 186
When the APA was enacted, the settlement that Congress reached was
forged in a context radically different from the one faced by the D.C.
Circuit in the mid-1970s. In response to this change in context, the D.C.
Circuit had gone beyond the statutory text-imposing additional procedural
requirements upon agencies, for example, in an attempt to erect function-
ally equivalent protections as would have been enjoyed before the context
had been so radically changed. As Scalia suggested, "[r]ealistically, [these
changes] should be regarded as an affirmation, rather than a repudiation,
of the 1946 'settlement.'"'" They were changes "designed to preserve
rather than destroy the status quo of procedural treatment.""' For in
light of the changes in the legal landscape, Scalia argued,
[Tihere seems to me little to be said for the Supreme Court's
assumption that its Vermont Yankee opinion represents a firm
adherence to the "settlement" of the APA. That is so only if one
considers the APA's abstract principles rather than the concrete
dispositions it was expected to produce.'89
Recast as an argument of translation, Scalia's point is quite telling.
As applied in its initial context, the APA required strict adherence to the
procedural rules inscribed within the statute. Though the statute nowhere
makes those rules exclusive, in that context, their exclusivity could be
presumed. But that context-or as Scalia called it, that landscape-
changed. Most critically, the mix of formal and informal rulemaking
changed, and, as Scalia suggested, the very rules that guided procedure
were in a sense premised on the type and mix of agency rulemaking.'1
Once that mix changed-once issues that were presumed to be subject to
formal rulemaking became issues within the scope of informal rule-
making-a court resolved to be faithful to the initial compromise struck by
186. Id. at 375 (quoting Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 523).
187. Id. at 378.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 381.
190. Id. at 378.
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Congress was faced with a problem of translation: how best to accommo-
date this changed presupposition of the APA.
Arguably, then, the D.C. Circuit's accommodation was an accommo-
dation in light of the change in a presupposition to the initial bargain-that
is, a response that aimed at fidelity. And arguably too, the Supreme
Court's attempt to avoid nominal change itself effected a real change. If
so, then it was the Court that had in effect taken up the legislative pen and
rewritten the APA by allowing it to be applied in the same way in a legal
context that was radically different. Just as applying the silver platter
doctrine in the same way in light of Wolf would have been to change then-
existing Fourth Amendment law, applying the APA the same way in light
of the radical change in formal/informal rulemaking would have been to
change the meaning of the APA.
Here again, accommodation was necessary to avoid infidelity. Conce-
dedly, the predicates to both changes could be questioned as an original
matter-one could question Wolf as well as the Supreme Court cases
leading to the shift in informal rulemaking-but once both had taken place,
the accommodation described by Scalia and taken by the D.C. Circuit can
be seen as an accommodation of fidelity.19'
3. Legal Presuppositions: Article V.-A third example of translation
to account for changes in legal presuppositions addresses a presupposition
more completely background than either of the two just sketched. In the
191. At this point, one could raise what amounts to a metaquestion about the response of fidelity.
It could be argued that accommodation of the APA is not appropriate because Congress had a clear
intent that the Court would not engage in such "tinkering"; that to the extent the meaning of the statute
in the transformed context changed, Congress intended it to change, or intended it to correct it itself,
and it would be an infidelity to that intent for the Court to accommodate nonetheless.
The type of meta-intent described aboveis the opposite of Aleinikoff's notion of a statute enacted
with the meta-intent of a nautical interpretation-that its meaning is to change according to the "mores"
of the day. See Aleinikoff, supra note 32, at 21 (constructing the nautical model of statutory
interpretation, which "understands a statute as an on-going process (a voyage) in which both the
shipbuilder and subsequent navigators play a role'). Aleinikoff's approach is distinct from the one
sketched here in that he fully rejects any attempt to ground current meaning in an "archeological" past.
Statutes are read as if enacted "yesterday," though his approach requires important qualifications.
As a reading of congressional intent, this view of the APA is certainly plausible. Indeed, the
Seventh Amendment is a good example of this meta-intent. See Philip A. Hamburger, The
Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 239, 296 (1989) (discussing the
Framers' awareness of the changing scope of Seventh Amendment protections). Workers'
compensation statutes may be a second example. CALABRESI, supra note 32, at 40. It may be that
many provisions, statutory or constitutional, are constrained by a similar meta-intent. It may even be
that there is good reason to presume that all are. But for the purposes of these examples, I will
presume there is no such meta-intent shown (how could the plain-meaning interpreter ever discover
such an intent?). For before we know whether we should accommodate for the sake of fidelity, we
should understand how such accommodation would proceed. After we understand the nature of such
accommodation, we can then ask whether such accommodation is permitted, and more fundamentally,
intended.
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first example, the presupposition was contained within the translated text
itself-the earlier and overruled opinion; in the second example, the
presupposition was background to the practice constituted by the statute
enacted; in this example, the presupposition affects the norms for inter-
preting a constitution generally.
Ordinarily, when a normative text prescribes a list of methods to alter
or amend that text, that list is taken to be exclusive. Ordinary canons of
construction such as expressio unius est exlusio alterius suggest as much,
as might common sense. Such a presumption is not irrebuttable: for
example, if the text were a contract, and the text provided for one way to
alter the contract, but the practice of that particular industry was always to
imply a second way to alter the contract, it would not follow from the
mentioning of the one that the other was excluded." Instead, whether
the second was a valid method of alteration would depend upon the context
within which the text was drawn. So too, even if the background presump-
tion were to disappear, such that in this industry, now, a contract that listed
one method for alteration would be presumed to intend that as the exclusive
method, an interpretation of a contract drawn in the earlier period would
be read to include the alternative method, if fidelity to the parties' intent
were the primary objective of the adjudicator's method.
So much is commonplace, and I have no concern here to draw into
question these ordinary conventions of interpretation."ra But against this
background, consider the enumeration in Article V of the means by which
the Constitution can be amended. Few would doubt (in this legal culture
at least) that this list is the exclusive means by which the Constitution can
be amended." Those words, read in the current era, would convey to
any lawyer a message of exclusivity.
But Akhil Amar argues that was not their meaning when written.
Citing numerous examples of state constitutions drafted and construed at
the time, as well as the Framers' own understanding of the revolutionary
power of the people, Professor Amar argues that an eighteenth-century
192. See Merk v. Jewel Foods Stores, 945 F.2d 889, 900-01 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that an oral agreement to renegotiate the terms of a labor agreement, as opposed
to a common commercial contract, required "flexibility"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1951 (1992).
193. No doubt one could. Compare SUNSMIN, supra note 5, at 111-57 (asserting that judicial
interpretation of regulatory statutes is the easiest means to correct "regulatory malfunctions" and
challenging "widely accepted propositions about statutory construction" that define courts as agents of
the legislature, unable to look beyond the words of the legislature to'interpretive norms) with POsNER,
PRoBLEMs, supra note 32, at 279-82, 292-93 (contending that under the substantive canons of
construction proposed by Sunstein, the "principles of judicial action are so patently political [that] the
gains over ad hoe adjudication are questionable, and we have not the substance but the shadow of
formalism and the rule of law").
194. Indeed, Bork goes so far as to describe the exclusivity of Article V procedures as a
.necessary implication," at least for judges. Boj.K, supra note 57, at 143.
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constitutionalist would not have understood the Constitution to presume to
limit the powers of the people to amend or abolish it.195 Any such list
notwithstanding, it was understood that a background right of amendment
survived-a right the eighteenth-century constitutionalist would have
viewed as inalienable. For the Ratifiers, Article V may have been under-
stood to list some of the means by which the document could be amended,
but not all. It may, for example, list the ordinary means by which ordi-
nary government can alter the document, but not the extraordinary means,
by which the people can." As the Supreme Court said of the Eleventh
Amendment, behind these words too are "postulates which limit and con-
trol" their meaning," and as Amar argues, one such limiting postulate
was that normal government could not limit the means of its own
alteration.
Let us assume that Amar's history is correct,' 98 and imagine, as
Amar does, an amendment ratified by popular vote, in a referendum con-
trary to the procedures of Article V. How does a fidelitist assess the
validity of such an "amendment"? If she read the text of Article V as if
it were written today-if she ignored its original context-then she would
find within it a presumption of exclusivity, and the "amendment" would
be invalid. But if she read the text of Article V according to its original
context, she would find within it a presumption of nonexclusivity. If
following a practice of fidelity, she would select the latter reading first.
But that is just the first step. Next she must ask whether a change in
that presumption constitutes a change in a presupposition of the original
context-whether, had the presumption been then as it is now, the Framers
would have explicitly reserved the people's residual right of amend-
ment."9 And here the fidelitist must make a judgment of character.
Would, she must ask, the Framers and Ratifiers, already skeptical of
centralized power, whether in Philadelphia (the capital) or London (the
Crown), have given ordinary government the sole ability to initiate the
amendment process, by not reserving amendatory power to themselves?
Would they have allowed a constitution to be established that presumed to
alter the very premise of the people's right to alter or abolish the Articles
195. Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1043, 1044 (1988).
196. Id. at 1054.
197. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934). See Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578,2581 (1991) (reading the Eleventh Amendment according to the "presupposi-
tion of constitutional structure which it confirms").
198. It is unimportant here to resolve that one way or another.
199. Maybe they did in the Tenth Amendment. What other "powers" could have been reserved
to "the people" except this power?
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of Confederation without following the path prescribed by the Articles of
Confederation?'
If Amar is correct, then it is at least not absurd to conclude that a
reading of fidelity must find in the text an implicit reservation of power to
the people-a reservation that would not be implied were the same text
written today-and enforce that reservation against all who would claim the
only means by which the Constitution could be amended is Article V. If
a judgment of the character of the Founding is that such a power would
have been reserved explicitly, fidelity would require that reservation not be
defeated merely because our political consciousness has invisibly trans-
formed in two centuries.
Note, however, that the accommodation to preserve the original
meaning of Article V is not without limits. Amar raises the idea that a
referendum might, under original conceptions, be a legitimate method of
amendment."0 But the original conception of an "amendment" outside
ordinary forms was that of change by a convention,' and a central
aspect of convention was deliberation "out of doors."' If the power to
dislodge ordinary government was thought to rest only in the extraordinary
institution of the convention, then it would not follow that any extra-
ordinary means of amendment would be consistent with this conception.
In particular, it would not follow that a means which short-circuited the
implicit postulate of deliberativeness in the original design-for example,
a referendum-would be consistent with the original understanding. Thus
Amar may be right in principle, but he may be wrong to suggest that if
Article V is not exclusive, a referendum may satisfy its demands.' 4
Finally, note that the example simply applies the text now as it would
have applied then. So how is this an example of translation, for the result
would be the same under the two-step fidelitist's model as under the one-
step model?
The example helps distinguish between those cases in which the
response of fidelity to a changed presupposition is simply to apply the text
in the same way, and those cases where the response is-as with the APA
example above-to apply it differently. The difference in the two cases is
not definable in the abstract; it turns instead on a judgment about which
change preserves the most. Here, the translator imagines the Framers hold
200. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 532-33
(1969) ("If the Federalists were to accomplish their revolution, they would necessarily have to
circumvent the Articles of Confederation whose amendment legally required the unanimous consent of
the state legislatures.").
201. See Amar, supra note 195, at 1044.
202. See WOOD, supra note 202, at 306-43.
203. Id. at 319-28.
204. Amar suggests this possibility. See Amar, supra note 195, at 1064 n.79.
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a view about a fundamental if implicit right reserved in the people to alter
or abolish their constitution, and contrasts that view with a modem view
that no such implicit reservation is essential, and concludes that the text
(Article V) would have included an explicit reservation of such right if the
presupposition then were as it is now. The text would have included such
a reservation, the translator suggests, in part because the alternative-no
reservation at all-would have required a radical reconceptualization of the
founding generation's political theory and theory of sovereignty.' That
change is the radical change; the change in Article V, the conservative
change. The translator opts for the conservative move every time.
With the APA, the story is similar even if the conclusion is somewhat
different. Again, the translator treats as exogenous the presupposition
reflecting the values served by the particular procedural protections
provided, given the existing mix of formal and informal rulemaking.
When that mix changed, the translator imagines the framers of the APA
adopting a different mix of procedural protections, in part because the
alternative-giving up the values manifested by the protections actually
given-is a far more radical change than is the change of increasing the
protections. The result is an application in the current context that
increases the procedural protections-a different application. Again, the
difference turns on which accommodation is the smallest change-it would
save more, the claim must be, to make this change than to allow the back-
ground change to proceed unchecked.
4. Legal Presuppositions: States' Rights.-Isomorphic with the APA
example given above is the constitutional battle over a concept called
"states' rights." To see the link, we must first place the debate in context.
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides in part: "The
Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.""
The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."'
It follows that the "power" to regulate commerce "among the several
States" rests with the federal government. But what is the scope of that
power? And is the Tenth Amendment relevant to determining its scope?
On two readings of the Tenth Amendment, it is; on a third, it is not.
Take the third reading first. According to what we can call a residuaist
205. The absence of such a reservation would have made the Founding illegal as well. See id. at
1047-49 (discussing the illegality of the Framers' actions in light of the Articles of Confederation and
then-existing state conditions).
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
207. Id. amend. X.
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reading, the Tenth Amendment states a tautology: we simply ask first
whether something is within a federal power. If it is, then the federal
power dominates. According to this reading, one need look no further than
Article I, section 8211 to resolve any federal power question.
This form of residualism flourished when the Court had a clear con-
ception of the scope of the commerce power-that is, after the New Deal,
when its conception was that the commerce power was essentially unlim-
ited .' It is similar to another form of residualism that flourished before
the New Deal,"' when the scope of the commerce power was unclear.
Under this approach (the first of my three readings), the Court looked at
whether it was clear at the Founding that the particular power at issue was
a power that the states had exercised. If it was, then it could not be
exercised by the federal government, since of course, it must have been a
power "reserved to the States." 211
Both kinds of residualism are similar in form; both embrace a similar
methodology. They are similar in form because each solves the power
question statically, as if the Constitution stated rules of accounting, by
looking to the half of that accounting relation that the Court feels most
confident about and then solving for the other half. They embrace a
similar methodology because each ignores the significance of a changed
interpretive context: each proceeds as if the meaning of either clause is
independent of the context within which it is read, as if we can be faithful
to the original regulatory balance struck by the Framers without actually
considering how that balance has changed. Thus, under the first kind of
residualism (does this affect commerce?), the Tenth Amendment is not rele-
vant to the solution; under the second kind of residualism (is this a
traditional function of the state?) the Tenth Amendment is dispositive.
Distinct from both forms of residualism is a method very much like
the method of the translator, a view best articulated by Justice O'Connor
in her dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority1
(the second of my three readings). In Garcia the Court overruled its
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery2 t3 in which the Court had
held nine years earlier that an otherwise permissible exercise of federal
power was limited by the Tenth Amendment if it regulated "states
208. Or any other federal power.
209. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
210. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,294 (1936) ("Mhe national powers of
legislation were not aggregated but enumerated-with the result that what was not embraced by the
enumeration remained vested in the states without change or impairment.').
211. Id.
212. 469 U.S. 529, 580 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
213. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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qua states."" 4 National League was one attempt to revive a nonresidu-
alist reading of the Tenth Amendment; Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Garcia is a better statement of the argument.
What is striking about Garcia is that both the opinions of Justice
Blackmun for the Court and Justice O'Connor in dissent structure the
question as one of translation. As Justice Blackmun conceded, citing
Monaco v. Mississippi,215 "[i]n order to be faithful to the underlying
federal premises of the Constitution, courts must look for the 'postulates
which limit and control'" its meaning.216 The search for "postulates
which limit and control" is the search of the translator. As Justice
O'Connor explained, one such postulate was that there would be a domain
of regulation left to the state because not granted to the federal government
under the original and limited understanding of the commerce power-a
domain of state autonomy within which the state would be free to deter-
mine itself.2 7 This autonomy, O'Connor suggested, was a presupposi-
tion of the original design, in just the sense that had the commerce power
been understood then as it is now, the amendment would have more clearly
limited the scope of federal power over commerce, in at least some areas.
Thus, the commerce power may have expanded, but O'Connor argued, the
Court has a duty to fashion doctrines in the current context to protect this
domain of state autonomy, and thereby protect an essential element of the
original constitutional deal. As she said:
Incidental to this expansion of the commerce power, Congress
has been given an ability it lacked prior to the emergence of an
integrated national economy. Because virtually every state activity,
like virtually every activity of a private individual, arguably "affects"
interstate commerce, Congress can now supplant the States from the
significant sphere of activities envisioned for them by the Framers.
It is not enough that the "end be legitimate"; the means to that
end chosen by Congress must not contravene the spirit of the Consti-
tution. Thus many of this Court's decisions acknowledge that the
means by. which national power is exercised must take into account
concerns for state autonomy ... [S]tate autonomy is a relevant fac-
tor in assessing the means by which Congress exercises its powers.
214. Id. at 847.
215. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
216. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.
217. Id. at 580-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor made this point most forcefully
in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775-91 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting)
(suggesting that state autonomy should be weighed as a factor in the balance when interpreting the
means by which Congress can exercise its authority on the states as states).
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This principle requires the Court to enforce affirmative limits
on federal regulation of the States to complement the judicially
crafted expansion of the interstate commerce power. 21 1
Thus, just as with the APA above, the landscape of federal power has
been transformed by a more expansive understanding of the commerce
power.219 In light of that change, the Court must adopt a different
reading of the Tenth Amendment, she argues, so as to preserve something
of the meaning of state autonomy from the original design. If the Court
does not "take into account concerns for state autonomy " ' something
crucial from the original design will be lost. Fidelity to that design,
O'Connor suggests, requires accommodation.
The Court, through Justice Blackmun, does not deny the shift in the
power of the federal government to regulate interstate commerce. And
nowhere does the Court deny that Justice O'Connor's corrective would be
an attempt at accommodating to that shift. The Court's unwillingness to
accommodate is instead based on simple pragmatics-the Court should do
nothing to restrike the balance, Blackmun argues, because anything it
would do would require it to make judgments that are either beyond its
capacity or inherently political. 1 The Court had tried before, Blackmun
insists, in other similar contexts (for example, when drawing the
governmental/proprietary distinction in the intergovernmental tax immunity
cases), ' and always the Court had to confront the embarrassment that
such distinctions "inevitably invite[d] an unelected federal judiciary to
make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dis-
likes."' Instead the Court leaves to the political branches the defense
of states' rights.
More recently, however, Justice O'Connor proffered a new technique
for checking this invasion of state autonomy, one perhaps less difficult for
judges to enforce. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,' the Court, again acknow-
ledging the dual structure of the Constitution's original design, and again
confessing its inability to police the border between permissible and
impermissible regulation of state functions, reaffirmed that that border is
best policed by Congress.' Nonetheless, said the Court, it will not
218. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 584-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
219. Whether that expansion was proper is a separate question;
220. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 545-47. Compare the discussion of the limitations of capacity and structure infra note
328 and accompanying text.
222. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545 (citing South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905); Ohio
v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934)).
223. Id. at 546.
224. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991) (O'Connor, J.).
225. Id. at 2400.
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presume that Congress crosses that border carelessly. Therefore,
where a statute only ambiguously indicates Congress's intent to regulate
traditional state functions, the Court will presume Congress intended no
such regulation. Instead, if Congress intends to regulate state functions,
the Court will presume that Congress articulates that choice clearly. Only
where Congress speaks clearly will the Court hear it to regulate traditional
state functions.'
The clear statement rule, then, functions as a device to accommodate
Tenth Amendment interests in light of expanded federal power and in light
of a growing judicial timidity to make what are considered political judg-
ments. It is a reading of the amendment in the current context that is no
doubt different from the reading in its original context, but that arguably
better achieves its aim in this context given contextual changes. Like the
D.C. Circuit's administrative common law, the clear statement rule acts to
buttress original values in a transformed legal context. Like the D.C. Cir-
cuit's change, arguably this too is a change of fidelity.
5. Legal Presuppositions: The Exclusionary Rule (Mapp).-One final
example will fill out the catalog of translations to account for changes in
legal presuppositions. This is the example of the exclusionary rule.'
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, (some) violations of the Fourth
Amendment entitle the criminal defendant to the exclusion from her trial
of any evidence which is the fruit of that violation.' Under the Fourth
Amendment as originally understood, no such exclusion was implied.
Indeed, no remedy for Fourth Amendment violations is mentioned at all.
Thus, the question for the fidelitist is whether creating this remedy today
can be understood as an act of fidelity.23
To say that the original Fourth Amendment specified no constitutional
remedy for its violation is not to say that there indeed was no remedy for
a Fourth Amendment violation. When originally enacted there was at least
one remedy for what we would think of as violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment: the common law of trespass. And we might presume that when
enacted, the common law of trespass was viewed as sufficient to guard
226. Id. at 2405-06.
227. Id.
228. For the suggestion of a similar translation, see Albert W. Alschuler, Fourth Amendment
Remedies: The Current Understanding, in THE BILL. OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT
UNDE STANDING 197, 197-98 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991) [hereinafter THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
229. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
230. The question whether the exclusionary rule was really a new rule at all is not itself settled.
See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., A Critique of Twvo Arguments Against the Exclusionary Rule: The Historical
Error and the Comparative Myth, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881 (1975). See generally Yale Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical
Proposition1?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983). In what follows, I ignore this "principled" basis.
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against government intrusion into private spheres. But to see how the
remedy was sufficient, we must rehearse briefly some history of the
common law.?31
As many have agreed, the aim of the Fourth Amendment as originally
conceived was not to define the scope of privacy that the Constitution
guaranteed to the individual, but rather to limit the kinds of immunity the
federal government could grant federal officials against state common-law
causes of action arising out of their official acts of search and seizure.1
2
The warrant was one such immunity: with it a state actor was protected
from civil actions for damages arising out of any trespass committed in the
course of his official duties. 3  If the constable had a warrant, he was
privileged from suit; without a warrant, he was strictly liable for trespass
unless he actually found contraband in the course of his search or had ex
ante a good reason for the search-that is, he was liable unless he could
convince a jury that the search was reasonable.' The aim of the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant ClauseP5 was to limit the grounds upon which a
warrant could be issued-limit them, that is, to probable cause, and thereby
to make unavailable the general warrant.
Thus, as many originalists have argued, in its present incarnation the
Fourth Amendment has little apparent relation to this original aim.'
But to understand whether the appearance is merely appearance, we must
look more closely at the original presuppositions of the amendment.
Essential to the Fourth Amendment was a structural incentive, one
built in by the common law. As originally conceived, the police (or their
equivalents) had a very strong personal incentive to secure a warrant before
searches or seizures, for without a warrant, they were liable personally for
231. For further discussion of this point, see Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in California v.
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1992-94 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (sketching the history of Supreme
Court holdings on Fourth Amendment remedies, beginning with the common law of trespass).
232. See WILuIAM E. NELSON, AMERCANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 17 (1975); TELFOPD
TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONALINTERPRETATION 21-50 (1969); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1178-80 (1991) [hereinafter Amar, The Bill of
Rights]; Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1506-07 (1987)
[hereinafter Amar, Of Sovereignty]. See Bradford P. Wilson, The Fourth Amendment as More than
a Form of Words: The View from the Founding, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 228, at 151, 156-
60.
233. See Acevedo, I llS. Ct. at 1992 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263
(N.Y. 1813); 4 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *288 (1769)).
234. See id. (citing Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763); Amar, The Bill of Rights,
supra note 232, at 1178-80).
235. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .....
236. The purpose was apparently different in the context of arrests. While warrants were not
required for felony arrests (at least whenever there were reasonable grounds to believe both that a
felony had been committed and that the arrestee had committed it) they were generally required for
misdemeanor arrests not committed in the officer's presence. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 418, 422 n.ll (1976).
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their trespass.' And of course essential to this incentive was a
common-law system of remedies that actually made it true that the police
had an incentive-that is, a common-law system through which the
wronged citizen could get damages for the wrongful search or seizure by
the state official. As Amar notes, "The structure of these cases is
illustrative of the myriad ways in which constitutional 'public law'
protections are intricately bound up with-indeed, presuppose-a general
backdrop of 'private law' protections ... .211
Now again, as originally structured the Fourth Amendment applied to
the federal government, not the states, but the common-law remedy of tres-
pass was a state remedy. Thus, as originally structured, there was no
opportunity for the government restricted (the federal government) to
undermine the effect of this restraint (a limitation on possible immunity
from trespass actions) by redefining the trespass action itself to exclude
governmental officials: the federal government, that is, had no power to
define state trespass actions, and hence had no ability to interfere with the
protection trespass actions provided. Its power was restricted by a
common-law protection, which it had no power to limit, either by granting
itself immunity or by redefining the underlying common-law right.
But obviously, once incorporation occurred, 9 this critical division
of power was undermined. For now the government restricted (the state),
though limited in the immunity that it can erect against plaintiffs, has the
power to redefine the cause of action of trespass itself. Unlike the federal
government before incorporation, the state government can change the
constitutional protection itself in spite of incorporation, not by expanding
the defenses to a trespass action (by expanding immunity), but by changing
the common-law action of trespass itself. After incorporation it is possible
that the state could escape the restrictions of the incorporated amendment
by a formalistic trick: rather than authorizing general warrants, or granting
an immunity from prosecution to its own police, the state could simply
redefine the right against trespass to extend only against private actors-
trespass by state actors would be defined not to be "trespass." The state
could escape the Fourth Amendment limitations on the immunity it can
grant its officials from violations of individual rights simply by redefining
those rights not to extend to state officials.'
237. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
238. Amar, Of Sovereignty, supra note 232, at 1507.
239. See Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
240. Though perhaps the first clause of the Fourth Amendment entrenches the state's original
definition of trespass. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28 ("Accordingly, we have no hesitation in saying that
were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the
guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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Of course so much is simply a reductio ad absurdum on the premise
of the exercise-for as incorporated, it would make little sense to under-
stand the amendment as leaving unreviewed the scope of power that a state
has to redefine its trespass protections. If the existing common-law system
was integral to the proscription of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the
federal government, and an essential presupposition of that scheme was the
inability of the federal government to control the state's definition of
trespass, then it should follow that as incorporated against the states, a state
could not, by redefining the common-law right, eliminate all liability of
state actors for illegal searches and seizures." Just as the original
Fourth Amendment had a structural protection in the division of federal
and state power, such that the federal could not control the state grant of
rights, ' so too must the incorporated Fourth Amendment include a
limitation on the state's power to control the scope of the rights protected.
Were a state to grant itself immunity by redefining the right, then a central
legal presupposition of the original amendment would have been under-
mined and its essential structural incentive eliminated. A translator aiming
to preserve the meaning of the original structure would have to find other
means to preserve the common-law remedy-an alternative remedy, for
example-so that the structural incentives originally settled by that
amendment could be preserved.
Return now to reality. In this world, the states have not redefined
"trespass"; no state action or rule such as I describe works to immunize
directly state officials from liability for wrongful invasions of privacy.
Nonetheless, state inaction may have effectively achieved the same result.
For if the costs of seeking a common-law remedy for state violations of lib-
erty exceed any possible recovery, and if the state has not enacted cost-
shifting measures to permit those costs to be avoided, then the state has in
effect granted an immunity to state actors for their wrongful invasion of
privacy by depriving victims of any possible incentive to pursue protection
of their rights. It is as if the state has eliminated the common-law right
itself. And if the right has in effect been eliminated by the changing
241. Compare Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892 (1992), where the
Court, speaking of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, said that "if the protection against physical
appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully enforced, the government's power to redefine
the range of interests included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by
constitutional limits."
242. Of course all this is contingent upon facts about the costs of common-law adjudication that
I only assume are true here. While a fair evaluation of the actual costs is beyond the scope of this
essay, I do not mean to suggest this idyllic common law was costless. For example, Alschuler has
counted some 40 stages at which fees were required in a common-law civil case, but as he notes
crucially, these were borne by the losing party. See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger:
The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tter Trial System in Civil Cases, 99
HARv. L. REv. 1808, 1857 n.200 (1986).
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availability of a common-law remedy, then we can say the state has in
essence removed a central presupposition of the Fourth Amendment's
protection.
It is against this background that the extension of the exclusionary rule
to state proceedings begins to make sense-not as the creation of new
rights, but as the creation of a different remedy, a translation aimed to
preserve old protections in a new legal context.
This, at least, was the rationale of Mapp v. Ohio, 3 which extended
the protection of the exclusionary rule to the states. As the Mapp Court
claimed, no longer was the common law a sufficient remedy for illegal
state action, and consequently, an alternative remedy was required to
restore the original constitutional balance.' The Court selected the
exclusionary rule, no doubt an imperfect and systematically biased
remedy,2 5 as an alternative remedy to ffill in the gaps left by the eroded
common law.' Thus, while in 1791, the amendment would not have
been read to imply an exclusionary remedy, in light of the transformed
social and legal context2 7 -transformed by the loss of a presupposition
essential to the original design-a different application of the amendment
is now required, one that substitutes a remedy where the state has with-
drawn the old remedy.'
243. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
244. See id. at 652 ("The experience of California that such other remedies have been worthless
and futile is buttressed by the experience of other States."); see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
42-43 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (commenting that the measure of monetary damages in trespass
actions provides no viable remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment).
245. In Wolf, Justice Frankfurter remarked on the bias inherent in the exclusionary rule:
Indeed, the exclusion of evidence is a remedy which directly serves only to protect those
upon whose person or premises something incriminating has been found. We cannot,
therefore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand such persons, together
with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of private action and
such protection as the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public
opinion, may afford.
Wolf, 338 U.S. at 30-31.
246. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 653-55. Note that the incentives under a current damages regime would
be different from those under the original regime, not just because of the judge-grown doctrine of
officer immunity, but also because of the wide reach of indemnification statutes. While I agree that
the former distortion is a real distortion, there are good reasons to believe that indemnification statutes
would be less distorting. Certainly the police departments, or cities, who bear the costs of the damage
remedy are in an adequate position to police the behavior of their own police. Indeed, they may be
better cost allocators than common-law courts. See Amar, Of Sovereignty, supra note 232, at 1488.
See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZENs REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS
100-121 (1983) (urging the expansion of governmental liability for official misconduct).
247. Of which of course I have only begun to address. Nothing so far begins to account for much
relevant change-for example, changes in technology, law enforcement, and organization. See
Alschuler, supra note 228, at 200-03; see also Kamisar, supra note 133, at 571.
248. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 30-31 (Frankfurter, J.). Admittedly, the Court might have chosen the
wrong translation. Judge Posner argues that a lodestar method would have been cheaper. See Richard
A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 49, 53-58 (1982) (arguing that
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If it is true that the incorporation of the exclusionary rule is justified
because of the continued need for a supplemental remedy, then this pro-
vides a clear test of my thesis that the extension of such a remedy is best
understood as an act of translation. For imagine that a state enacted the
equivalent of a workers' compensation statute for violations of privacy by
state actors-providing, say, a simple and cheap remedy for wrongful
searches and seizures. With this alternative remedy in place, the state
petitions the Supreme Court to exempt it from the requirements of the ex-
clusionary rule. In support of its petition, the state points to evidence
demonstrating that the remedial effect of its statute far exceeds the remedial
effect of the exclusionary rule, and does so at less social cost. 9 More
illegal searches are prevented, that is, through the use of remedies that
impose fewer costs on society. Faced with such a petition, the Court
would have little reason not to rule in favor of the state, if in fact the
extension of the exclusionary rule was grounded-on a fidelitist's commit-
ment to the original structure of incentives. For the fidelitist, once the
state acts to restore the original structure, there is no continued sanction for
an alternative remedial prophylactic.'
So understood, a central enigma for conservatives can be reconceived
as a fidelitist's response to the change in the structure of incentives under-
lying the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, such a reconception identifies a
means for eliminating the constitutional justification for the prophylactic
exclusionary rule. If the exclusionary rule is understood as an act of
translation, then translation suggests a means by which it can-or should-
be replaced."
6. Nonlegal Presuppositions: Safeguards Against Self-Incrimination
(Miranda).-The previous five examples have tracked translation in the
making a tort remedy feasible would produce "optimum deterrence" of unlawful searches at less social
cost than does the exclusionary rule). Also, I ignore what is no doubt the far more significant factor
accounting for the undermining of the common-law remedy: the ever-expanding, court-created doctrine
of officer immunity. See Amar, Of Sovereignty, supra note 232, at 1487 (noting that courts "have
opened up a wide remedial gap by creating expansive official immunities").
249. See Posner, supra note 248, at 71-75.
250. This conclusion is resisted by scholars LaFave and Israel, but as they note, the notion is
supported by the Court's later position in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), and Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). WAYNE R.
LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 107-08 (2d ed. 1992); cf Kamisar, supra note
230, at 664-67 (asserting that the exclusionary rule should be maintained irrespective of the existence
of other remedies).
251. Note finally that to the extent the exclusionary rule remains only so long as legislatures fail
to restore the constitutional baseline, the charge of countermajoritarianism remains weak. See BORK,
supra note 57, at 130 ("The rate of constitutional revisionism picked up with the New Deal Court and
became explosive with the Warren Court. The Courts after Warren's ... showed little significant
slowing. We observe, therefore, the increasing importance of the one counter-majoritarian institution
in the American democracy.").
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context of changes in legal presuppositions. But unless law were abso-
lutely autonomous, 2 there should also be examples of translation engen-
dered by changes in nonlegal presuppositions. The Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause example described above demonstrated one such
change; 3 the examples that follow sketch five others. In each, a
translation is made in light of a change in a nonlegal presupposition of the
originating context. Again, by nonlegal presupposition, I simply mean a
fact about the social context not primarily constructed by or constituted by
legal norms. Of course, no sharp line divides the two types of presup-
positions, and the first example discussed below comes close to the border,
appearing alternatively as a legal and nonlegal presupposition. Nonethe-
less, for reasons that should emerge, I will treat it here as a nonlegal pre-
supposition.
Few decisions of the Warren Court have attracted the derision of the
originalists as has Miranda v. Arizona.' Out of whole cloth, it is said,
the Court constructed this constitutional "right" to an arbitrary set of
warnings, a construction unprecedented in our constitutional history. It
was a "trompe l'oeil," in the words of Justice Harlan, 5 and "[a]t odds
with American and English legal history" according to Justices White,
Harlan, and Stewart. 6 But for its amazing constitutional entrenchment,
as well as broad acceptance by law enforcement officials, Miranda would
be the first sacrifice in the originalist's crusade. Its very heresy, however,
makes it an irresistible subject for a fidelitist's review of changed constitu-
tional readings. Can Miranda too be understood as translation rather than
free verse?
Professor Yale Kamisar has for some time sketched the argument that
suggests Miranda's translative pedigree, 7 and after the examples so far
presented, we can recast his argument quite easily. What has changed to
justify the change of Miranda?
As Kamisar argues, quite a lot, but to see just what we should return
to what was before. At the time the protections of the Fifth Amendment
252. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J.
624, 624-26 (arguing that law is not autonomous, but rather that social attitudes and values, such as
racism, often give rise to legal rules reflecting those attitudes and values).
253. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
254. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
255. Id. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
257. See Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New* Fifth
Amendment and the Old 'Voluntariness' Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966), reprinted in YALE
KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 41,41-55(1990) [hereinafter Kamisar, Dissent].
Kamisar made the same argumentsjust before Miranda was decided as well. See Yale Kamisar, Equal
Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions ofAmerican Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINALJUSTICE IN OUR
TIME 1 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965), reprinted in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, supra,
at 27-40 [hereinafter Kamisar, Equal Justice].
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were carved into the constitutional text, there was no generalized bureau-
cracy of investigation of the sort we know today as the police. The powers
of the common-law police analogs were quite limited and distinct: they
were empowered to quell disturbance and restore order, and to secure
offenders for presentment to a court and later a magistrate. As Kamisar
describes, it was a time "when 'local prosecuting officials were almost
unknown,' and a 'primitive constabulary . . . , consisting of watchmen
rather than police officers and wanting in any detective personnel,
attempted little in the way of interrogation of the persons they appre-
hended.'""8 Or, as Kamisar further describes:
[Tihere were simply no "police interrogators" to whom the privilege
could be applied.. . . "[Criminal investigation by the police, with
its concomitant of police interrogation, is a product of the late
nineteenth century"; in eighteenth-century America... "there were
no police [in the modem sense] and, though some states seem to
have had prosecutors, private prosecution was the rule rather than the
exception. "9
So if not the police, who were the interrogators? First note, as we
seem long to have forgotten, that before the time of the Founding, the
English common law forbade the defendant from testifying at trial as a
witness at all, whether to confess or claim his innocence.' Thus, if the
text of the Fifth Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself")"1 is read in its most limited sense (as
applying to witnesses at trial), it had no application when adopted, since,
again, when adopted criminal defendants could not be witnesses. As Dean
Griswold argues, "the importance of the privilege against self-incrimination
[at the time of adoption] was in investigations, in inquiries, and with
respect to questioning of the defendant by the judge in criminal cases, such
as had been made notorious by Judge Jeffries."I 2 Thus, concludes
258. Kamisar, Dissent, supra note 257, at 47 (omission by Kamisar) (quoting LEwis MAYERS,
SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 86 (1959)).
259. Kamisar, Equal Justice, supra note 257, at 36 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted in
original) (quoting Note, An Historical Argumentfor the Right to CounselDuring Police Interrogation,
73 YALE LJ. 1000, 1034, 1041 (1964)).
260. This fact was forgotten in Miranda itself. See Kamisar, Dissent, supra note 257, at 50
(noting that, although Justice White's Miranda dissent relied on a law review article that discussed the
common-lawprohibition against defendanttestimony, Justice White nonethelessignored this information
in his dissent).
261. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
262. Erwin N. Griswold, The Individual and the Fifih Amendment, THE NEW LEADER, Oct. 29,
1956, at 20, 22 (emphasis in original) (quoted by Kamisar, Dissent, supra note 257, at 50). Griswold
is referring to George, Baron Jeffreys, more commonly known as Judge Jeffreys. Jeffreys's judicial
exploits are infamous. See P.J. HELM, JEFFREYS: A NEW PORTRAIT OF ENGLAND'S "HANGING
JUDGEs 198 (1966) (stating that the combination of his "wide eyes," "powerful voice," and "volatile
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Kamisar, the privilege is given sufficient content if it is viewed as
protecting "an accused not sworn as a witness from interrogation by prose-
cutor or judge at the trial... or as protecting an accused from questioning
before trial."' Thus the primary locus of interrogation against which
the clause was directed was either at trial by the judge, or before trial by
magistrates.2
The world of the Framers has dramatically changed. As Kamisar
describes, "[e]ventually, 'but wholly without express legal authorization,'
interrogation became the function of the emerging organized police and
prosecuting forces. " ' Slowly investigation shifted outside the control
of the court, into the control of the police, an increasingly bureaucratic
purgatory-an interregnum between liberty and judicial process. With this
shift there opened a crucial gap in constitutional protection. At the
Founding, the privilege protected at least that place where the vast amount
of the wrong to be avoided (interrogation) occurred (at trial). But now the
place where the wrong to be avoided occurs (the stationhouse) has changed.
And the question becomes how the fidelitist is to account for this drastic
change-whether to ignore it or to incorporate it into existing constitutional
norms.
Kamisar argues that Miranda represents one response of fidelity: as
the locus of investigation shifted from the courtroom, to the preliminary
investigation by the magistrate, to the bureaucratic police, the protection
of the Fifth Amendment too must (and did) shift, if the same protection
afforded by the Founders is to be afforded to the Founders' progeny. As
Kamisar quotes, "If the police are permitted to interrogate an accused
under the pressure of compulsory detention to secure a confession....
they are doing the very same acts which historically the judiciary was doing
in the seventeenth century but which the privilege against self-incrimination
abolished."' Only by extending the privilege to interrogation by police
does one preserve the original meaning of the privilege.
temperament" was "an explosive one and there is no doubt that Jeffreys deliberately used it to alarm,
when he thought that fear would help him to uncover the truth"). Legend has it that Judge Jeffreys
carried out questioning of a witness from the bench, allowing counsel only an occasional contribution.
See E.S. TutRNER, MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP 86 (1971) (recounting that "[ec]ontantly Jeffreys
called on Heaven to witness the impossibility of getting the truth out of a lying Protestant knave").
263. Kamisar, Dissent, supra note 257, at 51 (emphasis in original) (citing Lewis Mayers, The
Federal Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Constitutional or Common Law?, 4 Am. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 107, 114 n.20 (1960)).
264. However, there is some evidence that the clause was meant to reach interrogation by the
executive before trial, as had occurred in Virginia during the Revolution. Id.
265. Id. at 47 (emphasis in original) (quoting MAYERs, supra note 258, at 86).
266. Id. at 53 (quoting ALBERT R. BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 104 (1955)).
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Miranda's translative pedigree thus rests upon at least one critical
change in the interpretive context between the Founding and today-the
locus of interrogation. 7 The two-step would claim that to preserve the
meaning of the original protection in this fundamentally changed context
requires something like the Miranda accommodation.' Indeed, Miran-
da's accommodation only appears odd to us because we are focused on
reading the Fifth Amendment's text out of context-today, a criminal
defendant can be a witness, and today, investigation and interrogation
occur both within and without the judicial process; thus today, a text that
required that no one "shall be compelled ... to be a witness against
himself" would reasonably be limited to the courtroom (giving the witness
the choice to testify) and not apply to the police. But this out-of-context
reading does not yield the text's meaning, for when written its protections
were complete, given the practice of the time.'
The question for the two-step resolves to this: Given the protection the
Fifth Amendment provided in context, and assuming the presupposition of
the primary locus of investigation was then as it is now, would the Framers
have accommodated this difference by making clear the broad application
of their protection? And if one could believe that they would, Miranda's
claim would be made.
Z Nonlegal Presuppositions: Protection of Privacy.-The change in
Miranda tracked a change in the locus of criminal interrogation, a change
that again was made for reasons independent of the constitutional text: in
the context of the Founding, the two-step claims, the protection extended
fully against the evil opposed; Miranda was required to assure that pro-
267. As Schulhofer points out, this shift was conceded even by the Meese Justice Department.
Stephen I. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 438 & n.9 (1987).
268. For a more recent instance of the continued need to preserve the Founders' right in the
present context, see Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1248 (9th Cir.) (holding that a willful police
attempt to deny "Miranda rights" gives rise to a § 1983 claim), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
For an excellent discussion of the nature of the remedy Miranda supplied, see generally David A.
Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190 (1988).
269. Schulhofer's more careful analysis of the case distinguishes three elements of the Miranda
decision. First, "that informal pressure to speak ... can constitute 'compulsion' within the meaning
of the fifth amendment. Second, [that this 'compulsion'] is present-in any questioning of a suspect in
custody .... Third ... that precisely specified warnings are required to dispel the compelling
pressure of custodial interrogation." Schulhofer, supra note 267, at 436. My analysis applies most
directly to the first (and least controversial) of these three elements. But so too, I suggest, does it apply
to the last two. For these last two are pragmatic accommodations to the dramatically changed context
of police interrogation in which there exists a much greater risk of compulsion. Id. at 460. These
accommodations are thus understandable as rules requiring the cheapest cost avoider bear the burden
of assuring that compulsion is not present. See id. at 449. As the Miranda Court explicitly remarked,
if the democratic branches disagree about these accommodations-ifthere are better, or more efficient,
methods of accommodation-the opinion in Miranda was not to stand in the way. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966).
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tection continued to extend fully against the evil opposed as that evil trans-
formed.
The particular form of Miranda's example suggests a second and more
famous example of translation to accommodate a change in nonlegal pre-
suppositions. This example, though, lives only in Justice Brandeis's
dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States.' Because the example
is so well known, and because the translative pedigree of Brandeis's
opinion has been so completely discussed before, 7' its treatment here can
be abbreviated.
The Fourth Amendment protects the right "of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" against unreasonable
"searches and seizures." 2' When adopted, the domain secured by the
amendment's protection was quite extensive, though as applied its protec-
tion was not complete. Eavesdropping, for example, was a form of inva-
sion that was not a trespass,2' as the scope of the amendment was
limited to physical invasions of property. Remember the functional struc-
ture of the amendment discussed above: its role was to limit the scope of
immunity that could be granted by federal law;' 4 but there need be no
immunity where there is at common law no wrong. Hence without the
predicate of a common-law trespass, the amendment had no role to play.
Thus, at the Founding the amendment's protection, while not com-
plete, was quite wide. In principle, the Fourth Amendment protected only
against physical invasion. Realistically, however, given the crude state of
surveillance technology, the only possible invasions were physical. Thus,
in practice, the amendment protected against the vast majority of possible
state invasions.
By the time the Supreme Court decided Olmstead, the technology of
possible state invasion had of course changed. New technology permitted
the state to extract all the information it could ever want without ever
crossing trespass law's barrier. And hence, when Olmstead was decided
(and if not by then, certainly soon thereafter), the practical effect of a
protection that extended only against physical invasions was very little at
all. Because of a change in facts alone, without any corresponding self-
conscious change in the scope of legal protection of citizens, a reading of
the Fourth Amendment that applied it now as it was applied at the
Founding would be a reading that remade the amendment's protection: for
270. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
271. James Boyd White, for example, offers an exceptional account in WHITE, JUSTICE AS
TRANSLATION, supra note 32, at 149-57.
272. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
273. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967) ("Eavesdropping is an ancient practice
which at common law was condemned as a nuisance." (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 233, at *168)).
274. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
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at one time the amendment protected citizens against all or practically all
of the possible means of invasion by the government, and at another it
protected against only some, or better, few, of the government's means of
invasion.
Yet in Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, construed
the amendment in precisely this limited way, using language that fits pre-
cisely the model of the one-step fidelitist sketched above. For him the
question was "what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when
[the amendment] was adopted."' 5 The text of the amendment itself, Taft
assured us, "shows that the search is to be of material things."6 But
the thing taken here-the words of another through a wiretapping device-
is not a physical thing. The amendment applied then only to physical
things; so too must it apply now.
In a justly famous dissent, Justice Brandeis understood the amend-
ment's protection differently, in part because Justice Brandeis's method
took the second of the fidelitist's steps. Quoting Weems v. United
States,' he wrote,
Legislation... is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils,
but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily
confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. There-
fore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth."
He then continued.
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, "the
form that evil had theretofore taken," had been necessarily simple.
Force and violence were then the only means known to man by
which a Government could directly effect self-incrimination. It could
compel the individual to testify-a compulsion effected, if need be,
by torture. It could secure possession of his papers .... Protection
against such invasion . . . was provided . . . by specific
language.... But "time works changes .... " Subtler and more
far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the
Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the
Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the
rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the
closet. 9
275. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
276. Id. at 464.
277. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
278. Ohmstead, 277 U.S. at 472-73 (Brandeis, I., dissenting) (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 373).
279. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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To protect against this new risk of invasion, to preserve the same
amount of protection as originally afforded, Brandeis argued that the pro-
tections of the Fourth Amendment must be applied to acts that fall outside
the literal scope of the text.' If, counting eavesdropping, the amend-
ment protected citizens against ninety percent of the practical means of
governmental invasion when adopted, so too must it be applied to protec-
tion against ninety percent of those means today. Thus states the argument
of translation.2"
8. Nonlegal Presuppositions: Support for Established Religions.-A
third example of translation to account for a change in a nonlegal
presupposition is adverted to in a recent article by Michael McConnell,
discussing the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
McConnell notes: "One of the most important eighteenth-century abuses
against which the no-establishment principle was directed was mandatory
support for churches and ministers. " ' This was an abuse because it
was, as McConnell describes it, "support for religion qua religion. '
Stated differently, the Founders considered this practice abusive for "it
singled out religion as such for financial benefit."' In a world where
government benefits were slight, where the federal government provided
essentially no welfare support, any spending that directly benefitted religion
would necessarily mean support for religion as religion.
Upon what did that conclusion-that mandatory support for churches
meant government support for religion-hang? As McConnell argues, it
280. Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
281. Finally, note one more obvious example of translation in the context of the Fourth
Amendment, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). At common law, officers were permitted to
use deadly force to apprehend a "fleeing felon." Garner, 471 U.S. at 13. The question in Garner was
whether this immunity survived. It did not. Said the Court, while it had often looked to the common
law to determine the reasonableness of police activity, it had "'not simply frozen into constitutional law
those law enforcement practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment.'. . . Because of
sweeping change in the legal and technological context, reliance on the common-law rule... would
be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical inquiry." Id. (quoting Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980)). Instead, two critical presuppositions had changed between the
Founding and 1985-first, unlike at the Founding, few felonies were punishable by death anymore, id.
at 13-14; second, "[t]he common-law rule developed at a time when weapons were rudimentary." Id.
at 14. The Court held that these changes justified a limitation on the use of force to situations where
"such force.., is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that
the suspectposes a significant threat .... " Id. at 3. The suspect in Garnerwas apparently unarmed.
Thus, the Court found that the rule permitting the use of deadly force on the fleeing "felon" in Garner
was not "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 11.
282. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroed, 59 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 115, 183
(1992); see also DsREK DAVIS, ORIOINAL bnmw 47-48 (1991) (describing the broad interpretation of
the Establishment Clause as a "no aid" approach).
283. McConnell, supra note 282, at 183.
284. Id.
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rested upon the presupposition that the government did not generally pro-
vide benefits for social services to the nonprofit sector. In that context,
aiding religious organizations meant aiding religion since the government
aided no one else.'
But the presupposition that the government aided no one else was, of
course, contingent. And by the 1940s, that contingency had radically
changed. By then the government provided a wide range of benefits to the
nonprofit sector.26 And thus, when the question whether the government
could supply churches just as it supplied nonreligious nonprofit benefit
providers was raised after this change, this change should have mattered.
Or at least it should have been accounted for somewhere in the Court's
reasoning. Instead, as McConnell argues, the change was ignored:
When government funding of religiously-affiliated social and
educational services became a constitutional issue in the late 1940s,
the Court properly looked back at the religious assessment contro-
versy. But it missed the point. The Court did not notice that the
assessments against which the advocates of the disestablishment in-
veighed were discriminatory in favor of religion. Instead, the Court
concluded that taxpayers have a constitutionally protected immunity
against the use of their tax dollars for religious purposes. This
immunity necessitated discrimination against religion, thus turning
the neutrality principle of the assessment controversy on its
head.2 7
McConnell then concludes,
The Court's analysis failed to recognize the effect of the change
in governmental roles. When the government provides no financial
support to the nonprofit sector except for churches, it aids religion.
But when the government provides financial support to the entire
nonprofit sector, religious and nonreligious institutions alike, on the
basis of objective criteria, it does not aid religion. 8
To determine the difference, the interpreter must look then to the context
of the initial determination; and once that context had changed in this
significant way, McConnell should agree that fidelity would require a
changed application as well.
Thus, the history of the Establishment Clause provides another
example of a change that is required to preserve something from the origi-
nal context. 289 The presupposition here was nonlegal (the amount of
285. See id.
286. Id.
287. McConnell, supra note 282, at 183-84 (footnote omitted).
288. Id. at 184 (emphasis in original).
289. A similar point is made by Donald Giannella:
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other spending); given its change, the fidelitist must ask what effect this
change would have had on the original judgments that informed the Estab-
lishment Clause. If the meaning of the original proscription hung upon the
fact that aid to religion would have been discriminatory (since the govern-
ment aided no one else), then continuing that proscription when govern-
ment aid is no longer discriminatory would change the meaning of the ori-
ginal proscription. As many have noted, it would be to transform the First
Amendment from neutrality to hostility.2' Because of its method, this
change the one-step would miss; because of its method, this change the
two-step must accommodate.
9. Nonlegal Presuppositions: Abandoning State-Imposed Segrega-
tion.-Finally, and most famously, is the example of Brown v. Board of
Education.29 As an example of translation, it is true to say both that
Brown provides the most self-conscious example of translation in light of
changes in nonlegal presuppositions, and that nonetheless, its utility to a
theory of translation is just slight. No one questions Brown's result
(anymore).2' Indeed, so completely has the legal system reoriented itself
after the decision that it may not even be possible to find the legal material
with which to mount a serious challenge to its conclusion. In a world
where a conservative like Justice Scalia says the correctness of the decision
"leaves no room for doubt,"293 it is difficult to reconstruct the world
where liberals such as Professor Herbert Wechsler could worry that no
principled opinion could be written to support it.2'"
So overdetermined, thus, Brown may provide no more than a purely
negative test of an interpretive theory: no theory of interpretation can
[Any thoroughgoing effort to interpret the religion clauses of the first amendment by
resorting to the original understanding of the authors and ratifiers . . . is apt to be
regarded as a misguided, if not dangerous enterprise.... For when we turn to
Madison's theories concerning religious freedom and non-establishment, we must
inevitably find them encrusted with certain implicit assumptions which were products of
prevailing social, political, and economic conditions. Doctrinal formulations designed to
achieve certain ends may achieve indifferent or perverse results when the assumptions on
which they rest change.
Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development (pt. 1), 80
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1967).
290. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1003 (1990) (arguing that a formally neutral law, such as
Prohibition, can actually lead to religious persecution).
291. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
292. Well, almost no one. See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 1, at 1040, 1037-43 ("It is even possible
that segregation would have ended more quickly in the deep South without Brown and the ten-year
grace period for compliance afforded by the 'all deliberate speed' formula.").
293. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, I., dissenting).
294. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 32-34 (1959).
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survive as a theory of interpretation of this Constitution unless it can justify
Brown. But as these limitations acknowledged, I still believe there is some
utility to exploring whether and how the theory of fidelity sketched above
could accommodate Brown.
In Plessy v. Ferguson,2' the Supreme Court upheld a state statute
requiring railroads to segregate passengers on the basis of race. Professor
Tushnet has argued that Brown can be understood as a translation of
Plessy.2' Translation explains Brown's result, Tushnet argues, because
of the changing importance of education between the two periods. In short
he argues that even if it was permissible to segregate schools when they
were insignificant, barely state-run, institutions, schools are not that
now.2' As Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Brown Court, "[W]e
cannot turn the clock back to 1868 . . . We must consider public
education in the light of its full development."298 Schools now are the
very center of state government, as clearly emblems of state action as any
state action could be.
But the problem with this argument is that it fails to explain the per
curiams of the Court following shortly after Brown itself, in which the
Court summarily struck down all forms of de jure segregation.2' If it
was the significance of education that explained Brown, then what was the
significance of public golf courses that explained Holmes v. City of
Atlanta?3
These questions invite a second understanding of the translation in
Brown.
Brown changed the application of the Fourteenth Amendment articu-
lated in Plessy. To understand Plessy, it is extraordinarily important to
understand the argument with which the Court was confronted. Homer
Plessy's argument focused not so much on the social importance of riding
in one car or the other; rather, Plessy's argument was about the construc-
tion of social meaning and, in particular, the state's responsibility for that
construction. Plessy did not complain about the social status of blacks in
America in general. He complained instead about the state's responsibility
for that social status.
At the center of Homer Plessy's case was a claim about the social
meaning of this legally imposed segregation: that the law's support of the
295. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
296. Tushnet, supra note 32, at 800-01.
297. Id.
298. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
299. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses); Mayor v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per
curiam) (beaches).
300. 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
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"social usage" of segregation "confirmed" the inferiority of the "black
man's" status. If so, then the social meaning of being black, Plessy
argued, was affected by the law's intervention, and affected for the
worse." t It was for this reason, he argued, that Louisiana was not
giving him equal protection of the law-not because Louisiana did not
provide equal access to public accommodations, but because Louisiana was
itself contributing to and responsible for the disability of the "black man's"
status.
Justice Brown, writing for the Court, joined issue with Plessy on
precisely this point. Like Plessy, he was not concerned with the impor-
tance of riding in one carriage versus another. Instead, Justice Brown
argued,
We consider the underlying fallacy of [Plessy's] argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
The argument necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than
once the case, and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race
should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and
should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby
relegate the white race to an inferior position. We imagine that the
white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption.'
Justice Brown believed that Plessy was wrong to believe that the social
meaning of being black was affected by anything the state did; wrong to
think that the stigma that he suffered was due at all to the actions of the
state; and wrong because Plessy's stigma was created by Plessy himself,
and thus was fully within Plessy's power to remove. Plessy's stigma was
"solely" a function of Plessy's choice and not at all a function of anything
the state enactment did. Thus, because the stigma was self-created, it was
not a burden requiring remedy under the Equal Protection Clause.
301. As attorneys Phillips and McKenney argued the case,
Sir Walter Scott reports Rob Roy as announcingproudly that whereverhe [sat], was
the head of the table. Everybody must concede that this is true socially of the White man
in this country, as a class. Nor does anybody complain of that. It is only when social
usage is confirmed by statute that exception ought or legally can be taken thereto. The
venom to free institutions comes in just there. A spirit of independenceis even nourished
in the poor man by observing the exclusive airs of good society. He can return its
indifference or its disgust with interest, leaning upon his sense of the impartiality of THE
LAW to both. But when law itself pronounces against his humble privileges the case be-
comes specifically different. What was mere fact yesterday, . . . becomes precedent
today. A pernicious down-grade is established.
Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210).
302. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (emphases added).
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Behind Justice Brown's argument is a conception of social meaning
that we could call libertarian-that social meaning is wholly within the
control of any individual to construct or reconstruct; that it is, to borrow
unfairly from Roberto Unger's terminology, fully plastic" not just
socially (that is, through collective action), but also individually (through
the action of one person alone). Justice Brown claimed that the social
meaning of being segregated was plastic in just this sense,' and if it
were plastic in this sense, then the state would indeed not be responsible
for any meaning of stigma attached to segregated train cars.
So was Justice Brown's understanding correct? Perhaps one could
imagine a time when social meaning was plastic in just this sense, and
maybe it was so in 1896, though I doubt it. Nonetheless, none could deny
that social meaning was no longer plastic in this sense by 1954. It was (at
least) by then clear that, as Justice Harlan argued in Plessy itself, the
actions of a government enforcing a separation because of race marked one
race with a badge of inferiority,' and that the social meaning of in-
feriority was not constructed, or reconstructable, by any one individual
acting alone.
Plessy's "fallacy" then became the premise of Chief Justice Warren's
argument in Brown: harm in the form of a stigma did flow from the actions
of the state,' since the social meaning of this stigma was in part state-
created. If the stigma was state-created, then the Equal Protection Clause
required its elimination, or at least it required the elimination of that part
for which the state could be held responsible. So held Brown."5
303. See ROBERTO M. UNOER, PLASTICITY INTO PoWER 153 (1987) (defining plasticity as "the
facility with which work relations among people.., can be constantly shifted in order to suit changing
circumstances, resources, and intentions").
304. See CHARLES LOFOREN, TE PLESSY CASE 178-79 (1987) (characterizing Justice Brown's
conclusion in Plessy as being that "racial instincts exist, and ... are sufficiently rooted in man's nature
as to be impervious to alteration through legal schemes").
305. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
306. See Brief for the United States on the Further Argument of the Question of Relief at 6,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1).
307. Or at least, reviewing the procedural posture of the case, nothing showed that the finding
below of stigmatic harm was false. One could well doubt whether such an important constitutional
issue should depend on the fact-finding of a particular tribunal. But the lawyer's appeal to procedural
posture has not been so limited. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 680
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing against the majority's "supposition that the constitutionality
of a state regulation is determined by the factual record created by the State's lawyers in trial court").
Brown itself was understood as a finding of fact (rather than ruling of law) by at least one federal court.
See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667, 678 (N.D. Ga. 1963) ("The
Court holds that the existence or non-existence of injury to white or black children [from integrated or
segregated schooling] is a matter of fact for judicial inquiry and was so treated in [Brown]."), rev'd,
333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964). Obviously the sense in which the finding
about the nature of the state's construction of meaning must be a different kind of fact than was spoken
of there.
308. It is of course an important and importantly troubling conclusion from the translation
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Now I do not mean to argue that Justice Brown would have converted
had we shown him a bit about the construction of social meaning. Brown's
opinion in Plessy is obviously overdetermined, and there can be little doubt
that had his argument not been available to him, he would have found
another. But on its face, the opinion offers a rhetoric that the argument of
fidelity can meet.' If, as the rhetoric suggests, the decision in Plessy
rests on a conception about the social meaning of being black, then
Brown's denial of Justice Brown's premise suggests another example of a
translation to account for a change in nonlegal presuppositions. In the
context of Plessy, taking Justice Brown at his word, if he believed that the
state-required segregation was not responsible for any additional harm to
Plessy's self-imposed stigmatic harm because social meaning was individu-
ally reconstructable, then the notion of individually plastic social meaning
was a presupposition of Justice Brown's argument. By the time of Brown,
however, that presupposition was certainly rejected. According to the
then-current view about the nature of social meaning, state-imposed segre-
gation was clearly a stigmatic harm for blacks (at the least). In light of
that changed presupposition, the application of the Equal Protection Clause
had to change. If it changed to accommodate the change in presupposition,
then it changed as an act of fidelity.31°
So much shows that a changed presupposition could explain the change
from Plessy to Brown." One could ask whether there was a changed
argument for Brown's correctness that it may also imply Plessy's correctness in context. Forjust this
reason, Justice Black rejected the argument. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 677 n.7 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Brown decision was correct for the same
reason Justice Harlan dissented in Plessy: the purpose of the framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments was "completely to outlaw discrimination against people because of their race
or color").
309. Thus, I am open to the same charge of implausibility that Professor Klarman raises against
Ackerman's isomorphic account of Plessy since "Justice Brown doubtlessly would have reached the
same result even if deprived of [the incorrect] premises." Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional
Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44
STAN. L. REv. 759, 787 (1992) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991)). In response I would argue, as I believe Ackerman must, that the question is not what Justice
Brown would have done, but rather what the structure of Brown's justificatory rhetoric is. Justification
operates at that level, and not the level of individual psychology. For example, if a defendant
successfully justifies the breach of a contract on grounds of impossibility, it is no reply to argue,
impossibility notwithstanding, she would have breached the contract anyway and so should be held li-
able in damages. See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at
288 (1991); cf. CommonwealthEdisonv. Allied-General NuclearServs., 731 F. Supp. 850, 860 (N.D.
Il. 1990) (Posner, J., sitting by designation) ("'[Slupervening impossibility'-that is, impossibility
arising after the promisor broke the contract-is a defense."). See infra note 311 for further discussion
of Ackerman's argument.
310. Professor Hovenkamp suggests a similar difference between Plessy's context and that of
Brown. As he forcefully argues, each opinion is consistent with the mainstream of social science of
its time. Hovenkamp, supra note 252, at 624-26. His explanation, too, could suffice as a justification
of a changed presupposition accounting for the differences in outcome between the cases.
311. As justification, this analysis might imply that both Plessy and Brown were correct
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presupposition between the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Brown-whether Plessy, that is, was wrong. For most assume that Plessy
was consistent with the understanding of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and hence most assume that a consistent one-step would have
agreed with the outcome of Plessy.31 If that is correct, then the central-
ity of Brown in our interpretive constellation may draw additional support
for the practice of the two-step.
Nonetheless, it is not important for my purposes to resolve whether
the conventional Wisdom about the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment is correct, or whether, as Michael McConnell now forcefully
argues, the conventional wisdom about the original meaning is flatly
wrong.1 3 For as I hinted at the start, the focus of the two-step's method
is incremental. The charge of justification comes when there is an apparent
change, which Brown was relative to Plessy. And it is sufficient here,
then, to suggest how Brown could be justified relative to Plessy. All the
better if it need not confront Plessy's embarrassment.
10. Nonlegal Presuppositions: Antitrust, Economic Theory, and Mis-
translations.-My final example of translation is the transformation of
antitrust doctrine effected by the courts over the century or so that antitrust
has had a federal charter. It may also be the best example of the dangers
of the practice of translation itself. For the best reading of the story I am
about to relate is not a reading of fidelity; indeed, it may be a model of
precisely the infidelity that the one-step seeks to avoid. All the more ironic
then that the story that follows is the child of judges who are usually
interpretations for their times. The argument is similar in structure to Bruce Ackerman's, as presented
in ACKERMAN, supra note 309, at 149. What distinguishes the two arguments is the difference in the
presupposition said to change: Ackerman claims the changed presupposition was a conception about
the proper role of an activist government; I claim that the changed presupposition was the conception
of race and stigma. Compare id. at 146-48 with supra notes 306-10 and accompanying text. See also
Kiarman, supra note 309, at 786-87 (describing Ackerman's "nifty" argument that "[m]odem
commentators miss the possibility that both cases [Plessy and Brown] were correctly decided . ..
because they fail to appreciate that the Constitution was amended in 1937"). This difference is
significant, since Ackerman's requires the pedigree of democratic change, while mine does not.
312. See RAOUL BER ER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 126-27 (1977) (noting that an attempt to
require state constitutions to provide a nondiscriminatory public school system failed soon after the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
SegregationDecision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955) (suggesting the Fourteenth Amendment was not
originally meant to apply to segregation); Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV.
1365, 1374-76 (1990) (describing Bork's position that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not intend to bring about social equality).
313. Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment. A SecondAmerican Revolution or the
Logical Conclusion of the Tradition?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1159, 1164-68 (1992) (arguing against
the view that the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment constitute a radical departure from those of
the original Constitution); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions (1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review).
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committed one-steps in the context of constitutional interpretation. 314 But
we save judgment to the end, on both the disciples and the discipline.
Born in the confusion of a statutory text that-standing alone-could
not mean what it said, from the start antitrust law has looked outside itself
for guidance in applying the proscription of "every" agreement "in
restraint of trade" in a way that made sense. 315  As Justice Scalia has
explained, the term had a common-law meaning, and the Sherman Act
"adopted the term ... along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the
common-law itself, and not merely the static content that the common-law
had assigned to the term in 1890." 1 6
The common law's dynamic potential serves to assure that the statu-
tory proscription continues to make sense. What "makes sense," though,
is answered only by reference to a theory; therefore antitrust law has from
the start been contingent upon the theory it embraces. As the theory has
been transformed, so too has antitrust been transformed. But, as all change
does not entail fidelity, we should ask whether this change was a change
of fidelity.
Assume for a moment that the framers of the Sherman Act had one
ideal in mind: that, as Judge Bork has argued, "Congress intended the
courts to implement... only that value we would today call consumer
welfare."3 7 As Judge Easterbrook described that common end chosen
by Congress in 1890: "Members of Congress did not see themselves
choosing between 'efficiency' and some other goal. The choice they saw
was between leaving consumers at the mercy of trusts and authorizing the
judges to protect consumers."" 8
314. Thesejudges, former Judge Bork, Judge Easterbrook, and Justice Scalia, are three I will refer
to as members of the "Chicago School." Although Judge Posner is also from the Chicago School, he
would not argue that current antitrust law emerges from any exercise of fidelity to the Sherman Act's
framers. POSNER, PROBLEMs, supra note 32, at 289 n.7 (understanding current doctrine not as an act
of fidelity to the enactors of the Sherman Act, but as an adaption to "the socially preferable
interpretation" of the statute).
315. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1 199 1). For a general account of the history
of the Sherman Act that treats well its economic aspects, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 309, at 268-95.
316. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988). Why this invocation
of the common-law concept embraces the dynamic potential of the term, whereas the location of the
common-law concept of "due process of law" or "seizure" does not invoke the dynamic potential of
those terms, Scalia does not here explain. See Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2505-07 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that, in interpreting the Due Process Clause, "[ilt is precisely the
historical practices that define what is 'due'"); California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1549-51 &
n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (relying on traditional common-law definitions of "seizure" in interpreting the
Fourth Amendment).
317. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7
(1966).
318. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1696, 1703 (1986).
It may be that it makes no sense to speak of one purpose of the Sherman Act. If this is so, then the
sense in which consumer welfare is a coherent limit falls away.
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How one protects the consumers and how one pursues the value of
consumer welfare are functions of the technology for pursuing welfare-
i.e., economics. Thus for the courts to know which practices and policies
make sense as they are pursuing the value of consumer welfare, courts
must look to the technology of economics.
The problem is that the guide of economics itself has not remained
constant.319 At first, the Sherman Act tracked a moralistic conception of
the operation of the market; but as economics developed, so too did its ap-
plication to legal doctrine change. From its beginning as a doctrine of
moralism rather than economics (e.g., attacking good or bad competition,
trust busting),3' the antitrust doctrine came to incorporate more explicitly
the objective of promoting competition itself as a means of advancing con-
sumer welfare. 21 The last decades have seen the pinnacle of this pro-
gress, as the Department of Justice itself has adopted guidelines that track
explicitly economic effects in allocating its own enforcement resources.'
Easterbrook summarizes the result: "Modem antitrust law is a search for
economic explanations of problematic conduct." 3
For the two-step, so much change appears quite unproblematic, espe-
cially as it turns on the discretion to allocate resources in prosecution.
Here a statute that almost by necessity forced a focus outside itself has
been applied in radically different ways as the doctrine it tracked (welfare)
came to be understood differently (since economics was different). The
transformation fits precisely the structure of translation: applying a context-
dependent text differently as presuppositions of that context undergo
radically important changes. According to this conception, then, one could
well understand the history of antitrust law as the selection of alternative
means to a common end, where the means chosen depend upon the context
of choice, and the context of choice includes both the values Congress
selected (protecting consumers) and the facts of the world (conceptions of
economics). And so conceived, the history of antitrust doctrine provides
319. Easterbrook, supra note 318, at 1702 ("Economists in 1890 thought that cartels were
inevitable, maybe even desirable, and dismissed the Sherman Act as political puffery. Not until the
1930s did the economic profession claim to have a partial equilibrium model of monopoly and
oligopoly." (citations omitted)).
320. See id. at 1702-03; supra text accompanying note 318.
321. See Easterbrook, supra note 318, at 1698 n.7 (citing cases in which the Supreme Court has
utilized an antitrust approach strongly influenced by consumer welfare).
322. This change occurred first in the merger context. See Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines (released May 30, 1968), reprinted in ABA ANTITUsr SETION, MONOGRAPH No. 7,
MEoER STANDARDS UNDER U.S. ANT=TRUS LAWs 209, 209 (1981) (establishing that the primary
role of enforcement "is to preserve and promote market structures conducive to competition" and
focusing on market structure chiefly because the conduct of individual firms in the market tends to be
controlled by the structure of that market).
323. Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 983,
983 (1987).
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yet another example of translation accounting for changes in nonlegal pre-
suppositions.
But as I said at the start, all this hangs either on the claim that the
value entrenched by the framers was consumer welfare, or on the claim
that the framers intended to delegate to the courts the power to choose the
policy values that the statute would advance. For if the value chosen by
the framers was "concern for farmers, laborers, or small businessmen""
then the path pursued by the courts has been unfaithful to those values.
And if unfaithful to those original values, then the courts are guilty of
infidelity unless empowered to select new values.
As to the first possibility-that the framers chose consumer welfare as
the underlying value of the Sherman Act-the Chicago School stands on
weak ground.3" Historians have forcefully argued that, at best, there
was a broad mix of ideals that underlie the Sherman Act's enactment, none
of which stand firmly enough to trump all others.3" And if this is true,
then the translations effected in the name of welfare may be technically
perfect, but begin from a forged original. If antitrust was not single-
mindedly focused on consumer welfare, translations that presume that it
was fail fidelity.
But maybe the charge to the federal courts was not just to carry on the
common-law progress of restraint of trade, but also to select the values that
the antitrust doctrine was to advance. Perhaps Congress meant for the
courts to decide, between consumers and laborers, who should prevail.
And if so, then the final selection of consumers as the courts' chosen
victors would not be the manifestation of infidelity, at least to Congress's
original intent, but the implementation of Congress's delegated authority.
In the Parts that follow, I develop what may be an independent reason
for a court focused on fidelity to disavow just such a power-the power to
select the values to pursue. For now it is enough to see that the fidelity of
the antitrust doctrine may hang on precisely this (otherwise scandalous)
claim of judicial authority. Thereby do we also see the potential for trans-
lation's abuse. Whatever the virtue of the current antitrust doctrine, it may
reveal the clearest vice of the translator's practice.
324. See Bork, supra note 317, at 26.
325. See Bruce Ackerman,Robert Bork's Grandinquisition, 99 YAE L.J. 1419,1423 n.18 (1990)
(reviewing BORK, supra note 57) (accusing Bork of having selective perception of the Sherman Act's
legislative history); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 22 (1989)
("Not a single statement in the legislative history comes close to stating the conclusions that Bork
drew."). But see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTmGS LJ. 67, 151 (1982) ("The antitrust
laws were enacted to become broad and flexible economic mandates to improve 'consumer welfare,'
as Congress defined this term.").
326. See Hovenkamp, supra note 325, at 21-22 (arguing that high consumer prices, injuries to
competitors, and concern that successful firms may be condemned as illegal monopolists were all
prominent in the minds of the Sherman Act's framers).
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VI. Two-Step Fidelity: Limits on Equivalence
As I have already pleaded, these ten examples are not offered for their
truth-little hangs on whether in fact each describes a proper translation.
Instead they are offered to sketch a pattern of argument, one consistent, I
have argued, with a commitment to fidelity under one conception of
meaning and change, and common, I suggest, throughout our legal cul-
ture.3" Arguments certainly remain for rejecting these particular transla-
tions. But the reason they stand together here is that whatever their
ultimate weaknesses individually, all are at least understandable as illus-
trations, rather than violations, of a principle of fidelity.
Of the aspects of translation that I suggested would guide the two-step
fidelitist, however, we have so far touched on just one-the creativity
required to effect a translation. This no doubt is the empowering aspect
of the practice, and suggests the potential for vast interpretive reconstruc-
tion. It no doubt also raises the conservatives' nightmare of activism run
rampant. For nothing offered so far suggests how a practice of two-step
fidelity could restrain the legal interpreter, in just the sense of restraint
ordinarily understood by "judicial restraint."3' Indeed, nothing yet
shows whether translation could accommodate practices of restraint.
But we have not yet completed the instruction that translation has to
offer. For we have not yet focused on the limitation of humility that I sug-
gested a particular practice of translation might import. In this Part, I
explore some of these limitations.
Humility, as I described above, is a constraint on the translator's
creativity.3' In terms of the two-step's practice, if translation functions
by accounting for changed presuppositions, humility functions by limiting
the scope of the presuppositions that the translator can reckon. For
example, if translation could account for changes in presuppositions of
327. Other examples of arguments based explicitly on something like the model of translation
sketched here include Justices Kennedy and Souter's approach to defining a "public forum" for
purposes of the First Amendment. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112
S. Ct. 2711, 2718 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("We have allowed flexibility in our doctrine to
meet changing technologies in other areas of constitutional interpretation... and I believe we must
do the same with the First Amendment."); see also Amar & Widawsky, supra note 78, at 1359
(translating slavery); Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 506 (1989) (translating separation of powers); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note
32, at 523 (translating Article I, Section 7); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment
Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700 (1992) (translating the Establishment Clause after
incorporation).
328. There are of course two importantly distinct conceptions of restraint: structural and judicial
restraint. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 207-15. I address the latter. For the argument that "any
defensible theory of constitutional interpretation must demonstrate that it has the capacity to control
judges," see Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 823, 825 (1986).
329. Supra section IV(B)(4).
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types A to Z, humility says, "Don't account for presuppositions of types W,
Y and Z." Thereby humility limits the range of translations that can be
effected, not because accounting for them would not advance fidelity in
some sense, but because institutional constraints make this particular kind
of change inappropriate for this particular translator to effect. So under-
stood, humility describes a "second best" of fidelity-a constraint on an
ideal of fidelity imposed by the nature of the institution effecting the trans-
lation.
As applied to legal institutions, the limitations of humility I describe
will be of two sorts, one which I call "structural humility," the other
"humility of capacity." Structural humility finds reason to limit the scope
of translation in the nature of the presuppositions at issue-it restricts the
extent to which the judge as translator may account for presuppositions of
a particular kind. Structural humility says, for example, "Because this is
a political presupposition, the judicial branch should not account for it."
Humility of capacity, on the other hand, finds reason to limit the scope of
translation in the nature of the institution effecting the translation itself-
because of the particular weaknesses of this translator, humility of capacity
entails that certain types of presuppositions will remain unaccounted.
While the two kinds of constraints are distinct, both point to the weakness
of a particular translator (because the translator is the judicial branch, for
example, it is unable to make the following translations) relative to a con-
ception of an ideal translator.
One caveat is critical. My purpose in this section is not to endorse or
justify any particular restraint of humility. Indeed, I believe that the
constraints flowing from capacity should certainly be removed, so long as
the institutional limitations described could be corrected. My purpose is
instead simply to complete the picture suggested by the approach of the
translator. A two-step fidelitist could well insist that a practice of fidelity
should admit none of these constraints; but that would require reconceiving
of much about the institution, the courts, effecting the translation. All I
want to claim here is that a two-step fidelitist could admit at least these
constraints, and perhaps more, as limitations on the scope of translation.
Whether limitations of humility should be accepted, and ultimately what
those limitations should be, is a question beyond the scope of this essay.
It is enough here just to suggest why they could be incorporated into a
conception of fidelity in translation.
A. Translative Limits: Structural Humility
Begin with the limitation of what I will call structural humility. As
I discussed the term in the context of literary translation, humility requires
that a practice of translation not "improve" the material translated; that it
carry the weaknesses of the original text as well as the strengths into its
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new context. 3 We have already seen the somewhat controversial place
this ethic holds in traditional translation.33' The controversy there
requires us to justify any role it might have in the two-step's practice.
One possible justification has already been hinted at. As I have
described it so far, the predicate for a change of translation is a change in
a "presupposition." A presupposition changes whenever the original text
would have been different, had that presupposition been different when the
text was authored. But so defined, should the two-step effect a translation
whenever a presupposition changes?
Consider one example. It was a presupposition of the Founders'
Constitution that a bicameral legislature was "best." Many modem consti-
tutional democracies do not follow this model.332 This may indicate that
bicameralism is no longer considered "best," and if it is no longer best,
then the presupposition relied on by the Founders has changed. If it has
changed, then a two-step could ask, what would the Framers have done had
they not thought bicameralism best? The answer to that question could be
that the Framers would have embraced unicameralism; if so, the two-step
could argue, a translation of the Framers' conception into the current
context (where bicameralism is no longer thought best) would be to erase
bicameralism.
Now clearly something has gone wrong, but not because the example
does not fit the form of the two-step's practice. Instead the example forces
us to ask whether, although fidelity requires accommodation for some
changed presuppositions, it follows that fidelity requires accommodation for
all changed presuppositions. Is it possible that within a particular
translative practice some changed presuppositions should not be accounted
for by a translator, depending upon the kind of presupposition at issue?
Translation need not be so unlimited, but to see why, return to the
basics of humility. The constraint of humility says a translator is not to
make the translated text "better." When we enjoin a translator from
making a text better, we can understand this as a decision about the kind
of judgment for which the author will be held responsible. And from the
relativity of translation and equivalence sketched above, it follows that the
kind of judgment is a function of the practice at issue. A better text for a
poet is one that improves the poetry, thus it is fine if the translator im-
proves the handwriting. A better text for a child is a neatly written text,
thus it is not fine if the translator improves the handwriting. What
330. Supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
331. Supra note 148 and accompanying text.
332. Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Liechtenstein, The
Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Malta, Portugal, Rumania,. Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, and
Zimbabweare all constitutional democracieswith unicameral legislatures. See THE 1993 INFORMATION
PLEASE ALMANAC 172-296 (Otto Johnson et al. eds., 1993).
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humility requires, then, is a claim about the background understanding of
what it is the author is being held responsible for. Against this back-
ground, humility counsels the translator to stay clear of presuppositions that
touch the author's responsibility.
The role of humility is tied to a particular institutional or practical
understanding-an understanding of the institution within which translation
functions-and whether humility is required depends upon that under-
standing. A two-step fidelitist could embrace structural humility if there
were a reason to assure a clear division of labor between the author
(Congress or the Founders) and the translator (judges). And of course it
is not absurd to claim that our legal culture requires precisely this division.
If any part of the agency conception of judges is correct-the presupposi-
tion, remember, of the enterprise of fidelity itself333-it follows there is
something the principal is to do that the agent should not. And if so, it
would follow that there would be a protected domain of judgments that a
translator should not invade. The question becomes how best to identify
and insulate this protected domain.
As a first step to identifying the domain of protected presuppositions
that humility requires judges to ignore, let me give these presuppositions
a name. Those presuppositions that humility requires the judge to ignore
I will call "political." The intuition behind the category should be
obvious-these are presuppositions that, between the judicial and legislative
functions, seem clearly to be within the domain of the legislative. But a
definition more precise than this is hard to conclude. One attempt,
suggested by Roberto Unger, would focus upon what it was those who con-
structed the original text considered themselves to be battling over.
Presuppositions within that terrain constitute the political, and without it,
nonpolitical.3' But I want to explore a second way of conceiving of the
distinction between political and nonpolitical presuppositions, one that
focuses more upon our collective sense about the nature of the presupposi-
tion. This collective sense is, of course, not natural or unchangeable; I
rely only upon it not seeming changeable at the moment.
By political I mean just this. A presupposition is a fact or belief that,
were it otherwise, would have resulted in a different text. Obviously, there
are at least two very different senses in which a presupposition "could have
been otherwise." One is that it could have been false, though once thought
to be true (e.g., a conception of law as naturalistic). Another is that it
could no longer be thought desirable or best. By political presupposition,
I mean a presupposition that is acknowledged because, in the sense just
333. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
334. Roberto M. Unger, Lecture I of the Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School (1987) (tape on
file with the Texas Law Review).
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described, it is best rather than true. The claim of structural humility is
that such presuppositions should not be accounted for in translation.
This distinction, between presuppositions that are acknowledged
because they are viewed as best and those that are acknowledged because
they are viewed as true, is no doubt hard to maintain. For of course what
is viewed as best is a function of what is viewed as true; and what is
viewed as true is a function of what is viewed as best. More importantly,
the distinction rests not on some philosophical claim about the nature of the
presuppositions themselves, but rather on the rhetoric about those presup-
positions contingently available to speakers within a particular legal culture.
My claim is just that at a particular time, there will be some propositions
that will be considered truth propositions, and some that will be considered
value propositions, and that the more a proposition seems to be a value
proposition rather than a truth proposition, the less the translator con-
strained by structural humility may account for it.
We have already seen one relatively clear example of this distinction
when discussing current antitrust doctrine.'3 5 As I said there, if we
conclude that consumer welfare was not the dominant political idea moti-
vating the framers of the Sherman Act, then we must either conclude that
the courts have not acted with fidelity in construing the act as they
have,"3 ' or that Congress gave to the courts the power to select which
value the Sherman Act was to protect. Tracking these values would be an
example of translation that accounted for political presuppositions in the
sense I describe, and the claim is that structural humility may provide
reasons why a court should resist such assignments.
But consider a second example that may make the distinction more
clearly.337
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,38 the Supreme Court revis-
ited the question of how long police could hold a warrantless arrestee
335. Supra section V(B)(10).
336. Whether the courts have acted sensibly is a separate question.
337. A third example may be Justice Douglas's notion of the different conceptions of equal
protection fit:
We agree... with [Holmes] that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Likewise, the Equal Protection
Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era. In determining what lines
are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of
equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was
at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights. Notions of what constitutes
equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.
Harper v. Virginia State Ed. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
The two-step constrained by structural humility would argue that if it is a conception of equal
protection that has changed, and if the conception has changed for political reasons, then the Court
should not adjust. the constitutional notion of equal protection to track this change.
338. 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).
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without presenting her to a magistrate. Earlier, in Gerstein v. Pugh,339
the Court had held that the presentation must be made "promptly"; the
question presented in Riverside was how "prompt" was promptly
enough.' 1 In a closely divided vote, the Court held that forty-eight
hours was presumptively promptly enough. Over a stinging dissent by
Justice Scalia, the Court, through Justice O'Connor, held that as long as
the reasons for the delay of forty-eight hours were not illegitimate, forty-
eight hours was not an unreasonable delay.' 2
There are at least two distinct issues raised by Riverside: first, what
reasons justify a delay, and second, given a delay for those reasons, how
long can that delay be? What is striking about the case for our purposes
is the sharp line drawn between these issues: for the former question-what
reasons for delay are justifiable-reflects what I have called a political
presupposition (what is best), and the latter question-how long can police
delay when faced with justifiable reasons-reflects something close to what
I have called a nonpolitical presupposition (what is a reasonable amount of
delay for these reasons).
In his dissent, Scalia made the point most sharply. The Fourth
Amendment had constitutionalized the common law, Scalia said, at least to
the extent that the only legitimate reasons for a delay in presenting a
warrantless arrestee to a magistrate were those reasons recognized at the
common law.' Those reasons included only the time necessary to bring
the arrestee to a magistrate, and not, for example, the delay necessary to
conduct further investigation.
But while the reasons for delay were frozen at the time of the
Founding, such that no further reasons or justifications for delay would
survive, the length of the delay allowed by those reasons was a function
not of what the delay would have been at the common law, but a function
of what the delay should reasonably be today, given today's technology.
Scalia put it much better than could I:
The Court dismisses reliance upon the common law on the
ground that its "vague admonition" to the effect that "an arresting
officer must bring a person arrested without a warrant before a
judicial officer 'as soon as he reasonably can' provides no more
support than does [Gerstein's] "promptly after arrest" language ....
339. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
340. Id. at 125; see also Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1665 ("In [Gerstein], this Court held that the
Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an
extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest.").
341. Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1665.
342. Id. at 1671.
343. Id. at 1672 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
344. Id.
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This response totally confuses the... constitutionally permissible
reasons for delay with... the question of an outer time limit [for
a delay]. The latter-how much time, given the functions the officer
is permitted to complete beforehand, constitutes "as soon as he
reasonably can" . .. -is obviously a function not of the common
law but of helicopters and telephones. But what those delay-legit-
imating functions are-whether, for example, they include further
investigation of the alleged crime. .. -is assuredly governed by the
common law .... W
Given the legitimate reasons for a delay, set, again, by the common
law, it was not the common law that set how long those legitimate reasons
could delay. As Scalia said, that turned not on the technology of the
common law, but on the technology of today-on "helicopters and tele-
phones."'
The distinction Scalia points to here is the distinction between the
political and nonpolitical presuppositions that I adverted to above.
Choosing which reasons were legitimate was to choose or acknowledge
presuppositions because they were best at the time. Choosing how long
those reasons could reasonably delay a presentation was to choose or
acknowledge presuppositions because they were true at the time. When the
latter presuppositions no longer are true, then the conclusions that rest
upon them must be translated. Structural humility would suggest, how-
ever, that the translator should not adjust presuppositions that change be-
cause they are no longer viewed as best.' 7 Tracking and accommodating
changed presuppositions about what is best is a task assigned, the two-step
could argue, to political branches.'
345. Id. at 1673 n.1 (Scalia, I., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
346. Id. (Scalia, I., dissenting).
347. Now again I confess the wholly artificial sense of the distinction between presuppositions
selected because best, and those acknowledged because true. Riverside itself reveals the inherent
ambiguity: for certainly the reasons viewed as best were in fact viewed as best in part because of how
long it took to satisfy them. It could then be argued that if, for example, a simple procedure that ad-
vanced an investigation could be performed in fifteen minutes, that a view of what reasons were "best"
would also include that investigative procedure. Nonetheless, the separation in function between our
understanding of the judicial and political branches leads to a separation in translations: the political
branches-sinceunconstrained by the limitation of translation-will effect a different translation of the
original meaning; and the judicial branches, since constrained by this structural limitation of humility,
will effect translations that do not fully account for the change in presuppositions. That, it could be
argued, is the whole idea: where political ideals change, where the view of the good is transformed,
then political machinery is to be invoked, and thus is the judicial machinery disempowered.
348. Here again Scalia may be helpful:
A democratic society does not ... need constitutional guarantees to insure that its laws
will reflect "current values." Elections take care of that quite well. The purpose of
constitutional guarantees ... is precisely to prevent the law from reflecting certain
changes in original values that the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally
undesirable.
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To the extent, then, that a presupposition is a presupposition because
it is acknowledged as best rather than because it is acknowledged as true,
structural humility would suggest the translator not account for changes in
such presuppositions, and this again for reasons internal to the particular
institution of judicial review.
If structural humility were the practice of the two-step fidelitist, then
it would provide us a way to distinguish the practice of the two-step fidel-
itist from the practice of others who have at times invoked something like
the rhetoric of translation. Such a practice of fidelity would not be a
practice by which one derives the "perfect constitution"349 because it
would not adjust for flawed political judgments even if flaws were recog-
nized. Nor would it transform the Constitution to accord to the current
"best moral theory" 3' because, again, some moral presuppositions would
be political in the sense described above. Nor would it discard a statute
merely because unsupported by a current congressional majority351 since
Scalia, supra note 77, at 862 (emphasis in original); see also Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1038
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("IT]he identification of 'modem problems' to be remedied
is quintessentially legislative rather than judicial business. . . . [R]emedies are to be sought through
democratic change rather than through judicial pronouncementsthat the Constitution now prohibits what
it did not prohibit before."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1984); State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514, 517
(Del. 1963) (arguing that whether whipping is constitutional should not be determined by the judiciary,
but rather by the legislature, which can reflect the will of the people about the meaning of "cruel and
unusual").
349. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 357-58 (1981)
(criticizing those who uniformly derive "perfect" results from the Constitution).
350. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 397-99 (1986) (positing a system of "constitutional
integrity," in which judges base their decision on the best available interpretation of American
constitutional text and practice as a whole, an interpretation that explicitly includes political morality).
Note, too, that in this way the approach of the two-step is distinct from Eskridge's. Eskridge does not
attempt to distinguish among the kind of changes that empower a court to permit a statute to "evolve"-
in his scheme, the change could be factual or not. Nor is he concerned with the need to assure some
form of constancy in meaning across such evolution. See Eskridge, supra note 32, at 321-22 (arguing
that "under any rigorous theory of statutory interpretation, legislative supremacy not only tolerates, but
requires judges to interpret statutes dynamically-that is, in ways not contemplated by the original
drafters"); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1479 (1987) (insisting that statutes should be interpreted "dynamically," that is, in light of their
present societal, political, and legal contexts). But what distinguishes an approach of translation from
other dynamic theories is the attempt to limit the kinds of facts that justify the interpretation's evolution.
While the approach here is certainly "dynamic," it is dynamic in its effort to preserve meaning rather
than evolve. If evolution means advancing politics or morality, then the translator wants to remain
backward. Such advances are the domain of political, not judicial, departments.
351. Compare CALABPESI, supra note 32, at 118 (discerning that one option when deciding who
should bear the burden of inertia in lawmaking is to force legislation to be reapproved to remain in
force) with William H. Rehnquist, The Notion ofa Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 696-97
(1976) ("A mere change in public opinion since the adoption of the Constitution, unaccompanied by
a constitutional amendment, should not change the meaning of the Constitution."). Of course, that was
precisely the Court's justification for the change the Court undertook two Terms ago in Payne v.
Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991) (stating that "social consensus" about the death penalty's
relation to certain offenses is a limit imposed by the Eighth Amendment).
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this is the core of any political presupposition. The product of the fidelitist
is not guaranteed to be the best possible political product, and, humility
would suggest, an important measure of the integrity of the practice is the
extent to which it permits blemishes to remain, left for the political branch
to correct.
It is particularly instructive to compare the practice of the two-step
fidelitist and the practice described by Dworkin as "Law as Integrity."352
For Dworkin, much of the practice of the judge of integrity is the practice
of translation so far described.353 The judge is to make sense of a past
practice through the dimension of "fit" first.35" But always, and essen-
tially, there is a gap: a question that does not fit past practice, and hence
a question that the judge must face, as it were, on her own. Here,
Dworkin suggests, the judge is to resolve the question in light of the "best
moral theory" then existing, resolving it in the way enlightened moral
sensibility would then resolve it.355
The two-step fidelitist would reject Dworkin's conception. 56 Al-
though the two-step agrees that at times there are gaps, she is not allowed
to make changes that turn on changing or current moral or political presup-
positions. Tracking morality, or political correctness, is the duty of the
political branch; structural humility, the duty of the translative branch.357
In this way, at least, the approach sketched here is distinct from Calabresi's far more ambitious
and insightful effort. It is distinct in a second way as well. Calabresi does not engage the possibility
that fidelity requires change when presuppositions change. He presumes, along with the traditional de-
bate, that change based on changed presuppositions is just bad interpretation. Such an approach, he
suggests, does "violence" to legislative intent or language and to "the core of honest interpretation."
CALABRESt, supra note 32, at 35.
352. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 350, at 176-275.
353. Dworkin describes, for example, an "aesthetic hypothesis" that guides and constrains the
practice of interpretation, distinguishing interpretation from "change." See RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 149 (1985).
354. See DWORKIN, supra note 350, at 255 (noting that "[c]onvictions about fit will provide a
rough threshold requirement that an interpretation of some part of the law must meet if it is to be
eligible at all").
355. See id. at 255-56 (noting that if more than one interpretation survives the "fit" inquiry, the
judge "must choose between eligible interpretations by asking which shows the community's structure
of institutions and decisions ... in a better light from the standpoint of political morality").
356. The two-step would also reject similar conceptions, such as those discussed in Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (tracing how interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause has changed throughout history); Robert W. Bennett, The Mission of Moral
Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 647, 647-48 (1985) (comparing constitutional
interpretations that call for "moral reevaluation and possible moral growth" in only individual rights
cases with those calling for such moral interpretation in all cases); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 705 (1975) ("It seems to me that the courts do
appropriately apply values not articulated in the constitutional text, and appropriately apply them in de-
termining the constitutionality of legislation."); Sandalow, supra note 32, at 1053 ("The values that
have informed decisions under the equal protection clause, as under the due process clause, are those
that each generation has thought appropriate to its time.").
357. From this assertion flow thewell-knownrefrains. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra
note 32, at 818 ("It is not the judge's job to keep a statute up to date in the sense of making it reflect
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Structural humility requires that the judge maintain an old-fashioned obsti-
nacy to questions in that gap, in part adopting a practice that is the inverse
of Dworkin's, by resolving the question as if the political presuppositions
were as they were when the text being applied was authored-willfully
blind to the currently best moral theory, and embracing instead the original
moral or political theory, at least where not later altered by the political
branch. Again, the translator's duty is to carry over the warts; the author's
or her assign's duty is to erase them. In this way the practice of the two-
step could stand between the originalist and the phantom the originalist
most forcefully attacks-the proctor of that "continuing national seminar
S.. in moral philosophy."35 From the perspective of the two-step
fidelitist, both the originalist and the Dworkinian are infidels.
Finally, we should be clear about one important restriction upon the
limit of structural humility. Compare the following two ways in which
moral values may underlie a particular text. In the first, a legislature
proscribes an act because it is considered immoral-fornication, for
example. In the second, a legislature delegates to a court the task of
enforcing a law that embraces explicitly current moral understandings-the
Mann Act, for example, which forbade transporting a "woman or girl" to
engage in a group of listed activities or "any other immoral practice,"
could be understood as a command to track what purposes are now deemed
immoral.359 In the first case, humility would counsel that a translating
court ignore the changed views about the morality of the proscribed act-if,
for example, fornication was no longer considered immoral, humility
would counsel the court ignore that change.' In the second case, humil-
ity would have no necessary role. For in the second case, the command
includes updating to account for changed moral views, and to update
according to that command is not to make the statute "better"; rather it is
simply to keep the statute the same. The limit to this practice would be a
limit of separation of powers, not humility.
contemporary values; it is his job to imagine as best he can how the legislators who enacted the statute
would have wanted it applied to situations that they did not foresee.").
358. Gerard E. Lynch, Constitutional Law as Moral Philosophy, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 537, 549
(1984) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1982)).
359. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421 historical notes (1988). This language was removed in 1986. Id.
360. This analysis is distinct from the analysis pointed to by Daniel Farber when discussing the
cy pres doctrine., Farber, supra note 32, at 310. Farber discusses Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm.,
Inc. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982), in which the court "declined to enforce a clear
congressional mandate that homosexuals be excluded from entry into the country because Congress had
acted on the outmoded understanding that homosexuality was a psychiatric disorder." Farber, supra
note32, at 310 n.149. One could distinguish a changed view about the morality of homosexuality from
a changed view about its pathology. Humility would constrain accounting for the former change, but
not the latter.
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Structural humility thus constrains the practice of the interpreter, again
for reasons internal to the practice of the institution within which trans-
lation functions. As sketched above, the constraint would limit the range
of presuppositions that the translator could account for in a translation.
The translator may account for all presuppositions-save the political." 1
B. Translative Limits: Capacity
Thus far the limits on the translator's practice have derived from the
nature of the presuppositions accounted for: structural humility limits the
range of presuppositions because it is inappropriate for a court to account
for this type of fact. But inappropriateness of type does not exhaust the
reasons that a translator may have for refusing to effect a translation. Even
if a presupposition is of a type that is appropriate for a translator to ac-
count, the very judgment required in the translation may be far too com-
plex for the translator to complete. This possibility suggests the second
dimension of humility-one that looks to the translating institution itself
and limits the scope of presuppositions because the kind of judgment
required would exceed the institutioi's ability.
This second limitation of humility, then, is a limitation of capacity, a
recognition of the inability of a court as currently structured to account for
certain kinds of changes in presuppositions, either because the material at
issue is itself too complex, or because the resources necessary to track
them are too great. While the plea of incapacity has been a frequent one
over the courts' history,362 and one we have already seen when discussing
the Tenth Amendment, 3" it is nonetheless a persistent (and perhaps exag-
gerated) one, and its persistence suggests its possible place in the two-step's
analysis.
Here is just one example. One way to understand the Court's unwil-
lingness to police the boundaries of interstate commerce is the Court's
incapacity to make judgments about the actual effects of legislation on
interstate commerce. Once beyond the categories of the nineteenth-century
formalist, the Court quickly saw, as Cardozo warned, that every subject of
regulation would eventually have some effect on interstate commerce, so
361. In this way, the two-step constrained by a practice of structural humility may resemble the
method of originalism endorsed by Robert Bork. Bork concedes the need to permit constitutional law
to "evolve" to adjust to, among other things, changing technology, but resists evolution to adjust to
changes in politics. See BORK, supra note 57, at 167-70; see also Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,
995-96 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, I., concurring) (equating changes in First Amendment libel doctrine (in
response to a changing culture) to changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine (m response to the
technological invention of wiretapping)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1984).
362. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 581-82 (1946) (recounting the
plaintiffs' argument that any decision as to immunity from federal income tax is beyond the capacity
of the courts because it "brings fiscal and political factors into play").
363. Supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
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that in principle no clear line could be drawn. Judge Posner describes Car-
dozo's view:
Every economic activity, however local, affects interstate commerce
because of the chain of substitutions that connects all activities in a
national economy. But Cardozo recognized that to infer from this
that Congress could regulate all local activity would wreck the
balance between state and federal regulatory power that the
Constitutionhad struck in empowering Congress to regulate interstate
and foreign-not all-commerce. He thought a line should be drawn
that would, however crudely, balance the competing values of
nationalism and localism.3 6'
It would seem to follow from this, were fidelity the Court's sole aim,
that the Court would strive, as Cardozo counseled, to find some workable
line dividing interstate from intrastate commerce, if only to find some way
to preserve the Constitution's division of power. Yet, since the New Deal,
the Court has abstained from just such policing, 3  no doubt in part
because of the political nature of the judgment made (a reason of structural
humility), but also perhaps because of the complexity of the judgment
required (a reason of capacity). Under the latter reading, the Court was
unwilling to second-guess Congress's determination, in part because it was
in no better position to judge the actual economic effects of legislation that
form the predicate for Congress's action than was Congress itself.
Whether or not Congress could or did make the judgment, for the Court
to make it would require it to engage an inquiry far beyond its institutional
ability. Or at least the Court could so claim. And if this was the justifi-
cation for its refusal to engage in substantive review of the limits on
Congress's power, then this refusal would constitute a defense of necessity
to the charge of infidelity-a refusal grounded in incapacity.
One final but critical feature distinguishing this type of humility must
be noted. Humility grounded in incapacity is contingent in a way that
humility grounded in the nature of the presuppositions accounted for is not.
If fidelity is constrained by a limit of incapacity, then the fidelitist has a
strong argument for institutions that eliminate this limitation of capacity,
and thereby advance an objective of fidelity. But without this remedy, the
limitation based on capacity provides a second way in which the structure
of the judiciary limits the scope of fidelity.
364. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 122 (1990).
365. The Court abandoned its earlier attempts to make distinctions between intrastate and interstate
commerce when it adopted the economic effects test for Commerce Clause questions in 1937. See
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 40 (1937) (noting that, for purposes of deciding
the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act as applied to a steel plant's labor practices,
the relevant question is the effect of the labor practices on interstate commerce).
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C. Two-Step Fidelity: The Model Summarized
We are in a position to draw together the model of two-step fidelity.
Both the one-step and two-step fidelitist begin the practice of fidelity
with a contextualized understanding of the text being read. For both, the
question is, "What was the meaning of the text when written?" Unlike the
one-step, however, the two-step is sensitive to the effect of context in both
the context of writing and the context of reading, or the context where the
"text" is the application. Thus in the two-step's view, fidelity requires that
the meaning of the application in the context of reading be as close as
possible to the meaning of an original application in the context of writing.
Thus does the two-step adopt a practice designed to preserve meaning
across contexts, and that practice I have called translation.
Translation moves in two steps. First, the two-step becomes familiar
with both the context of writing and the context of application, so that she
has a sense of what I have called the character of each. Second, she seeks
an equivalent in the application context to the original application in the
authoring context. To identify those cases where a translation must be
made, she adopts a method of analysis. First, she identifies changes in
presuppositions between the two contexts. (Again, not all changes are
changes in a presupposition; only a change that would have resulted in a
different text in the originating context counts as a change in a presup-
position.) And if a presupposition has changed, then second, she may be
required to accommodate that change, by making the smallest change
possible in the outcome or reading to preserve the most possible from the
original context.
May, and not must. For despite a changing presupposition, the trans-
lator may be required to do nothing. A principle of humility may require
her to ignore the changed presupposition, either if it is what I have
described as a political presupposition, or if accounting for the change of
that presupposition would exceed the institutional capacity of the two-step
translator. Either way, values other than fidelity might trump that ideal of
fidelity, and for these values, the two-step must allow the text translated to
fall out of tune.
VII. Conclusion
Readings of the Constitution have changed, but standing alone, that
says nothing about fidelity. Readings of the Constitution have remained
the same, but again, standing alone, that says nothing about fidelity.
Changed readings are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of infidel-
ity or fidelity. So much I have tried to argue.
There is a practice of interpretation that could conceivably meet a
legal system's demands for fidelity. That practice is one I have called
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translation. Translation is distinct from one-step originalism. For reasons
tied to how meaning changes across contexts, one-step originalism as a
practice must systematically defeat any ideal of fidelity. Blind to the effect
of context on meaning, originalism allows context to change constitutional
meaning.
Unlike one-step originalism, arguments from translation accommodate
changes in context so as to preserve meaning across contexts. These argu-
ments are familiar to the law, and have been made by jurists spanning the
political spectrum. Where they have been limited, I have identified two
types of limits, structural humility and humility of capacity, that may ex-
plain these constraints-constraints serving values other than fidelity. But
beyond these, or to the extent the fidelitist could escape these, the fidelitist,
I have suggested, would translate.
Thus one-step fidelity is distinct from two-step fidelity, but depending
upon the constraints of humility, it might be that we consider both to be
forms of originalism. What two-step fidelity adds to our ordinary under-
standing of originalism is a way to understand how originalism can be
dynamic without it being unfaithful. What it also may add is a way to dis-
tinguish the emerging originalist jurisprudence of the middle Justices of the
current Supreme Court. For what distinguishes the practice of originalism
of at least Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, and perhaps Justice Souter,3"
is its attention to issues that I would identify as issues of translation.
Justice Kennedy, for example, has attacked the one-step originalist position
of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist on the meaning of the "public
forum" doctrine, arguing:
In a country where most citizens travel by automobile, and parks all
too often become locales for crime rather than social intercourse, our
failure to recognize the possibility that new types of government
366. Consider his quite striking description of Brown in his confirmation hearings:
There certainly was no intent whatsoever in the enactment of the 14th Amendment to
bring about school desegregation. And if in fact the meaning or the guarantee of equal
protection were confined to specific intent, then of course, Brown... would have been
a wrong decision. But my interpretive position is not that original intent is controlling,
but that original meaning is controlling.
The Nomination of David H. Souter to Be Assocate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 101 st Cong., 2d Ses. 161 (1990).
He later continued:
The majority who decided Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 accepted as a matter of fact that in
the context in which they were applying the 14th Amendment there could be separateness
and equality. Whatever else we may see in Brown v. Board, there is one thing that we
see very clearly and that is that the Court was saying you may no longer ... ignore the
evidence of non-tangible effects. When you accept that evidence, then you see that you
cannot have separateness and equality.
Id. at 303.
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property may be appropriate forums for speech will lead to a serious
curtailment of our expressive activity. 6 7
Likewise, and perhaps more significantly, in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter offered an account of why
two past Supreme Court reversals-Brown's reversal of Plessy, and the
Court's change after the New Deal-were justified as acts of judicial fidel-
ity in the face of changed understanding of fact.' As I discuss with
respect to Brown 369 to see such a change as nonetheless a change of
fidelity requires an understanding consistent with the two-step's, and
inconsistent with the one-step's. The one-step can only see the reversals
of Brown and the New Deal as infidelity, however that infidelity is
justified.
Two-step fidelity may then help map the currently emerging conserva-
tive middle. But does it show whether we should be fidelitists? For if
anything, by sketching what fidelity is not (originalism), and suggesting
something it might be (translation), we have only made plain an intuition
present from the start of this Article: that perhaps the best picture of a
practice of fidelity is a picture of a practice beyond our reach. We may
understand enough to see what fidelity would be, but also enough to see
why it is beyond what we could hope to achieve.
To put these aspects of skepticism into context, we must distinguish
between two very different uses of arguments from translation, one nega-
tive, the other positive. The negative is this: We find ourselves now
surrounded by a myriad of interpretations of a Constitution generations old.
Some of them were interpretations of fidelity, some certainly not. The
question for a fidelitist reviewing any past interpretation is whether it is an
interpretation of fidelity. But as should be clear, fidelity is not binary.
There will be more and less faithful, not faithful and unfaithful, readings.
So in evaluating a reading, evaluation must always proceed by comparison
(i.e., is this reading more faithful than that?).
367. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2717 (1992)
(Kennedy, I., concurring). According to the one-step position adopted by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
public forums-that is, those in which the government is most limited in the regulations it may
impose--werejust those and only those traditionally considered public forums. See International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706 (1992).
368. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2812-13 (1992). The Casey Court noted that
during the Lochner era, the Court's decisions regarding economic regulation were based on a laissez-
faire theory of contractual freedom; the eventual repudiation of Lochner and related cases, the Court
said, was justified by "the clear demonstration that the facts of economic life were different than those
previously assumed." Id. at 2812. Similarly, the Casey Court noted that the holding in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), was based on a factual assumption-that separate did not imply
inferiority-that was repudiated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Casey, 112
S. Ct. at 2813.
369. Supra section V(B)(9).
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In this comparison, the originalist presumed that the original reading
would always trump any later interpretation. We have seen enough to see
why this is not necessarily true. Indeed, as we get further removed from
any original context, even a presumption in favor of an original reading
may disappear: We may be so removed from that context that their applica-
tions presumptively may be not our own. But regardless of any presump-
tion, the originalist's restoration must be compared with the current
reading, and the question becomes whether the alternative is more faithful
than the status quo.
Well, again, the originalist reading will not be more faithful simply
because it was the original application. Its claim to fidelity must be made
by showing that it-though identical with the original application-is the
best translated application in light of the many changes in context between
the original time and now. Faced with such a burden, the originalist
aiming to restore original meaning faces a difficult task. As the changes
in context multiply, the difficulty of that showing increases as well, and
with increased difficulty goes a decreased likelihood of success. The
originalist fails to demonstrate the original is still the faithful reading
because demonstrating that an alternative is a better translation becomes an
impossibly difficult standard to meet.
This suggests the sense in which translation can be used defensively
as a shield against a current crusade of restoration organized under the
banner of originalism and fidelity. But, in the same way, the argument
suggests the weakness of translation as a tool of fidelity used positively-
not as a shield against the crusaders, but as a sword against an interpretive
status quo.
For the problem is always that the task of translation itself is despair-
ingly difficult. To translate we must speak another language, which for
constitutional lawyers is the language of the eighteenth century, synthesized
with the restructuring of the nineteenth century. "Language" is more than
words people use; it is their ideals, their hopes, their prejudices, their
enlightenments-in short, it is their world. As the distance to that world
increases, so too does the difficulty of the task of translation, not just in the
sense that it becomes more and more difficult to understand who the
Framers were, but also in the sense that it becomes more and more difficult
to accept what they were about. Wittgenstein wrote, "If a lion could talk,
we could not understand him." 3" Can we anymore understand a genera-
tion for whom the Nobility Clause7 l was an organizing ideal of original
370. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 223 (G.E.M. Anscombetrans.,
1953).
371. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States
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design? At some point does it no longer make sense to speak of trans-
lation, for at some point the contexts become so different that any under-
standing between them is lost? And if so, then at some point we must
decide whether the enterprise itself-the enterprise of fidelity-continues
to make sense.
To this skepticism, there are two standard responses. One is Justice
Jackson's. Finding himself in the middle of the constitutional storm over
the New Deal, Justice Jackson wrote:
True, the task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of
Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the
eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with
the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-
confidence. These principles grew in soil which also produced a phi-
losophy that the individual was the center of society, that his liberty
was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints, and
that government should be entrusted with few controls and only the
mildest supervision over men's affairs. We must transplant these
rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or principle of non-
interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social
advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of
society and through expanded and strengthened governmental
controls. These changed conditions often deprive precedents of
reliability and cast us more than we would choose upon our own
judgment. But we act in these matters not by authority of our
competence but by force of our commissions. We cannot, because
of modest estimates of our competence in such specialties as public
education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the
function of this Court when liberty is infringed.3"
In Jackson's view, the Court had no choice. Its job, however diffi-
cult, was precisely this "translating" even though it acts "not by authority
of [its] competence" as translators "but by force of our commissions " '
as judges. However impossible, however underdetermined, however poli-
tical, the Court must, Jackson thought, work to keep the Constitution alive.
The second tack is simply to confess the impossibility and look else-
where for constitutional authority, or for substitutes for constitutional
authority. This was Brest's response after sketching the outlines of a
practice of translation and concluding that any such practice was too hope-
lessly complex.374 Because, Brest argued, the counsel of fidelity is so
372. West Virginia State Bd. of Edue. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943) (emphasis
added).
373. Id. at 640.
374. Brest, supra note 32, at 234-37.
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unpredictable and unknowable, better to fasten constitutional norms to
ideals more familiar and predictable.
Maybe so. But a third response is also possible, one that looks for
ways to rekindle constitutional authority. We come from a tradition when
ordinary citizens, as Paine described, would carry copies of the Constitu-
tion in their pockets and refer to them in ordinary political debate.37 We
live in a time when almost sixty percent of the American public cannot
even identify the Bill of Rights.37 If the document has become so out
of date that its meaning is no longer plain to all-if it has become impos-
sible to imagine a world where ordinary people carry the Constitution in
their pockets-then perhaps it is time to restore its meaning by, as Justice
Stevens has recently suggested, amending the text to preserve the
meaning." Perhaps, that is, it is time to rewrite our Constitution,
written in a language long lost and forgotten, with ideals and expectations
too far from the ordinary ken of constitutional readers, in a language we
once again understand, with a meaning that is once again our own. We
could struggle to understand what is the most faithful translation, but at
some point the question becomes why? We are like the person who finds
himself at the store, with a list he can no longer make out, struggling to
reconstruct what it must have been that he wanted to buy; at some point it
may make sense simply to decide again what he wants, to rewrite the list,
to give up the obsession that it must be the same as the old list, to move
on.
If fidelity is translation, then perhaps the lesson from the great
distance in language is that we have come to the point when a translation
of the whole would give us more than translation piece by piece could ever
promise. And if not translation of the whole-if not an effort to recapture
and restate constitutional meanings that would be ours-then perhaps the
lesson of the great distance that separates us from the Framers is that
fidelity cannot be our aim. Or at least it cannot be our aim anymore.
375. In discussing the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Paine writes,
It was the political bible of the state. Scarcely a family was without it. Every member
of the government had a copy; and nothing was more common, when any debate arose
on the principle of a bill, or on the extent of any species of authority, than for the
members to take the printed constitution out of their pocket, and read the chapter with
which such matter in debate was connected.
THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 182 (Heritage Press 1961) (1791).
376. Ruth Marcus, Constitution Confuses Most Americans; Public Ill-Infonned on U.S. Blueprint,
WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1987, at A13.
377. See John Paul Stevens, The Bill ofRights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 13,
19-24 (1992).
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